COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fifth Session
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE NINETY-FOURTH MEETING
Held at Lake Success, New York,
on Friday, 20 May, 1949, at 10.30 a.m.

CONTENTS:
Draft international covenant on human rights (E/806, E/CH.4/158,
E/CH.4/208) (discussion continued)

Chairman: Mrs. F. D. ROOSEVELT (United States of America)
Rapporteur: Mr. C. MALIK (Lebanon)
Members:
Mr. JOCKEL (Australia)
Mr. LERBAU (Belgium)
Mr. SAGUES (Chile)
Mr. CHA (China)
Mr. SORENSEN (Denmark)
Mr. CASSIN (France)
Mr. GARCIA BAUER (Guatemala)
Mrs. MEHTA (India)
Mr. INGLES (Philippines)
Mr. KOVALenko (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic)
Mr. PAVLOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
Miss BOWIE (United Kingdom)
Mr. VILFAN (Yugoslavia)

Any corrections of this record should be submitted in writing, in
either of the working languages (English or French), and within two
working days, to Mr. E. Delavenay, Director, Official Records Division,
Room F-552, Lake Success. Corrections should be accompanied by or
incorporated in a letter, on headed notepaper, bearing the appropriate
symbol number and enclosed in an envelope marked "Urgent". Corrections
can be dealt with more speedily by the services concerned if delegations
will be good enough also to incorporate them in a mimeographed copy of
the record.
Observer from the Commission on the Status of Women

Miss KENYON
Representative of a specialized agency

Mr. EVANS
Consultants from non-governmental organizations

International Labour Organization

Category A
Miss SENDER
Mrs. MEAGHER

American Federation of Labor
World Federation of Trade Unions

Category B
Mr. STEIDER
Mr. FRIEDMAN
Mrs. VANDERBEG
Mr. CRUICKSHANK
Miss SCHAVER
Miss MILLARD
Mr. GROSSMAN

Commission of Churches on International Affairs
Co-Ordinating Board of Jewish Organizations
International Alliance of Women
International Council of Commerce and Production
International Union of Catholic Women's Leagues
Women's International Democratic Federation
World Jewish Congress

Secretariat:
Mr. J.P. HUMFREY
Mr. E. LAWSON

Representative of the Secretary-General
Secretary of the Commission


Article 5 (discussion continued)

The CHAIRMAN reminded the Commission that it had been agreed that the vote on article 5 of the draft international covenant on human rights would not be taken until a sub-committee had taken all views into consideration and, in default of full agreement, had produced concrete proposals upon which votes could be taken.

Mr. SCHEIBNIEK (Denmark) thought that the reference to lawful acts of war in paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b), of the joint United Kingdom and Lebanese amendment (E/CN.4/204) might be inappropriate. It might be advisable that the covenant should not contain provisions which might modify existing international conventions; that had been suggested in the French draft proposed for article 4 (E/CN.4/157). A similar /objection
objection might apply to other articles of the covenant, particularly to article 11, paragraph 2, which dealt with the right to leave any country -- a right which was usually suspended in war time -- and to the Australian amendment to article 9 (E/CN.4/212). While, however, it might not be advisable to include such references in the covenant, the Commission must be prepared to face the possibility that war might break out again.

The CHAIRMAN, speaking as representative of the United States of America, agreed with the representative of Denmark, but thought that, although the possibility of war must not be disregarded, it was the duty of the Commission on Human Rights and of the United Nations in general to proceed in the hope that there would be no war. Sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2 in the joint amendment required far more exhaustive consideration since its scope appeared to be very much broader than the authors of that amendment had intended. The Sub-Committee should examine that paragraph with the greatest attention.

Mrs. MERITA (India) agreed with the Danish representative that facts must be faced, but the phrase contained in the sub-paragraph under discussion was far too broad, because it covered many aspects of war, which, while legally justifiable, could not, in her opinion, be justified on humanitarian grounds. Events such as the atom bombing of Hiroshima or the bombing of civilians should not appear to be condoned. That sub-paragraph, therefore, should be deleted or greatly altered.

Mr. PAULOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his country had always maintained and continued to maintain that it was perfectly possible for various social systems to coexist in amicable competition. The experience of the Second World War had shown that the achievement of co-operation between differing systems was feasible. There was no reason why similar relations should not be continued in time of peace. If certain political, diplomatic and perhaps even ideological prerequisites were fulfilled, the work of the Commission on Human Rights could be directed exclusively towards providing for conditions of lasting peace. Such an approach would require goodwill on both sides. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had given an earnest of such goodwill; the other countries must respond. The sub-paragraph under discussion, therefore, raised considerable difficulties. If it were retained, it might give the impression that the Commission was giving undue attention to the possibility of war at a time when the peoples of the world were eager for peace.

In that connexion
In that connexion, the Hague Convention, regardless of some failure in practical application, was particularly important, because its main purpose was to ensure the protection of the civil population and the respect for the lives of individuals on the battlefield. The Commission must be extremely careful to see that the international covenant on human rights contained no provision which might in any way diminish the effectiveness of the Hague Convention; rather, it should strengthen the principles embodied in it. The drafting Sub-Committee should pay particular attention to that consideration. The exception in respect of killings resulting from the performance of lawful acts of war was open to objection; he would therefore support the original text (E/306).

The CHAIRMAN proposed that the drafting Sub-Committee's membership should be broadened in order that all views might be represented. She therefore suggested that the representatives of Chile, China, France, Lebanon, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States of America should serve on it.

At the request of Miss BOWIE (United Kingdom), the CHAIRMAN added the representative of Denmark. She proposed that the Sub-Committee to draft article 5 should meet on the morning of 23 May.

It was so decided.

Article 8 (discussion continued)

Mr. MALIK (Lebanon) reminded the Commission that the United Kingdom amendment (E/4.4/202/Rev.1) and the United States alternative proposal to article 8 (E/4.4/170/Add.3) contained provisions which had been rejected by the Drafting Committee of the Commission on Human Rights. They should be examined in the light of that rejection. Paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (a) of the United Kingdom amendment should not be accepted, because it did not take into account the imposition by a court of a sentence of forced labour, a penalty regularly enforced in many countries. It appeared to refer to compulsory labour imposed upon a prisoner by the prison authorities; that, however, should not be legalized. Even if the United Kingdom delegation had intended to refer to judicial sentence of forced labour, it appeared to have avoided the direct use of the term by placing it among the exceptions. If a sentence of forced labour were intended, that should be clearly stated.

//He therefore
He therefore preferred the original text, as reproduced in paragraph 2 of the United States proposal. He could, however, accept sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) of paragraph 3 of the United Kingdom text or their variant form in paragraph 4, sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of the United States text.

Sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 3 of the United Kingdom amendment raised the most serious difficulties. The situation of conscientious objectors was a very serious one. The Lebanese delegation had brought it to the attention of the Drafting Committee and had successfully urged the inclusion of a relevant provision in the article. Although he was not in sympathy with the views of conscientious objectors, he had been impressed by their experiences. In certain countries where conscientious objectors were permitted release from military obligations, they were treated in a manner inconsistent with human dignity. They were set to compulsory labour, were paid little or nothing, and in many cases their health or sanity broke down. If the system of conscientious objection were permitted at all, the countries permitting it must honestly accept their responsibility to grant the objectors humane treatment. The United Kingdom amendment made no such stipulation. Rather than support such an inadequate treatment of the question, he would prefer the United States proposal, which did not raise that question at all. It would be more advisable, however, to adopt the original text, with its vital stipulation that conscientious objectors should receive maintenance and pay not inferior to that of the lowest rank of soldier. Such a stipulation provided at least a minimum safeguard. The adoption of that clause by the Drafting Committee had been greeted with relief by conscientious objectors throughout the world. To withdraw it at that stage would be a great disappointment to them.

With regard to the first clause of paragraph 2 in the United Kingdom amendment, he would support it if the insertion of the word "involuntary" before the word "servitude" were accepted.

Miss BOWIE (United Kingdom) accepted that insertion.

Miss BOWIE (United Kingdom) was afraid that the Lebanese representative, in speaking on the basis of what he remembered of the Drafting Committee's work, had read into the United Kingdom proposal a meaning which it did not in fact contain. The first United Kingdom proposal (E/CN.4/202) was very similar to the Drafting Committee's
Committee's text. The revised draft had been submitted only in order to meet objections raised at the Commission's previous meeting, to the effect that the former text was not altogether logical.

With regard to the question of conscientious objectors, she reminded the Commission that her country fully recognized the rights of conscientious objectors and had followed a far more liberal policy in that respect than that set forth in the Drafting Committee's text. The United Kingdom wished the principle to be included in the covenant and for that reason could not support the United States proposal for article 8. For purely drafting reasons, it considered the reference to pay made in the Drafting Committee's text inappropriate in an article dealing with compulsory labour, but the United Kingdom delegation would not vote against such a provision should the Commission wish to include it.

Mr. INGLES (Philippines) preferred paragraph 2 of the United States draft of article 8 to the other texts submitted. He could not, however, agree to the insertion of the word "involuntary" before "servitude". There must be no servitude in any form, whether involuntary or not. To qualify "servitude" in the covenant would be a step backward from the position taken in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which did not include the word "involuntary".

The phrase "except as a consequence of conviction of a crime by a competent court" used in both the United States and the Drafting Committee's texts should be retained, as it would ensure that a prisoner being held pending trial would not be required to do forced labour. Since the United Kingdom amendment would not afford the same protection, Mr. Ingles could not support that draft.

Mr. CASSIN (France) agreed with the Philippine representative that the word "involuntary" in the United States draft should be omitted. France considered freedom a fundamental human right of which a man could not be deprived even by a contract.

Referring to paragraph 2, he supported the United States and the Drafting Committee's text, both of which recognized that compulsory labour might be imposed as a consequence of a conviction of crime by a competent court. He agreed with the Indian and other delegations that a distinction should be made in that paragraph between a common criminal and a political prisoner, in the latter case forced labour was not permissible.

Before discussing paragraph 3 of the draft of article 8, the Commission should first ask the ILO representative to inform it of the
provisions of the 1930 ILO Forced Labour Convention. In that connexion, a procedural point arose. Should the draft covenant repeat or rephrase the definition of forced labour given in the existing international convention on the subject, or should it simply contain a reference to the provisions of any international conventions that might be applicable? If the first procedure were followed, would the covenant have to be amended if subsequent international conventions on forced labour were different from the existing convention? The Commission might consider it advisable to leave technical details in connexion with the protection of human rights to be set forth in international conventions drawn up by specialized agencies.

Mr. EVANS (International Labour Organization) stated that according to article 2 of the ILO Forced Labour Convention of 1930, in force among twenty-two member States of the ILO, forced labour was defined in the following terms:

"1. For the purposes of this Convention the term 'forced or compulsory labour' means all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.

"2. Provided that, for the purposes of this Convention, the term 'forced or compulsory labour' does not include --

(a) Any work or service exacted in virtue of compulsory military service laws or work of a purely military character;

(b) Any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations of the citizens of a fully self-governing country;

(c) Any work or service exacted from any person as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law, provided that the said work or service is carried out under the supervision and control of a public authority and the said person is not hired to or placed at the disposal of private individuals, companies or associations;

(d) Any work or service exacted in cases of emergency, that is to say, in the event of war or of a calamity or threatened calamity such as fire, flood, famine, earthquake, violent epidemic or epizootic disease, invasion by animal, insect or vegetable pests, and, in general, any circumstance that would endanger the existence or the well-being of the whole or part of a population;

(e) Minor communal services of a kind which, being performed by a member of the community in the direct interest of the same community, could therefore be considered as normal civic obligations incumbent upon the members of the community, provided that the members of the community or their direct representatives /should
should have the right to be consulted in regard to the need for such services."

Mr. Evans stated that, according to the Convention, while the aim was that forced labour in all its forms should be suppressed within the shortest possible period, recourse might be had to it during the transitional period for public purposes only and as an exceptional measure.

Mr. SOERENSEN (Denmark) observed that the United Kingdom text of paragraph 2 of article 3 was much broader than the Drafting Committee's text. As the United Kingdom representative had previously explained, under her text a man who had been imprisoned for refusal to support himself or his family might be required to do forced labour. That point was an important one which should be included in the Covenant. On the other hand, the argument advanced by the Philippine representative against the United Kingdom text also had weight. The United Kingdom draft might in fact be insufficiently precise.

He therefore suggested that paragraph 2 might be re-drafted along the general lines followed by the United Kingdom in its proposal for article 9 (A/CN.4/188). The new text might specifically state the grounds on which forced labour could be imposed on a prisoner -- particularly conviction by a competent court of a crime or of having refused to support himself or the persons for whom he was responsible -- and then mention the legal procedures or organs by which such labour could be imposed.

Mr. LEBEAU (Belgium), referring to the question of conscientious objectors, stressed the importance he attached to that matter. He regretted that his country, which considered a conscientious objector to be guilty of a serious violation of the law, followed a less liberal policy in that regard than the United Kingdom.

The Commission's major concern should be to ensure legal recognition of the position of the conscientious objector and of his right to fulfill his duty to his country in some way other than by military service, without fear of punishment. The reference to conscientious objectors in the United Kingdom draft was quite sufficient to set forth that fundamental right; details such as the way the conscientious objector should receive were of secondary importance and were not necessarily appropriate for inclusion in the covenant. He therefore supported the United Kingdom text.

/Mrs. MERTA (India)
should have the right to be consulted in regard to the need for such services."

Mr. Evans stated that, according to the Convention, while the aim was that forced labour in all its forms should be suppressed within the shortest possible period, recourse might be had to it during the transitional period for public purposes only and as an exceptional measure.

Mr. SORENSEN (Denmark) observed that the United Kingdom text of paragraph 2 of article 3 was much broader than the Drafting Committee's text. As the United Kingdom representative had previously explained, under her text a man who had been imprisoned for refusal to support himself or his family might be required to do forced labour. That point was an important one which should be included in the Covenant. On the other hand, the argument advanced by the Philippine representative against the United Kingdom text also had weight. The United Kingdom draft might in fact be insufficiently precise.

He therefore suggested that paragraph 2 might be re-drafted along the general lines followed by the United Kingdom in its proposal for article 9 (A/CN.4/188). The new text might specifically state the grounds on which forced labour could be imposed on a prisoner -- particularly conviction by a competent court of a crime or of having refused to support himself or the persons for whom he was responsible -- and then mention the legal procedures or organs by which such labour could be imposed.

Mr. LEBEAU (Belgium), referring to the question of conscientious objectors, stressed the importance he attached to that matter. He regretted that his country, which considered a conscientious objector to be guilty of a serious violation of the law, followed a less liberal policy in that regard than the United Kingdom.

The Commission's major concern should be to ensure legal recognition of the position of the conscientious objector and of his right to fulfill his duty to his country in some way other than by military service, without fear of punishment. The reference to conscientious objectors in the United Kingdom draft was quite sufficient to set forth that fundamental right; details such as the pay the conscientious objector should receive were of secondary importance and were not necessarily appropriate for inclusion in the covenant. He therefore supported the United Kingdom text.

/Mrs. MERTA (India)
Mrs. MERTA (India) suggested that in view of the fact that the texts submitted by the Drafting Committee, the United States and the United Kingdom were not basically very different, a small committee might be appointed to prepare a generally satisfactory draft.

She hoped that such a committee would take into consideration the Indian amendment (E/CN.4/20 and E/CN.4/206) which was designed to make a distinction between political offenders and those guilty of common crimes.

Mr. MALIK (Lebanon) stressed that the basic difference between the United States and the United Kingdom drafts was that the latter did not make clear the right of a court of law to impose forced labour. Paragraph 3(a) of that text provided that such labour might be required of a person "undergoing detention imposed by the lawful order of a court"; but in that case, the prison authorities rather than the court might impose the penalty of forced labour. Those authorities should not be free to impose such a penalty on prisoners unless a sentence to that effect had been passed by a competent court.

Referring again to the question of conscientious objectors, Mr. Malik did not agree with the United Kingdom and Belgian representatives. In some countries the principle of conscientious objection was accepted, but the life of the conscientious objector was made impossibly difficult. If the principle was accepted, then the conscientious objector must be assured, at the very least, of receiving the pay of a soldier of the lowest rank. The United Kingdom text mentioned that, in the case of conscientious objectors, services might be "exacted in virtue of laws requiring compulsory national service"; but there was no assurance that the laws in that respect would be just and reasonable. The text proposed by the Drafting Committee was not designed to require nations to accept the principle of conscientious objection, but rather to protect conscientious objectors in those countries where the principle was supposedly recognized.

Mr. Malik welcomed the statement of the United Kingdom representative that she would not vote against the provision concerning conscientious objectors in the Drafting Committee's text.

Mr. SOERENSEN (Denmark) thought the Drafting Committee's text did not make it plain that forced labour itself must be imposed only as the result of a conviction by a competent court. He therefore supported
the Indian representative's proposal that a small committee should be appointed to prepare a new draft of article 8.

With regard to conscientious objectors, he felt that the question of pay was only one of many points on which they should be protected; for example, there was the matter of hours of work or length of service. Since the problem was such a complicated one the covenant should not stress only one aspect of it. For that reason he supported the United Kingdom text.

Mr. Jockey (Australia) fully appreciated the position of the Lebanese representative in regard to conscientious objectors and would support any suitable text that would ensure decent treatment of conscientious objectors.

He asked the United Kingdom representative whether sub-paragraph 3(c) of the United Kingdom draft covered other forms of compulsory national service than the case of conscientious objectors.

Miss Bowie (United Kingdom) replied in the affirmative.

The Chairman, speaking as the United States representative, briefly explained her amendment. Paragraph 2 of that amendment spoke of "involuntary servitude" rather than simply "servitude", in order to make it quite clear that compulsory servitude was meant, rather than contractual obligations entered into voluntarily. If, however, the Commission felt that the word "servitude" alone sufficed to cover the first concept, she was prepared to withdraw the qualifying adjective.

In order to meet the Danish representative's objection and the point raised in the Indian amendment, she amended the latter part of paragraph 2 to read: "except pursuant to sentence as a consequence of a conviction of common crime by a competent court."

Paragraph 3 of the United States amendment virtually reproduced the language used in the ILO Convention to define forced or compulsory labour; that paragraph helped to make clear the meaning of the article.

Paragraph 4 set forth the exceptions to the provisions of paragraph 2 more briefly and in more general terms than did the original text; she would, however, be prepared to accept the United Kingdom proposal for that paragraph if the Commission expressed preference for it.

She had been greatly impressed by the remarks of the Lebanese representative on the subject of conscientious objectors, and could not but agree that the provision in the original text which guaranteed to them a minimum living wage was of the utmost importance. If the rights of conscientious objectors were to be respected, a living wage had to be assured first of all; other aspects of the problem might be taken care of by a process of gradual development in various countries.

/She was therefore
She was therefore ready to vote for sub-paragraph 3(a) of the original text - in preference to sub-paragraph 4(a) of her own amendment - and urged the Commission to give serious consideration to that provision.

Sub-paragraph 4(b) of the United States amendment did not differ substantially from sub-paragraph 3(c) of the United Kingdom amendment. Sub-paragraph 4(c) stated in simpler and more general language the provision of paragraph 3(c) of the original text; it was preferable to the ILO proposal (E/CN.4/156), which urged that communal services should be abolished in the shortest time possible. The covenant should deal with immediate conditions and not look too far into the future. Finally, sub-paragraph 4(d) of the United States amendment had been introduced to cover work normally performed by children in their homes.

Mr. CASSIN (France) reminded the Commission that during the debate on the Declaration of Human Rights it had been agreed that "involuntary servitude" was properly translated into French by "servitude" rather than by "servitude involontaire".

He agreed that paragraph 2 should make it clear that forced labour could not be imposed on persons not previously convicted of a common law crime, thus excluding both persons awaiting trial and political offenders.

With respect to the next paragraph, the question arose whether the Commission should make a reference to the ILO definition of forced or compulsory labour or should provide its own. The inconvenience of an independent definition, even if it were based on that of the ILO, was that Governments parties to the ILO Convention would be asked to subscribe to two texts which were not identical; moreover, the situation would become even more confusing if the ILO Convention were revised. On the other hand, the text before the Commission included a mention of conscientious objectors, which the ILO definition did not do. It would be necessary to decide in principle what course to follow before referring article 8 to a drafting committee, so that it might be instructed to deal either with paragraph 2 alone, or with paragraphs 2 and 3.

Mr. Cassin further remarked that work which the unemployed might be required to do in return for State assistance should surely not be considered forced labour; he wondered whether that point was covered in sub-paragraph 4(c) of the United States amendment. In the main, he preferred that sub-paragraph to the text suggested by the ILO. On the other hand,
other hand, while he had no objection in principle, he questioned the appropriateness of including sub-paragraph 4(d) of the United States amendment in an international convention.

He did not think it necessary to include in the article the provision with respect to remuneration of conscientious objectors which appeared in the original draft; it might make an unfortunate impression on a number of States which did not recognize the right of the individual to refuse to fight for his country.

Mr. MALIK (Lebanon) agreed with the Indian representative that it was essential to make a distinction between common criminals and political offenders and to ensure that the latter were in no circumstances required to do forced labour. He strongly supported the re-wording of the latter part of paragraph 2 of the United States amendment which the Chairman had suggested in her capacity as the United States representative, both because it incorporated the Indian amendment and because it brought out clearly the intention of the Drafting Committee, which had been that forced labour could legally be imposed only by a court sentence, and not by prison authorities on their own initiative.

In regard to the provision on conscientious objectors in the original text, he was grateful to the United States representative for her support, and to the United Kingdom representative for her willingness to abstain; he called the Danish representative's attention to the fact that the existing provision was the only one which the Drafting Committee had been willing to adopt, and that if it were deleted there would be nothing left; finally, he begged the French representative to reconsider his position, in view of the fact that the provision on pay applied only to those countries which recognized conscientious objectors and laid no obligation whatsoever on the countries which did not.

Mr. PAVLOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that it had been agreed to insert the word "servitude" in paragraph 2. That had been done in the United Kingdom amendment. The United States amendment, however, spoke of "involuntary" servitude, which might be quite a different matter. He was anxious to ascertain what interpretation the sponsor of the amendment put upon that adjective. Was servitude by persons who did not object to their condition because they were too young or too uninformed to realize its full horror to be considered voluntary?

He cited, as possible examples, the case of negroes in African
territories who were lured into signing contracts for work in mines by
depositing their thumbprints on papers which they were unable to read,
were given an advance which, because of their minimal wages, they could
never repay, and were made to live in compounds circled with barbed wire
and guarded by the police; the case of workers in the oil industry in
a South American republic, who were similarly kept under guard lest they
should leave their employment; and that of a minor, also in South America,
who was made to work long hours and was cruelly searched, but in whose case
the local police had claimed to have no jurisdiction. People like that
were frequently resigned to their fate simply because they were not aware
that conditions were different elsewhere and that they were the victims
of social injustice. Yet, because contracts existed, the employers might
claim that those were cases of voluntary servitude.

Paragraph 3 of the United States amendment contained a definition of
forced or compulsory labour. No such definition appeared either in
the original text or in the United Kingdom amendment, and the USSR repre-
sentative questioned the need for it. Should the Commission decide,
however, that it was desirable to include a definition, he would be glad
to explain why, in his opinion, the one suggested by the United States was
entirely untenable.

The CHAIRMAN, speaking as the United States representative remarked
that the USSR representative had cited perfect examples of what he meant
by "involuntary servitude" since they had all been cases of servitude
induced and maintained by force.

She proceeded to appoint a drafting committee on article 8 consisting
 of the representatives of France, Guatemala, India, Lebanon, the
Philippines, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom
and the United States of America. In the absence of any objection, she
stated that the committee would deal with the whole of article 8, with
the exception of paragraph 1, which had already been adopted, and would
prepare either an agreed text or alternative texts on which the Commission
could vote.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.