CONTENTS

Chairman: Mrs. Ana Figueroa (Chile).


[Item 29]*


1. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that the Afghan amendment (A/C.3/L.209) to the joint draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, The Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon (A/C.3/L.186 and Add.1) had been accepted by the United States delegation (399th meeting), and that the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.204/Rev.1) had therefore been withdrawn.

2. Mr. MUFTI (Syria) regretted that the Netherlands representative should have asserted (398th meeting) that human beings, once formed into groups, ceased to require protection of rights and interests. He doubted whether the speaker himself was convinced of the truth of his statement that the international covenant on human rights was designed for the individual and not for peoples, and that, though it might perhaps be extended to cover the rights of the family, it could not cover the human family as a whole. He suggested that the Netherlands representative should re-read those parts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the United Nations Charter which dealt with the subject.

3. The attitude of the Netherlands representative and of those who thought as he did could not arrest the march of history. Some Powers still made the mistake of thinking it a sign of strength to oppose the natural process of evolution, and justified their action by ascribing all legitimate nationalist movements to communists and fellow-travellers.

4. He urged the colonial Powers not to continue, on strategic grounds, to occupy the territories of other peoples, not to inflame nationalist feeling by maltreating nationalist leaders. The principle of self-determination would, in the end, inevitably be asserted. Obstacles placed in the way would increase the violence of a reaction which might be delayed but could not be prevented. The excuse that certain peoples were undisciplined and therefore incapable of self-government was unacceptable, and it was regrettable that some Members of the United Nations continued, in violation of the principles of the Charter, to keep peoples in subjection.

5. In reply to the representative of France (399th meeting), he said that the competent organ, as regards the right to self-determination, was the United Nations itself. The text of the proclamation of that right had in fact been prepared by the thirteen Powers, and France could facilitate its implementation by voting for their draft resolution. Mr. Mufti thought that the French representative, in his reference to Germany, had been talking rather as a politician than as a jurist. As regards alleged dislike which France had of ties, he said he hoped France would act generously and pursue that policy in practice, not only in cases where circumstances left no choice.

6. Mr. TAMBA (Liberia) recalled that the vast majority of the peoples of Africa were deprived of the fundamental human right to self-determination, the country having for centuries been partitioned amongst certain European Powers. Fortunately, the international community was at last becoming conscious of the injustices of the colonial system, and even the aforesaid Powers subscribed to the principle that democratic government must be based on the consent of the people governed.
7. Liberia, the only free sovereign State on the western coast of Africa, welcomed whole-heartedly the inclusion in the covenant on human rights of a clause on the right to self-determination; and would, therefore, vote both for the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add.1), which was clear, positive and simple, and reflected contemporary facts; and for the USSR (A/C.3/L.206), Iraqi (A/C.3/L.217) and Syrian (A/C.3/L.221) amendments thereto.

8. The representative of Liberia could not share the views of those who maintained that the international covenant on human rights should deal only with the rights of the individual and the family, and not with the rights of subjugated communities; article 2, second paragraph, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a plain contradiction of such views.

9. It was clearly the duty of the States responsible for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories to implement the right to self-determination; they alone were in a position to do so, and they could not evade their responsibility on the grounds that the peoples of those territories were backward as a result of centuries of subjugation. The Liberian delegation hoped that the Administering Powers would recognize the free and genuine will of the subjugated peoples.

10. Mrs. DOMANSKA (Poland) said that her delegation would support both the thirteen-Power draft resolution and any other proposals really designed to guarantee the rights of peoples to self-determination, without which all other rights upheld by the draft covenant would be meaningless.

11. Colonial peoples were still being brutally oppressed and deprived of all their rights, although the Charter recognized the right of all peoples to self-determination, and made it incumbent on Members of the United Nations responsible for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories to recognize the interests of the inhabitants of those territories as paramount, and take measures to develop self-government. The USSR amendments (A/C.3/L.206), based on Article 73 of the Charter, were important because it suggested including in the covenant a clause to the effect that States responsible for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories should promote the realization of the right to self-determination.

12. The Polish delegation would vote against both the first United States amendment (A/C.3/L.204/Rev.1), if it still stood, on the grounds that it proposed merely that the principle of self-determination should be reaffirmed, and not that the covenant should include a clause making it incumbent upon Administering Powers to grant that right; it would also vote against the second United States amendment (A/C.3/L.222) which, by extending to all Powers the responsibility of granting peoples the right to self-determination, neutralized the USSR amendment. All peoples which had not yet attained the right to self-determination looked to the United Nations to draw up a covenant which guaranteed that all-important right, and the manoeuvres of the United States and other Powers responsible for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories must not be allowed to frustrate their aspirations.

13. The Polish delegation would vote against the United States amendment, in the belief that the covenant must clearly proclaim the right of peoples to self-determination; and it would vote for the thirteen-Power resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add.1) and the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.206).

14. Mrs. MARSHALL (Canada) said that her delegation fully accepted the principle of self-determination of peoples, and that any doubts it might have regarding the procedure proposed in the thirteen-Power resolution and some of the amendments applied solely to method.

15. She thought it would be inappropriate to insert in the covenant on civil and political rights, which was concerned exclusively with the rights of individuals, an article dealing with the rights of peoples and nations; especially since the proposed article was declaratory in nature, whereas the other articles in the covenant contained legally binding provisions to which States could give effect through their national legislation.

16. Further, the Canadian delegation did not think the General Assembly should present the Commission on Human Rights with a finished article for inclusion in the covenant; nor did it think any practical purpose could be served by arbitrarily appending an article which permitted of no precise implementation procedure to a covenant the other articles of which could be precisely enforced. It was because the majority of the Third Committee had recognized the need for different implementation for the two different types of rights that the decision to have two covenants had been taken.

17. The Canadian representative would therefore vote against the thirteen-Power draft resolution, which she thought would impede the attainment of the right to self-determination.

18. She would support the Greek amendment (A/C.3/L.205). She could not accept the Afghan amendment (A/C.3/L.209), which replaced the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.204/Rev.1), and she regretted that the United States amendment had been, in effect, withdrawn. She would vote for the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.222). She would vote against the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.206), which she thought designed to divert attention from the Soviet Union's own vulnerable position on the question of self-determination; and also against the various amendments to the amendments, namely the amendments submitted by the USSR (A/C.3/L.216), Iraq (A/C.3/L.217) and Syria (A/C.3/L.221).

19. Mr. SHANN (Australia) said that, while Australia was prepared at any time to reaffirm the provisions of the Charter relating to self-determination of peoples, his Government thought it inappropriate for the General Assembly to direct the Commission on Human Rights to include an article on that subject in the covenant; though it would not object to calling for a reaffirmation of the principle of self-determination as proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. That was a political principle applicable to peoples, not a legal right of individuals; the two were radically different, and he disagreed that the rights of the family could constitute a precedent for including group rights
in a covenant. The international covenant on human rights would, nevertheless, have a direct bearing on the principle of self-determination, by placing States under the obligation to respect the rights whereby people could, when sufficiently mature politically, determine their own form of government.

20. The draft covenant before the Committee, by guaranteeing respect for all individual rights without distinction, paved the way for political action whereby peoples would be able to organize and determine their own government, including an independent government. Without such individual rights, self-determination was not possible.

21. Mr. REYES (Philippines) said he represented a country which had for centuries resisted and finally overthrown foreign domination. Later, United States rule had only been acquiesced in after the United States Government had pledged itself to respect fundamental human rights in the Philippines; but full satisfaction had not been won until Philippines had attained independence in 1946, after fighting loyally on the side of the Allies in the Second World War because they had a stake in the conflict—the right to self-determination.

22. The right of peoples to self-determination was closely bound up with international peace and security, and any attempt to defer recognition of the right was a threat to international security. He illustrated his argument by quoting the case of Indonesia which, until its right to self-determination and independence had been fully recognized, had been a point of weakness for the free world. Indonesia had since become a point of strength. Disturbances in certain regions—the Middle East and Africa, for example—could usually be traced to the lack of recognition of, or insufficient respect for, the right to self-determination. Accordingly his delegation had taken great pleasure in becoming a co-sponsor of the draft resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add.1) concerning the inclusion of a clause dealing with the right to self-determination in the covenant, and hoped it would meet with general support.

23. Mr. DAVIN (New Zealand) was not clear on the exact meaning of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples referred to in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter. At the San Francisco Conference the question of equal rights of peoples and that of self-determination had been considered as two complementary parts of one standard of conduct; the respect for that principle had been regarded as a basis for the development of friendly relations and as one of the measures to strengthen universal peace, an essential element of the principle being that it was a free and genuine expression of the will of the people, which avoided cases of the alleged expression of the popular will such as those used for their own ends by Germany and Italy. Apparently, representatives had in mind the right of a group of people occupying a particular area, who felt that they had substantial interest in common, to break away from the tutelage of an existing State and to establish their own independent organs of statehood. It was opposed to the idea of colonialism and related to the wishes of the majority occupying a given area or territory, and it should not be confused with rights of minorities scattered throughout the territory who might be seeking equality of treatment with the majority, but not political separation. The covenant on human rights would undoubtedly be concerned with the fair treatment of every person included in such minorities, but it ought not to deal with the wider problem of political secession, which involved grave political, constitutional, economic, social and financial considerations, in short, the capacity for self-government. Such problems concerned, not individuals as such, but groups or entities identifiable with a particular area or territory, and would normally fall within the purview of United Nations organs other than the Third Committee.

24. The covenant on human rights was concerned with the individual within a given political setting and with the individual's equality of treatment with the rest of humanity. It was intended to secure to individuals the great fundamental rights and freedoms which transcended all political boundaries.

25. Thus, the attempt to force an article on self-determination into the covenant was an attempt to mix two basically different ideas. The result could only be confusion. Either the right would be a mere assertion, without the means of enforcement, or the implementation procedure would break down in practice when the proposed committee on human rights realized that it was not the proper agency to supervise the enforcement of that principle. At best, the insertion of such a right could be nugatory. At worst, it might be misleading and dangerous. His delegation would therefore resist any attempts to saddle the Commission on Human Rights with an inappropriate task.

26. He did not wish to cast any reflection on the sincerity of those who were arguing for the inclusion of that right. As a signatory to the Charter, the New Zealand Government believed in the self-determination of peoples, but felt that the specific application of that principle was a complex political task which should not intrude itself into and confuse the work of the United Nations in connexion with human rights.

27. Mr. TSAO (China) said that his delegation’s views had already been clearly stated in the general debate (369th meeting). While he warmly supported the general idea embodied in the draft joint resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add.1), he believed that it would be undesirable to draft an article in rigid terms. The General Assembly should confine itself to deciding policy directives and leave the actual drafting of the text to the Commission on Human Rights. If the Commission produced a draft resolution on the right of self-determination at a later stage, his delegation would consider it favourably.


29. Mr. MENEMENCIOGLU (Turkey) said that the people and Government of his country regarded the

right of peoples to self-determination, the right of States to sovereignty and legal equality and the right of countries to territorial integrity as basic concepts of their national aspirations and of international relations, in view of the Turkish people's long struggle for their very existence. He thought that the debate on the matter should have been limited to the strictly legal question whether or not a right already enunciated in the Charter should be included in the draft covenant.

30. His delegation had given careful consideration to all the arguments advanced in the Third Committee and had reached the conclusion that the covenant on human rights was not the document in which the right to self-determination should be stated. The purpose of the covenant was to define the relations between the State and the individual. It had been claimed that the concept of human rights extended to the family, which was a collective unit, but the concept of the family in connexion with human rights concerned the rights and duties of the individuals who constituted families, rather than the family as a collective legal unit. The concept of self-determination itself would be weakened if classified in a category of rights designed to define relations between the sovereign States and the individuals falling under its jurisdiction.

31. His delegation would have been prepared to set aside even those well-considered convictions were it not for the fact that it believed that inclusion of an article on self-determination, without proper definitions and legal guarantees, could only be detrimental to many vital principles embodied in the Charter, including the principle of self-determination itself. The Charter represented a balanced legal system and an attempt to strike a balance between all the vital aspects of the main problems confronting the modern world. The Turkish delegation therefore considered that extreme caution should be used in taking any principle of the Charter out of its context, lest it should serve as a tool in ruthless hands. History had shown how political, social or legal concepts could be abused if they were not clearly defined and protected by a system of guarantees.

32. He would therefore vote against the operative parts of the joint draft resolution and all the amendments thereto.

33. Mr. ALFONZO RAVARD (Venezuela) agreed with those who contended that the right to self-determination was part of international public law rather than of private law, but could see no irreconcilable conflict between the two. There could be no harm in reaffirming a principle of public law in dealing with a matter of private law; thus, that right could be safely incorporated in one of the draft covenants. If the Committee adopted the Afghan amendment (A/C.3/L.209), it would not be going beyond its powers. The references to the right of self-determination in Article 1 and 55 of the Charter were not very definite and seemed to refer rather to the safeguarding of national sovereignty or to the ultimate intentions of those States administering Trust or Non-Self-Governing Territories than directly to the principle itself. Thus, the Venezuelan delegation could in principle support both the Afghan amendment (A/C.3/L.209) and the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add.1), with the exception of the first paragraph of the preamble of the latter. In its resolution 421 (V), section D, the General Assembly had not in fact recognized the right of peoples and nations to self-determination as a fundamental human right, but had merely requested the Commission on Human Rights to study ways and means which would ensure that right.

34. The vote on the joint draft resolution should accordingly be taken by parts; the Venezuelan delegation would abstain on the first paragraph of the preamble.

35. Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia) maintained that the argument that the right of peoples to self-determination was a collective rather than an individual right and thus could not be included in a covenant on human rights was merely academic and flagrantly contradicted the course of history, contemporary fact and legal sense. All the historic struggles for human rights had been indissolubly linked with that right, whereas national oppression had always been a serious impediment to social advancement and thus to the growth of human rights and freedoms. The Czech and Slovak peoples had found to their cost that the Western European supporters of democracy had failed to realize, particularly in 1848, the need to link the struggle for national liberation with the struggle for democracy. Only after the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia had the real scope of the right to self-determination been correctly understood and fully applied. The enforcement of that right in the USSR had compelled the imperialist statesmen to pay lip service at least to the principle in the Treaty of Versailles. That the recognition of that right had not been genuine had been shown at Munich. The German occupation and even more the liberation by the Red Army had brought home to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe how the consequences of a successful struggle for self-determination could lead to the removal of barriers to economic and social progress and to the creation of the conditions necessary for the full exercise of the rights and freedoms of the citizen under the socialist system. The exercise of the right of self-determination had enabled the Czechoslovak people to throw off their traditional nationalist and chauvinist sentiments and to hold out the hand of friendship to their brothers over the borders.

36. History also refuted the contention that the right to self-determination was solely a political right, unlike the other human rights to be included in the draft covenant. That the French representative should have so argued was particularly surprising, seeing that the fundamental rights embodied in the French constitutions, such as the rights of individual freedom or freedom of conscience, had been attained by political struggles and should thus be regarded as in essence political.

37. The experience of the Czech and Slovak peoples enabled them to understand with particular sympathy the battle that was being waged in Asia and Africa by millions demanding the right to self-determination. That struggle was of the utmost importance for human
progress, as world peace depended largely upon the speed with which that problem was settled, the way in which those efforts were supported by the rest of mankind and upon how long the leaders of the imperialist States took to see that the victory of the oppressed was historically inevitable.

38. At the period when such countries were fighting against fascism no one would have dreamed of contesting their claims to political maturity. Article I and Chapters XI and XII of the United Nations Charter bound the signatories to put an end to the system of colonial exploitation. Unfortunately, recent events in Africa and Asia showed that some Member States were not prepared to live up to their obligations.

39. The draft covenant must therefore incorporate a clear and explicit statement of the right of peoples to self-determination. The Czechoslovak delegation would support the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add.1) and the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.206), which was its logical complement. The United States amendment (A/C.3/L.222) was intended to weaken the statement of that principle and to lessen the responsibility of governments administering Non-Self-Governing Territories. The statement of principle must not be allowed to become nebulous and thus to serve as a pretext for the failure to enforce the right forthwith. The Czechoslovak delegation would also support the Greek (A/C.3/L.205) and the Syrian (A/C.3/L.221) amendments.

40. Mr. ACRITAS (Greece) supported the Afghan amendment (A/C.3/L.209) to the United States amendment.

41. The Greek amendment (A/C.3/L.205) would, however, enable the Commission on Human Rights to make more progress towards drafting appropriate measures of implementation for the right. The Greek amendment should not be considered apart from the joint draft resolution, but rather as its natural complement. In its amendment the Greek delegation had the Commission on Human Rights in view, because it did not know of any other United Nations organ competent in the matter. What was required was not merely the statement of the right to self-determination, but also its application and the enforcement of respect for it.

42. Miss BERNARDINO (Dominican Republic) pointed out that the arguments used in the general debate on the same subject in the Third Committee during the fifth session had been reiterated in the current debate. There could be no doubt, however, that there was a genuine concern to clarify the issue. The Dominican Republic, which had struggled for its own independence, had always advanced the view that all peoples should have the right to self-determination. The fact that the Charter, which constituted the substantive law of the United Nations, contained a provision on self-determination, made it the more proper and fitting to incorporate that right into the draft covenant. She would therefore vote for the amendments which were most in keeping with those considerations.

43. Mr. DAZA ONDARZA (Bolivia) believed that the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination was a universal and inalienable one deeply rooted in international law and in Latin American history. The enforcement of that principle had made the existence of the Latin American countries possible after three centuries of struggle for their independence. The new Latin American republics had from the outset shown a remarkable vitality and solidity because they had enjoyed the three factors which were the quintessence of the principle of self-determination: economic unity, territorial unity and geographical unity. That had given birth to a new and incontestable legal principle: that of uti possidetis. If, owing to subsequent historical events, it had happened that the three-fold unity had been broken, to the detriment of the historical course so wisely plotted by Spain, perhaps that suggested that some rectifications might still be indicated to return to that historic national course.

44. The self-determination of peoples could be enforced only if it was based on the unity of those three principles, not upon artificial creations with no foundation in definite historical tradition, itself based upon economic, geographical and demographic factors. The Bolivian delegation would therefore whole-heartedly support the proposals before the Committee in order that the principle of the self-determination of peoples laid down in the Charter should be reaffirmed in the draft covenant on human rights.

45. Mrs. AFNAN (Iraq) stated that, in view of the fact that the United States delegation had accepted the Afghan amendment (A/C.3/L.209) to replace the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.204/Rev.1) she would like to reintroduce her amendment (A/C.3/L.217) as an amendment to the Afghan amendment and asked that her amendment should be voted on before the Afghan amendment (A/C.3/L.209).

46. She deplored the academic and legalistic approach of certain delegations to the question at issue. The essential and realistic aspect of the matter was that millions of people would never be able to become members of the world community unless they secured the right of self-determination and unless their own governments could represent them. It was impossible to ignore the fact that colonialism still existed.

47. The French representative had stated (399th meeting) that the incorporation of such an article in the covenant might endanger international security; it was the denial of the right to self-determination, however, that was currently threatening world peace. The French representative's fears concerning the opportunities which the inclusion of the article might give to Germany seemed to be far-fetched, since the German peoples right to self-determination would hardly depend on the enunciation of that right in the covenant. Moreover, the French representative's reference to his Government's refusal of the accession of certain French-speaking peoples of North Italy to France in order to maintain friendly relations between Italy and France did not explain the French Government's authority over the non-French-speaking Arab populations of North Africa.

48. The CHAIRMAN ruled that the Iraqi amendment (A/C.3/L.217) could be reintroduced.
49. Mr. BORGHOL (Yemen) regretted the attitude of certain representatives who had persistently distorted the meaning of articles of the Charter in their attempts to halt the march of history and had used legalistic arguments to exclude an article on self-determination from the covenant and to further their political interests.

50. He hoped that those representatives would reconsider their attitude in accordance with their conscience and would join the supporters of the thirteen-Power draft resolution in taking a step towards securing the right of all peoples to self-determination.

51. Mr. PAVLOV (Union of Soviet Republics) wished to explain the joint Byelorussian and USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.225) to the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.224) and recalled that the USSR delegation to the fifth session of the General Assembly had already stated its position on the matter by proposing the inclusion of an article on the right to self-determination in the covenant (Assembly resolution 421 (V), section D). He did propose to deviate from that position.

52. One of the fundamental contradictions of the capitalist system was the sharp differentiation between the rulers and the ruled; imperialism and colonialism depended on the shameless exploitation of the vast populations of Non-Self-Governing Territories. In exploiting those populations, however, the imperialists were obliged to industrialize and develop the countries concerned to a certain extent and that led to the rise of a proletariat and intelligentsia and thence to liberation movements. That ineluctable awakening of the consciousness of subjected peoples was being manifested in all parts of the world.

53. The colonial Powers were obliged to find a new and more lenient approach in their dealings with non-autonomous areas. Representatives in the Committee had sounded the alarm and had warned the colonial Powers that, unless they made the necessary concessions, they would be overwhelmed by a flood of reprisals. He was not concerned with the fate of those Powers, but with that of the populations of non-self-governing areas and had therefore submitted proposals which could not be unacceptable to any person who was really inspired with democratic ideals and which were in full conformity with the principles laid down in that connexion in Article 106 of the Charter.

54. The USSR position was also based on the absolute equality of the rights of all nations and races, irrespective of any considerations, such as that of alleged political immaturity. Such equality was fully realized in the USSR, where over a hundred races and nations lived together in fraternal co-operation. That multi-racial system had successfully stood the severe test of the Second World War and served as an inspiring example to all those who aspired to the right of self-determination.

55. The allegation that the right to self-determination was not a human right properly so-called because it could not be enjoyed by an individual was based on an anachronistic concept of individuality. Everyone lived in a society and a group, and individual rights therefore depended on group and national rights. No basic human rights could be assured without the right to self-determination; the denial of that right would therefore be tantamount to the denial of all human rights to vast populations.

56. The issue of the duality of the covenant also arose. The French representative had proposed in his amendment (A/C.3/L.192/Rev. 1) that the two covenants should contain as many similar provisions as possible; it would be interesting to see whether the right of peoples to self-determination would be included in both covenants; if it were not, it would be obvious that certain rights were being threatened, to the detriment of under-developed countries in particular.

57. He thought that the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.222) to the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.206) was unsatisfactory, since it merely referred to promoting the realization of the principle of self-determination. The purpose of that wording was to evade the implementation of a concrete right and the inclusion of an article in the covenant. Similarly, the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.224) to the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.216) represented an attempt to exonerate States which were responsible for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories from their special duties in the matter. That special responsibility was clearly stated in the Charter and it was therefore erroneous to aver that all States should be placed on an equal footing in that connexion. In order to frustrate that attempt, he had sponsored the joint Byelorussian and USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.225) to the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.224).

58. In spite of the attempt to vitiate the basic purpose of the thirteen-Power draft resolution, the progressive concept of that document would inevitably prevail. He quoted the Latin proverb quos vult Jupiter perdere dementat prius; the colonial Powers had to realize that the current mass movement towards self-determination could not be stopped.

59. Mr. PAZHWAK (Afghanistan) asked the Greek representative whether he would accept two minor amendments to his amendment (A/C.3/L.205) to the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add. 1), namely the insertion of the word "international" before the word "respect" and the deletion of the words "principle of". If they were accepted, his intentions in submitting his amendment would be clearer and the Committee's work would become easier.

60. Mr. ACRITAS (Greece) accepted the Afghan amendment.

61. Mr. CAASIN (France) observed that new amendments had been submitted and, despite the limitations on the number and time of speeches agreed on by the Committee, they should be discussed.

62. The CHAIRMAN thought that such a procedure would frustrate the Committee's previous decision.
63. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia), speaking on a point of order, said that a stop must be put to the current procedure in which delegations persisted in introducing amendments to other amendments *ad infinitum*, as could be seen from the description of the amendment embodied in document A/C.3/L.225. Undoubtedly, delegations were within their rights in submitting such amendments, as no time limit had been set for them. All delegations, however, would be equally within their rights if they spoke at length on such amendments. He could not quite see, however, why the French representative had made such a point of exercising that right, as he had challenged the Committee's competence to draft the article on the self-determination of peoples.

64. Mr. CASSIN (France) had not objected to the submission of amendments to amendments but had merely asked that they should be discussed fully and that delegations should be allowed to exercise their right of reply.

65. The CHAIRMAN agreed that the Committee would waste precious time. The time limit for the submission of amendments had been set at 5 January 1952. In view of the considerable period that had elapsed since then, she proposed that no further amendments to amendments should be submitted after the close of the current meeting.

*It was so agreed.*

66. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon), Rapporteur, said that the section of the Committee's report concerning the book *The Refugee in the Post-War World* had been distributed to the members of the Committee only. He requested them to submit any corrections to him before 6 p.m. on 24 January 1952.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.