



C O N T E N T S

	Page
Draft international covenant on human rights and measures of implementation (A/1883, A/1884 (chapter V, section I), E/1992, E/2057 and Add.1 to 5, E/2059 and Add.1 to 8, E/2085 and Add.1, A/C.3/559, A/C.3/L.88, A/C.3/L.186 and Add.1) (continued)	311
Programme of work of the Committee	316

Chairman : Mrs. Ana FIGUEROA (Chile).

Draft international covenant on human rights and measures of implementation (A/1883, A/1884 (chapter V, section I), E/1992, E/2057 and Add.1 to 5, E/2059 and Add.1 to 8, E/2085 and Add.1, A/C.3/559, A/C.3/L.88, A/C.3/L.186 and Add.1) (continued)

[Item 29]*

JOINT DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY AFGHANISTAN, BURMA, EGYPT, INDIA, INDONESIA, IRAN, IRAQ, LEBANON, PAKISTAN, THE PHILIPPINES, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA AND YEMEN (A/C.3/L.186 and Add.1) (continued)

1. Mr. D'SOUZA (India) recalled that his country was, along with Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, one of the sponsors of the draft resolution embodying a proposal to insert in the covenant on human rights an article on the right of peoples to self-determination (A/C.3/L.186 and Add. 1).

2. The sponsors of the draft resolution intended the article in question to apply in particular to peoples who were still under the authority of other nations. In their efforts to obtain independence, the peoples of those countries could count on the effective aid of India, whose recent accession to self-government had, in spite of temporary difficulties, been achieved under favourable conditions owing to the understanding that existed between the people of India and the Power which had hitherto been responsible for their destinies.

3. The USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.216), which stressed the need to grant the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories the exercise of the right of self-determination, was in conformity with the principles already recognized by the United Nations, which had

assumed a certain responsibility towards the people of those territories, or had at least undertaken to devote its full attention to them. The Indian delegation would therefore vote for the amendment.

4. However, the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories were not the only ones who should be guaranteed the right of self-determination; when putting forward that principle during the First World War, President Wilson and the representatives of those democratic countries which had followed his lead had been thinking of all peoples — those who were subject to colonial régimes and those who were not on an equal footing with the peoples with whom they were associated. Therefore, although there was good reason to make special reference to the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories, it must be recognized that the field of application of the principle of self-determination was wider than that. The Indian delegation was therefore willing to vote also for the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.222), which recognized that fact.

5. From the outset, India had been in favour of proclaiming the principle of the self-determination of peoples. However, it realized that the application of that principle might create great difficulties and that the problem of minorities, which was completely different, should not be raised in connexion with its implementation.

6. The sponsors of the draft resolution would never allow the article which they requested should be inserted in the covenant to be invoked in an attempt to destroy the unity of a nation or to impede the creation of such unity. Any such attempt would be contrary to the purpose of the sponsors of the draft resolution, who recognized the basic principle of national sovereignty.

7. In calling upon the General Assembly to ensure universal respect for the principle of the self-determination of peoples, the thirteen sponsors of the draft resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add. 1) hoped to be able

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

to help to remove some of the existing causes of friction and thus strengthen international peace and security.

8. Mrs. ROOSEVELT (United States of America) said that in order to save the Committee's time she would withdraw the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.204/Rev. 1) to the original draft resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add. 1) in favour of the Afghan amendment (A/C.3/L.209), on condition that the latter was regarded as an amendment to the original draft resolution.

9. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) thought that the conditions on which the United States representative desired to withdraw her amendment might raise certain difficulties in view of the fact that the Afghan amendment related to the United States amendment and not to the original draft resolution. The sponsors of the joint draft resolution would need a little time to study the effect which the Afghan amendment would have on the text they had submitted.

10. From the point of view of procedure, the Third Committee would also have to know whether the Afghan representative, who was one of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution, would be submitting the amendment on his own behalf, or whether he would come to some agreement with the other sponsors of the joint draft resolution.

11. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) thanked Mrs. Roosevelt for her attitude towards his amendment. However, since his delegation had not been expecting such a proposal, he would prefer not to reply to it until he had consulted the other sponsors of the joint draft resolution.

12. Mr. PLEIC (Yugoslavia) said that, from the outset, the Yugoslav delegation had felt that the proposal to insert in the covenant an article on the self-determination of peoples was completely justified by the teaching of history and by an objective study of the facts. His delegation had already cited examples of the violation of that right. He would merely point out that oppression was assuming new forms and new proportions.

13. The right of peoples to self-determination was also an individual right and, as such, should be given a place in the covenant. The Yugoslav delegation had already pointed out that many of the rights which were included in the existing text of the covenant and which were enjoyed collectively, were in fact the sum of individual rights: the right to freedom of religion and the right of freedom to live under a democratic régime in fact represented the right of any individual to adopt the religion of his choice or to participate in the organization of the State and the conduct of public affairs.

14. No serious objection had been raised against the insertion in the covenant of an article on the right of peoples to self-determination. It would seem, therefore, that the arguments for inserting that right had made some impression. The Yugoslav delegation was glad to note that fact and regretted that it had not been the case during the two months which the Third Committee had devoted to revision. The result of the work done by the Committee in the course of the sixth session would not in that case have been so disappointing.

15. In order to insert in the covenant an article on self-determination, the Third Committee could either confine itself to adopting a text of a general character, or it could indicate what the content of the article should be and leave the task of preparing a text to the Commission on Human Rights. If the Third Committee adopted the second method, the Yugoslav delegation thought that it would be necessary to define the elements which should be taken into account in composing the text as precisely as possible and give the Commission on Human Rights the most detailed instructions. In view of the relationship between the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council as defined in the Charter, the Third Committee would also need to do what was required to see that the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council complied with the decisions of the General Assembly in that respect.

16. Mr. VALENZUELA (Chile) said that the amendment submitted by Afghanistan (A/C.3/L.209) was of vital importance in the debate. Under its provisions the General Assembly would merely decide to include an article on the right of peoples to self-determination and, it seemed, would entrust its drafting to the Commission on Human Rights. He asked whether the sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add. 1) would be prepared to agree to what appeared to be the consequences of that amendment, namely, that the General Assembly would not draft the article in question itself.

17. The Chilean delegation would vote for the Afghan amendment, since it did not believe it would be proper to approve a draft resolution similar to resolution 422 (V), which contained the text of a colonial clause actually drafted by the General Assembly. In that instance it had been a question of putting an end to a legal anomaly, and it had been easy for the General Assembly to draft such a text, but the situation was different in the case of the right of peoples to self-determination.

18. The Chilean delegation had also considered the amendments proposed by the United States of America (A/C.3/L.222) and USSR (A/C.3/L.206) delegations to the joint draft resolution and had come to the conclusion that those amendments were not contradictory, but complementary. His delegation therefore hoped that it would be possible to combine them in a single text.

19. It was logical to leave it to the Commission on Human Rights to draft the article in question; it would therefore be advisable for the sponsors of the joint draft resolution to clarify the text in such a way as to help to determine the directives which should be given to the Commission on Human Rights.

20. There were four different cases which might be covered by the article on the self-determination of peoples: first, the case of nations and peoples which had lost the free exercise of that right or were in danger of doing so as a result of an act of aggression; secondly, the case of highly developed peoples who had, however, not yet been granted free exercise of the right to self-determination; thirdly, the case of those metropolitan Powers whose mission it was to prepare

certain peoples for the exercise of self-determination ; and lastly ; the case—no less important than the preceding three—of peoples who did not have full control over their own territory and their own natural resources.

21. He also asked the sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add. 1) how they thought they could reconcile their text with the draft resolution by which the Third Committee had recommended the Commission on Human Rights to draft two covenants. He asked in which of the two covenants the article in question would be included. If it was included in the covenant on civil and political rights, it would apply to countries which had lost their independence, to almost the whole of Africa, to part of Asia and to certain regions of Latin America. If it was included in the covenant on economic, social and cultural rights, it would relate to under-developed countries which did not have full control over their natural resources.

22. In conclusion, he would be grateful if some light could be thrown upon the measures for implementing the article in question. He presumed that that would show once more that implementation of the article would be easier if it were applied to economic, social and cultural rights than if it were to apply to civil and political rights.

23. Mr. DEMCHENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) recalled his delegation's views on inclusion in the covenant of an article relating to the right of peoples to self-determination. It would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add. 1), which stated that right in a clear and simple form, for it considered that the self-determination of peoples was the key to all other human rights. He asked how individuals could enjoy civil, political, economic, social or cultural rights if, collectively, they were not free to determine their fate and the form of their government. Equality before the law meant little in colonial territories, where the legal machinery had been imposed from outside and where there were two sets of weights and measures, one for the indigenous inhabitants and the other for nationals of the metropolitan territory. The idea of an autonomous national entity was accordingly implicit in the right of peoples to self-determination. It was therefore impossible to accept the Netherlands representative's argument (398th meeting) that the right of self-determination of peoples should not be included in the covenant because it was a collective right and the covenant should only formulate individual rights. He asked how the greater part of individual rights could be exercised, if not collectively.

24. The Ukrainian delegation would also vote for the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.216) in view of the fact that the text explicitly covered peoples which were still without institutions of self-government and were still dependent on foreign countries. It was, indeed, to the application to such peoples of the principle of self-determination that the United Nations should primarily devote its efforts. The United States amendment (A/C.3/L.222) would weaken the USSR amendment by distracting attention from that basic aim of the United Nations. It was quite unnecessary, particularly

in view of the fact that the Greek amendment (A/C.3/L.205) requested the Commission on Human Rights to prepare recommendations concerning respect for the principle of self-determination of peoples. The Ukrainian delegation would support the Greek amendment, but it could not accept the United States amendment, because it felt that the responsibilities of States administering Non-Self-Governing Territories should be explicitly referred to. The United States amendment doubtless meant that the States in question, which were usually so sensitive when they were reminded of their promise to lead the non-self-governing peoples towards self-government and to take heed of their political aspirations, were desirous of sharing that responsibility with other nations ; but that was not necessary if they themselves saw to it that the peoples they administered enjoyed effectively the right to self-determination. He hoped that the Third Committee would approve the joint draft resolution as amended by the USSR and Greek representatives and would thus assist those peoples who were still deprived of independence to obtain it.

25. Mr. CASSIN (France) said that he would speak on the question under consideration, to which his delegation attached great importance, as a lawyer, not as a politician. France was heedful of the commitments it had entered into on signing the Charter of the United Nations ; it considered that the aim of the United Nations' work was to put into effect the provisions of the Charter. France accepted the principles of the self-determination of peoples, as laid down in Article 1, paragraph 2, and in Article 55 of the Charter. He agreed with the representative of Mexico (397th meeting), who had referred to the revolution in the concept of consent—although he himself preferred the word "evolution"—to show clearly that he was opposed to any form of violence. The French delegation had been prepared to co-operate in drafting recommendations for submission to the General Assembly and sincerely regretted that the Commission on Human Rights had not had time to do so. It was still in favour of such recommendations being considered, in accordance with Article 55 of the Charter, paragraph *c* of which provided one of the ways of achieving the purposes of the Charter.

26. If the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add. 1) meant that the covenant would reaffirm what was stated in the Charter and that the principle of the self-determination of peoples would be included in the preamble, he would be prepared to accept it. He felt it his duty however to warn the Third Committee not to include an article in the body of the covenant. In the first place, that would result in the subjectmatter of the covenant exceeding the bounds directly established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a whole, and the Third Committee would be failing to discharge the important task assigned to it by the authors of the Charter.

27. The question of the self-determination of peoples had many aspects ; in particular it had political aspects, whereas the Third Committee was solely responsible for social, humanitarian and cultural questions and the

Commission on Human Rights had a still narrower field of work. The joint draft resolution stated that the General Assembly had recognized the right of peoples and nations to self-determination as a fundamental human right. In point of fact General Assembly resolution 421 (V) had called upon the Economic and Social Council to request the Commission on Human Rights to study ways and means which would ensure the right of peoples and nations to self-determination and to prepare recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly, which was not the same thing. Self-determination was a right of mankind; it was a political right of the community, but it could not be said that even as a collective right it had the slightest individual application.

28. The Committee had discussed the question of including justiciable rights, that was to say, rights which the individual could vindicate in the courts. Clearly that criterion could apply to individual or mixed rights, like the right of association, but not to the right under discussion, which it was impossible to conceive as existing for the benefit of an individual.

29. He agreed with the Netherlands representative (398th meeting) that it would be dangerous for the Third Committee to allow itself to be diverted from the question of the implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to concern itself with a political problem which was not within its competence. If the Committee decided to draft such an article it would have to refer the matter to a large number of organs, including the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council and the International Law Commission, to mention only a few.

30. A number of delegations wished to include the article in the covenant in order to give it binding legal force; but it could only be included if a thorough study were made of the way in which the wishes of the peoples in question were to be expressed, and of the consequences of the limits to and the penalties attending the right of self-determination. Under Article 55 of the Charter the right of self-determination was proclaimed as one of the means for bringing about conditions of stability and ensuring peaceful relations among nations. He regretted the Saudi Arabian representative's interpretation of the right, under which it would in extreme cases cover the right of peoples to kill one another. So interpreted, the right was contrary to the Charter. It would be recalled that Germany had attacked France three times in less than a hundred years; and while France was prepared to welcome a democratic Germany into the international community it could not agree to renounce all guarantees—which would be the effect of accepting the suggested article. Moreover, such an article would allow certain powerful nations to try to disintegrate other nations by instigating artificial separatist movements within peoples united by mutual consent. Even the most united nations were not proof against that danger.

31. He turned to the question of territorial union. He asked whether it would be true to say that a sincere and freely expressed desire for union must always be satisfied. The French delegation did not think so;

three times in the last century France, actuated by its concern for peace, had rejected a territorial union with districts whose inhabitants had, by plebiscite, expressed the wish to join France. His country had acted in that way in order to avoid creating causes for friction with neighbouring countries and undermining the foundations of future peace. Finally, he quoted the case of the Val d'Aosta, whose inhabitants had given proof of that desire for reunion with France.

32. Those various examples showed the far-reaching implications of the problem, which was an essentially political one and could only be solved by the creation of implementation machinery which could not be made the responsibility of a purely judicial organ. That was the reason why the Committee was behindhand in its work.

33. In conclusion, the French delegation saw no reason why the principle of the self-determination of peoples should not be stated in the preamble to each of the two covenants envisaged, which would incidentally offer a solution to the problem referred to by the Chilean representative; but for the reasons he had just explained it could not agree to the insertion of an article of a legal nature in the body of a covenant on human rights. His delegation would vote accordingly.

34. Mr. PAVLOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) noted that the United States representative had announced her intention of conditionally withdrawing her amendment bearing the symbol A/C.3/L.204/Rev. 1, but had not mentioned the other United States amendment, bearing the symbol A/C.3/L.224. She was thus withdrawing an amendment from the beginning of the series merely in order to add an identical amendment at the end. He wondered whether that was purely innocent manoeuvre. The situation was becoming extremely confused, and the deluge of amendments to amendments amending other amendments must be halted. Moreover, a time limit had been fixed for the introduction of draft resolutions and amendments. An attempt was being made to convey the impression that there was perfect harmony on the question under discussion; but discordant notes could be heard; and that was doubtless not accidental.

35. If the Committee agreed to consider the last United States amendment, a Russian translation would have to be provided.

36. The CHAIRMAN replied that the Russian translation would be distributed during the afternoon.

37. As for the time limit, that applied only to draft resolutions and amendments to them; no time limit had ever been fixed for amendments to amendments. As required under rule 129 of the rules of procedure, the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.206) would not be put to the vote if the other USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.216) to the Afghan amendment and the Afghan amendment (A/C.3/L.209) itself were adopted.

38. If the USSR amendment bearing the symbol A/C.3/L.206 was not put to the vote, no vote would be taken on the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.222) to that USSR amendment, but the Committee

would vote on the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.224) to the other USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.216).

39. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) suggested that before the afternoon meeting the sponsors of the joint draft resolution and the amendments, including the representatives of the United States of America and the USSR, should confer in order to ascertain whether the joint draft resolution could be revised and a number of amendments eliminated.

40. Mr. PAVLOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that Mr. Baroody's suggestion was an extremely good one, but that it was unfortunately impossible to reconcile what was irreconcilable. The Committee was faced with a choice between a draft resolution embodying the text of a precise article on a clearly defined right, and a text which made vague reference to that principle with the sole object of preventing its implementation.

41. Mrs. ROOSEVELT (United States of America) did not believe that consultation with the USSR representative could produce useful results. The United States amendment (A/C.3/L.224) had been necessitated by the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.216), which had replaced another USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.206).

42. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) said he had attempted to create an atmosphere of harmony with regard to the lofty and humane principle of self-determination of peoples. He had not desired a compromise; on the contrary, he had hoped one of the parties would convince the other. Since neither side would give way to persuasion, he wished to state for his part that he still supported a precise article.

43. Mrs. ROOSEVELT (United States of America) said that in order to simplify the Committee's work her delegation would accept the amendment (A/C.3/L.209) proposed by Afghanistan to the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.204/Rev.1). In that way the Afghanistan amendment would be put to the vote as an integral part of the United States amendment.

44. Mr. DELHAYE (Belgium) recalled that the Belgian representative had expressed his delegation's point of view on the right to self-determination at the 361st and 371st meetings. The Belgian delegation accepted the principle of the self-determination of peoples as applying to all peoples and accordingly would support the United States amendment (A/C.3/L.222) to the USSR amendment (A/C.3/L.206), because it expressed a progressive idea which should help towards a well-balanced solution of the difficult problem involved. He reserved the right to use the rest of the time at the disposal of his delegation for other observations.

45. Mr. ALEMAYEHOU (Ethiopia) announced his delegation's support of the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add. 1), which reaffirmed the principle of the right of self-determination of peoples laid down in the Charter. After all, the right to self-determination was a natural one, inevitably destined to become a reality. It was therefore logical that the United Nations should endeavour to give it practical effect and that it should decide to establish it in the draft international covenant on human rights. The

joint draft resolution was couched in general and fairly flexible terms as it did not lay down any time limit for the implementation of the right in question. The Ethiopian delegation would support it and would indicate its position regarding the amendments after their sponsors announced the result of their conversations.

46. Mr. RAADI (Iran) explained that when his delegation, together with twelve others, had submitted the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.186 and Add. 1), it had hoped that the majority of the Third Committee would reaffirm the principle of a single covenant. Its view had been, and still was, that such a decision would guarantee the theoretical and practical interdependence of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and would remove the anxiety of a large section of humanity, which feared that manoeuvres might be used to delay the implementation of economic and social rights. At the same time it had considered that it was essential that an article on the right to self-determination should be included in a covenant — which should be a single covenant — in order to give moral and legal support to peoples aspiring to political and economic independence.

47. Since the Third Committee, by an incoherent majority decision (395th meeting), had sacrificed the fundamental principle of a single covenant to considerations of dubious value, and had reawakened serious anxiety concerning the fate of the covenant, the Iranian delegation was more than ever convinced of the need to set forth the right to self-determination in an international legal instrument.

48. No one could deny the fact that, if an instrument was to be concluded, ratified and observed, it must be drawn up in an atmosphere of trust and sincerity, and contain elements that would reassure the contracting parties. But the vote by which it was decided to draft two covenants had already considerably changed that atmosphere, which would disappear entirely if the joint draft resolution under discussion were rejected. The supporters of the idea of two covenants had maintained that their attitude was not dictated by any ulterior political motives: the future would prove whether that was true.

49. The Third Committee was faced with a new case of conscience because, by its attitude to the thirteen-Power draft resolution, each delegation could either mitigate or aggravate the consequences of dividing the covenant into two instruments, without however being able to obliterate them entirely. The covenant was mainly designed to defend a very large part of the world's population which could not fully enjoy the rights set forth in that instrument so long as they were the object of a desire on the part of certain countries to dominate them politically or exploit them economically. Those people could only have confidence in the United Nations and its great work if it fulfilled the aspirations which the Charter recognized as legitimate and if the international covenant on human rights were specifically based on the right to self-determination.

50. Some people were afraid that the insertion in the covenant of an article on the right of peoples to self-

determination would have far-reaching consequences and would make it necessary to draft an article for each of the rights set forth in the Charter of the United Nations or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For himself, he regretted that a place could not be found in the covenant for all the rights which derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but he was convinced that for many reasons of major importance the right of peoples to self-determination was the keystone of any covenant on human rights. The reasons for drafting an article on the principle of the self-determination of peoples would be readily recognized if it was remembered that attacks on the principle had led to terrible bloodshed in the past and that they constituted a permanent threat to peace; and the United Nations would only become a reality and a pledge of peace on the disappearance of the last vestiges of colonialism, whether in ancient or modern or form, and whether open or concealed.

51. The representative of Iran was surprised that the right of peoples to self-determination had been called an essentially political right, which could not appear in a legal instrument under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council, at a time when the world was witnessing the economic exploitation of communities and individuals, an exploitation which resulted from the fact that peoples were denied the right to control their own economic lives and were forced to submit to political domination. Moreover, it was quite normal that a legal instrument, and also the text of such an instrument, should include political, economic, psychological and other elements.

52. It had also been alleged that since the principle of the self-determination of peoples was set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, it would be superfluous to repeat it in the covenant. He emphasized that it was not a matter of repetition but of the implementation, by means of a legal instrument, of a principle set forth in the Charter. Moreover, it would be better to repeat such a principle than to deprive the covenant of a psychological factor which would give the peoples confidence and excite their enthusiasm.

53. He was not thinking only of the non-self-governing peoples. In an impulse of human brotherhood, free from all chauvinism and hatred, he was convinced that the Administering Powers would also derive benefit from the universal application of the right of peoples to self-determination, for although colonialism had brought much suffering to colonial territories and to the exploited peoples, it had also brought great misfortunes to the colonizing countries. The latter had accumulated wealth and conquered vast empires, but their achievements had engendered an insatiable desire for possession and had created dangerous rivalries between them. It could not be denied that one of the chief causes of the two most recent world conflicts had been the lust for domination and expansion and the lure of colonies. Individual families had perhaps grown richer materially, but they had had to mourn a son or sons who had died for the empire. Moreover, by a curious irony of fate, the metropolitan Powers were becoming each day more dependent economically on

their own victims. It was therefore hard to understand why they should persevere in that fatal course.

54. He quoted an old Persian proverb which said that a man who resisted aggression did two praiseworthy acts; he freed himself, and at the same time helped his attacker to change an unjust attitude. The fact that the non-self-governing peoples were becoming conscious of their position should be welcomed with gratitude by the metropolitan Powers. They would see themselves in a new light; they would have to give up living in idleness on the wealth derived from subject lands and seek to organize their material and political lives on other bases, which would almost inevitably be those set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, namely, understanding and co-operation, instead of domination and exploitation. The metropolitan Powers ought, moreover, to realize that they too might one day be constrained by the course of events or the vicissitudes of history, to claim in their turn the right of self-determination and the right to exercise collectively or individually their economic or political rights. Such considerations should encourage them to give a favourable reception to the principle of the self-determination of peoples.

Programme of work of the Committee

55. The CHAIRMAN gave the Committee certain information regarding its programme of work and the date by which it should conclude its discussions.

56. At a meeting of the Chairmen of the Main Committees and the President of the General Assembly on the previous day, it was learnt that the Fourth Committee had concluded its work the week before, that the Second Committee would be holding its last meeting the following day, that the First Committee and the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee would be concluding their work at the end of the week or at the beginning of the following week, the Fifth Committee in the course of the week and the Sixth Committee probably on Wednesday, 30 January. In the circumstances, the General Assembly would be able to close its session on 5 February, provided the Third Committee concluded its work on 31 January and so enabled the Joint Second and Third Committee to complete its agenda.

57. It was therefore necessary that the Committee should complete in one week its examination of the draft international covenant on human rights, of chapter V of the Economic and Social Council's report (with the exception of section I), and of the draft protocol relating to the status of stateless persons. In order to do that, the Third Committee would have to hold three meetings a day from Monday, 28 January, to Thursday, 31 January. However, that programme could be altered at the end of the week if the Committee had made sufficient progress by that time.

58. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) urged the members of the Committee, in order to obviate night meetings, to reduce the number and length of their speeches, for example, by referring to earlier speeches as the Belgian representative had done. For himself, he would waive

the thirty minutes to which he was entitled and would make only a brief statement.

59. Mr. PAVLOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that in connexion with the draft protocol relating to the status of stateless persons,¹ the Vice-Chairman of the Committee had said that the Sixth Committee would study the legal aspects of the question. The USSR representative wished to know

whether the Sixth Committee had concluded that examination, which ought to precede the Third Committee's study of the matter.

60. The CHAIRMAN said that, when the agenda items had been allocated to the Main Committees, the General Committee of the Assembly had decided quite definitely that the draft protocol in question would be studied by the Third Committee before being considered by the Sixth Committee.

¹Item 58 of the General Assembly agenda.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.