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Chairman : Mrs. Ana FIGUEROA (Chile).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Dehousse (Belgium), Vice-Chairman, presided.

Refugees and stateless persons (*continued*)

[Item 30]*

Problems of assistance to refugees: reports of the International Refugee Organization and of the High Commissioner for Refugees (A/1884 (chapter VI), A/1948, A/2011, A/C.3/563, A/C.3/L.199, A/C.3/L.200, A/C.3/L.201) (*continued*)

[Item 31]*

DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC (A/C.3/L.201)

1. Mr. KUSOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that his delegation's sole purpose in submitting its draft resolution (A/C.3/L.201) was to put an end to the abnormal situation resulting from the failure to implement General Assembly resolutions 8 (I) and 62 (I), which had recommended the early repatriation of displaced persons to their countries of origin.

2. It was an established fact, which had been proved once again during the general debate, that in defiance of those resolutions, the Western Powers, and the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France in particular, had made every effort to prevent the nationals of the USSR and the peoples' democracies from returning to their countries because they found in the refugees a source of cheap man-power and wished to recruit agents and mercenaries from among them to serve the United States plans of aggression. The representatives of those countries had tried in vain to refute the evidence adduced, but had only been able to make general and unfounded statements, and had failed to

reply to a single one of the specific charges against them. Failure to implement the General Assembly resolutions was a fact, and the High Commissioner himself had admitted that six years after their adoption 400,000 persons were still languishing in International Refugee Organization camps. Figures given in a German newspaper, which had recently published a detailed survey of the numbers and nationalities of the displaced persons in the United States, British and French zones of occupation in Germany, showed how many nationals of the USSR and the peoples' democracies were vainly asking to return home. The Byelorussian representative asked how the High Commissioner could hope to convince the Third Committee that there was no longer anyone to be repatriated. As for the persons who had been forcibly resettled in other countries, hundreds of thousands of them would return to their own countries if allowed to do so.

3. In the face of those activities of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, as well as IRO, in the past, and of the Office of the High Commissioner at the current time, his delegation could not agree to point 1 of the Syrian amendment (A/C.3/L.202/Rev.1), which proposed that those States should not be referred to by name. There was no reason why the General Assembly should conceal the facts or why the guilty should not be denounced. Point 2 of the Syrian amendment added nothing to the original draft and was therefore pointless. In point 3 of its amendment, the Syrian delegation asked for the deletion of the word "forced" from paragraph 2. Since that amendment apparently constituted a somewhat wider interpretation of the same idea, and since compulsion could be exercised in many ways, he was prepared to accept it.

4. He could not, on the other hand, agree to the deletion of paragraph 3 of his draft resolution, since that paragraph condemned as incompatible with the principles of the Charter and with the accepted practice

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

of international law the attempts by certain Member States, and primarily by the United States of America, to recruit displaced persons for subversive and diversionary activities in the territory of the USSR and the peoples' democracies. It was impossible for the Byelorussian SSR not to ask the General Assembly to condemn such activities, which the United States openly acknowledged by enacting legislation to provide funds specifically for the organization of espionage. The votes of the various delegations for or against that paragraph would show whether the States they represented sincerely sought to safeguard the peace or whether they were under the orders of the United States of America.

5. Failure to implement the General Assembly's resolutions had been amply proved and the General Assembly was entitled to call upon States to implement them. If governments agreed in good faith to carry out repatriation, the problem of refugees would disappear. There would no longer be any need for IRO, the Office of the High Commissioner, regional offices, or special appropriations. He therefore called on all members of the Third Committee to support a draft resolution which constituted the sole means of achieving a just and equitable solution.

6. Mr. MUFTI (Syria) said that his delegation was not directly concerned with the three draft resolutions before the Third Committee (A/C.3/L.199, A/C.3/L.200 and A/C.3/L.201), since the Palestine refugees had formed the subject of a General Assembly resolution (resolution 212 (III)) in 1948. It had, however, felt bound to intervene, as it supported the principles of the repatriation of refugees who expressed the desire therefor. He emphasized that there could be no question of repatriating anyone against his will. The right of asylum granted to political refugees was a sacred right and had been embodied in the Syrian Constitution.

7. His delegation had submitted a number of amendments to the Byelorussian draft resolution on the one hand (A/C.3/L.202/Rev.1), and to the draft resolution submitted jointly by Colombia, Denmark, Lebanon, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Uruguay on the other hand (A/C.3/L.207/Rev.3). He urged the Committee to consider those amendments solely from the humanitarian viewpoint, leaving all political considerations aside. A number of delegations, however, had criticized the Syrian delegation on four counts: it had been criticized for supporting paragraph 1 of the Byelorussian draft resolution, although that paragraph, in its amended form, was very moderate and merely noted that certain Member States had failed to implement General Assembly resolution 8 (I). In view, however, of the small proportion of refugees who had returned to their countries of origin, only two hypotheses were possible: that those who had not done so had not wished to do so or that they had been dissuaded from doing so. The reports were silent on that point, and pending an explanation, his delegation could only accept the second hypothesis.

8. His delegation had been criticized for accepting paragraph 2 of the Byelorussian draft resolution, although the word "forced" had been deleted. It had

also been criticized for introducing political considerations into purely humanitarian questions. To that he must reply that it was no secret that the refugee problem existed only as a result of the political antagonism between two clearly defined groups of States. One group feared the creation of pockets of resistance within their frontiers, while the other group sought to develop them. That, unfortunately, had nothing to do with the real refugee problem. The important thing for his delegation was to safeguard legality. That was why it always urged that General Assembly resolutions should be implemented. Lastly, it was criticized for always thinking of its own problems, but the best way to stop it from doing so would be to find a just solution for the problems.

9. His delegation's other amendments stemmed from the two principles he had stated. As for the amendments he had submitted to the Byelorussian draft resolution, he was compelled to withdraw them since the Byelorussian delegation wished to preserve its original wording.

10. Mr. HOLMBACK (Sweden) said that his delegation could not support the Byelorussian draft resolution, since, although it referred to certain provisions of General Assembly resolution 8 (I), it failed to take into account the clause which stated that no displaced persons should be repatriated against their will, with the exception of war criminals and traitors. It was unnecessary to recall that the principle of freedom of choice was perfectly in harmony with humanitarian principles and with article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and that every person had the right to seek asylum from persecution in other countries.

11. Sweden abided by that principle and considered that it was for governments to decide whether the refusal to be repatriated was justified. One factor in that decision was the question whether the refugees' countries of origin allowed the outside world to know how those who had been repatriated were treated. His own experience with refugees enabled him to state that the refugees from the countries of Eastern Europe based their fears on the fact that those countries let nothing be known of what happened to those who returned to them.

12. In paragraph 5 of the Byelorussian draft resolution governments were invited to submit to the Secretariat of the United Nations full information regarding the refugees and displaced persons in their territories. Official statistics were published each month on the refugees and displaced persons in, or arriving in, Sweden. The submission of data on individual cases could not be considered by the Swedish Government; that would be very inhuman since it would deeply frighten those refugees who thought that such information could hurt their relatives still living in the country they had come from. The Swedish delegation could raise other objections to the Byelorussian draft resolution, but did not think there was any point in doing so.

13. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) said that although it had not participated in the general debate, his delegation had nevertheless followed it attentively and had found it very instructive. He would confine himself to

stating his position on the draft resolutions before the Third Committee. His delegation would not vote in favour of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the Byelorussian draft resolution. In so doing it would merely be following the firm line it had always taken in refusing to join in the condemnation of certain States by others, and, just as it had never voted in favour of resolutions attacking the USSR, it would not vote in favour of a text condemning the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France. The Byelorussian representative had said that those who voted against paragraph 3 of his draft resolution would show that they were under the orders of the United States of America; he could not have had Afghanistan in mind, as that country was too close to the USSR for the Soviet delegations not to know that it did not allow anyone to dictate its actions. He asked that the various paragraphs of the Byelorussian draft resolution should be voted upon separately. He would have to abstain from voting on the draft resolution as a whole unless it were amended.

14. As regards the draft resolution submitted jointly by Colombia, Denmark, Lebanon, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Uruguay (A/C.3/L.200), he had no objection to it in principle and would vote in its favour, on the understanding that paragraph 3 of the operative part involved only a moral obligation and that the fact of voting in its favour did not commit his Government. As regards paragraph 1, he supported it in principle but, while acknowledging that it was quite legitimate to give priority in the matter of assistance to the most needy groups, he considered that it would be better not to confine the benefit of the funds in question to the refugees within the mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner, and that it would be better if the appeal were issued by the United Nations itself. Those observations should not be construed as an objection. He would vote in favour of the draft resolution, while reserving his Government's position. He would also vote in favour of the Syrian amendment (A/C.3/L.207/Rev.3) to that draft resolution.

15. Mr. REYES (Philippines) said he would vote against the draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR because it made no contribution to the solution of the refugee problem and was clearly intended only to exploit their distress for purposes of political propaganda. Such an attitude tended to aggravate international tension and thus prevent instead of facilitating a just solution of the problem.

16. Mrs. DOMANSKA (Poland) supported unreservedly the draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR, which condemned the policy of the United States of America. The charges had been abundantly proved, both so far as the States mentioned and so far as IRO and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees were concerned. She appealed to all delegations to vote for the draft resolution.

17. Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia) recalled that his delegation had already given the reasons of principle for which it would vote for the draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR. He would say why it could not accept the Syrian amendments. There were certain questions of principle on which it was not

possible to compromise. The Byelorussian draft reaffirmed the need for ensuring respect for the resolutions of the General Assembly and condemned certain States which refused to implement them. The Syrian amendment weakened the text of the Byelorussian draft resolution. The delegations of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia had adduced facts in support of their charges and those facts had not been refuted. The States named in the draft resolution must therefore be denounced as chiefly responsible for the situation in which the refugees found themselves.

18. In his view, it was also impossible to delete paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, which derived directly from the Charter. It could not be denied that the attempts charged had actually been made. The delegation of the United States of America had scarcely tried to deny that the acts concerned had really been committed. On the exceptional occasions when it had attempted to do so, its denials had amounted to confessions. For those reasons the Czechoslovak delegation would vote for the draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR and called upon all delegations to do the same.

19. Mr. ROCHEFORT (France) said he had been able to give only a brief account of the reasons why the French delegation would vote against the draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR. The USSR delegation had played its part in the decision (378th and 379th meetings) to limit the time allowed for exercising the right of reply. The fact was that it did not want to hear the truth. The truth was indeed embarrassing when it was a matter of voting on a draft resolution based on nothing but falsehoods. Since he had not been given the opportunity to answer the Soviet delegations properly, he had had the text of the speech he would have liked to make distributed. News would be found in it of Mr. Zaitzev. As for the sixty tubercular refugees to whom reference had been made, he ventured to remind the representative of the Byelorussian SSR that Samar was not in Indo-China but in the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of the Byelorussian draft resolution calling upon governments to furnish complete information regarding the refugees constituted the clearest possible admission that the refugees did not wish to apply to the embassies and consulates of their countries of origin.

20. An attempt had been made to improve the Byelorussian draft resolution; it had not been successful, for it was impossible to make a work of war into a work of peace.

21. So far as the draft resolution (A/C.3/L.199) on the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was concerned, the text gave him complete satisfaction.

22. Mrs. ROOSEVELT (United States of America) said the draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR unjustly condemned the policy of IRO and the High Commissioner which, in reality, had never sought to replace repatriation by the forced settlement of displaced persons in other countries. She added that the draft contained unjustified charges against certain Member States. She would therefore vote against it and

hoped the draft would be rejected by the great majority of the members of the Committee.

23. Mr. SMITT INGEBRETSEN (Norway) endorsed the opinion of the representative of Sweden. The Norwegian delegation would vote against the adoption of the draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR, which unjustly discredited the work done for the refugees by IRO and the High Commissioner.

24. Norway had supported the work of IRO, for which it had provided funds. He recalled that formerly Dr. Nansen had gone to Russia to bring aid to millions of persons threatened with famine. That example should be followed and an attempt should be made to relieve the sufferings of the displaced persons without regard to any political considerations.

25. The Norwegian delegation would therefore vote for the two draft resolutions (A/C.3/L.199 and A/C.3/L.200), for they seemed likely to enable the High Commissioner to accomplish effectively his difficult task in the service of mankind.

26. Mr. KOS (Yugoslavia) said the Yugoslav delegation still had a number of reservations to make in connexion with certain activities of IRO, but it would nevertheless vote against the draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR. Actually, the Government of the USSR had not yet returned to Yugoslavia the Yugoslav children which it was forcibly keeping in its territory and had not even considered it necessary to answer the protests transmitted to it through diplomatic channels. The Government of the USSR and the governments of the other countries of Eastern Europe were using deserters and so-called political emigrants from Yugoslavia for criminal and subversive purposes. Lastly, the Government of the USSR refused to receive Soviet citizens then in Yugoslav territory, although the Yugoslav Government had on several occasions requested their repatriation.

27. The Yugoslav delegation therefore considered that the draft resolution had been submitted purely for propaganda purposes and that the disparity that was to be noted between the actions and the words of the USSR was so obvious that there was no choice but to vote against the draft resolution and for the other two texts which had been submitted to the Committee and which seemed likely to assist the High Commissioner's efforts.

28. Mr. MENEMFCIOGLU (Turkey) said he would vote against the draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR for the reasons already adduced by a number of delegations and particularly by the delegation of New Zealand (378th meeting). While supporting the various points of the Syrian amendment in principle, he was gratified to note that its author had thought it desirable to withdraw them, for it seemed to him that no amendment was capable of rectifying the text of the draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR.

29. Mr. PAVLOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he would vote for the draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR, which alone was in

accordance with the principles of resolution 8 (I), by which the General Assembly had recommended that the displaced persons should be encouraged and assisted to return as early as possible to their countries of origin. That resolution had established a clear distinction between, on the one hand, genuine refugees and displaced persons—who, if they advanced satisfactory reasons for not returning to their countries, were to be protected by the organization to be established by the United Nations—and, on the other hand, war criminals, quislings and traitors, who were to be handed over without delay to the authorities in their countries of origin. Despite those provisions, however, some States were tending increasingly to confuse the two cases and to grant war criminals the same treatment as refugees and displaced persons. For its part, the USSR delegation considered such an attitude inadmissible.

30. In its report for 1951, the International Refugee Organization had stated that, according to information received, more than a thousand displaced persons living in camps had expressed the desire for repatriation. Without taking that desire into account, however, the High Commissioner was trying to avoid repatriation and to replace it by the forced settlement of displaced persons abroad. He protested against that tendency and recalled that the High Commissioner was obliged by his Statute (General Assembly resolution 428 (V), annex) to promote the voluntary repatriation of all refugees and displaced persons.

31. Concerning the motives of those who sought to disregard the decisions adopted in 1946 and to perpetuate the refugee problem, it was enough to refer to an act recently promulgated in the United States of America and to hear the representatives of that country in order to realize that the United States was employing all means to recruit displaced persons for sabotage and diversionary activities in the territory of the USSR and the peoples' democracies. Such a practice was incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The delegation of the USSR was not indulging in gratuitous charges; in support of its statements it had already quoted definite facts and figures which the delegations of the United States of America and other countries had only vaguely denied.

32. In 1946, the General Assembly had stated (resolution 8 (I)) that in its view the case of those Germans who had been transferred to Germany from other countries or who had fled to other countries before the Allied troops did not fall within the framework of the refugee problem. Despite that declaration, however, it was desired at any price to regard those Germans as refugees and cause them to live as refugees in order to organize them subsequently into units of a new Wehrmacht for the purposes of a future war against the peoples' democracies.

33. When displaced persons in camps expressed the desire to return to their homes and countries they were threatened with punishment and subjected to the influence of fascist groups composed of former SS men or collaborators with the nazis, who used all means to influence their judgment and dissuade them from applying for repatriation. So far as ordinary criminals

were concerned, it could not be denied that they should answer for their crimes and that they had less right than any others to the status of refugees.

34. He would oppose the establishment of branch offices representing the Office of the High Commissioner in various countries. In view of the lines along which the High Commissioner was working, those offices would only serve to place obstacles in the way of repatriation.

35. The representative of France had indulged in false charges when he said that the delegation of the USSR was one of those which had wished to limit the length of replies and that it had not been opposed to the closure of the debate. That allegation was, if not a misrepresentation of the truth, at least the result of a misunderstanding.

36. The draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR represented the best and most humane solution, the only solution that could possibly be adopted from the point of view both of principle and of practice.

37. Mr. DE ALBA (Mexico) said the draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR was so extravagantly worded that it was impossible to consider amending it or to find parts of it on which an attempt at conciliation could be based.

38. The representative of the Philippines had stated that the authors of that draft had deliberately sought to increase the existing international tension. There seemed to be a vicious circle: international tension did not diminish because the Committee could not find for problems like that of the refugees and displaced persons a solution that could satisfy everybody; and on the other hand, the problem of the refugees and displaced persons could not be solved because international tension did not diminish.

39. At the beginning of every session of the General Assembly, Member States expressed the hope that great progress might be made towards strengthening peace and establishing international co-operation. Every year they had to accept the evidence of the facts and to note that no progress had been recorded.

40. The Mexican delegation was unable to support the Byelorussian draft resolution, and considered in fact that the serious charges made against certain Member States in that draft were devoid of all foundation. Furthermore, the charges were directed against the most generous countries, countries which had not hesitated to open their doors to foreign refugees. They were not to blame if in certain cases it had been impossible for them to solve the refugee problem completely. It was easy to understand that in the case of Spanish refugees, for example, repatriation would have been impossible in view of the fact that, as the representative of Uruguay had stated (377th meeting), it was easy to foresee what fate would await them if they returned to Spain.

41. Furthermore, the Byelorussian draft resolution implied censure of the work of the High Commissioner, although he had only just assumed his duties and could not be held responsible for the heavy burden he had inherited from the International Refugee Organization.

The Mexican delegation considered that, instead of expressing an unfavourable opinion on the policy of the High Commissioner's Office in advance, the Third Committee should, on the contrary, show its confidence in the High Commissioner in order that he could undertake under the most favourable conditions the enormous task devolving upon him.

42. The current situation of the refugees and displaced persons raised a problem which would have to be solved gradually at the cost of much patient effort. It would be presumptuous to expect that it would be possible to repatriate all refugees and displaced persons during 1952. The Mexican delegation would support the Syrian amendment (A/C.3/L.207/Rev.3) to the joint draft resolution, which took that necessity into account. It considered the amendments a substantial improvement on the text of the draft resolution.

43. The problem of the refugees and displaced persons was of interest to mankind as a whole, and therefore a solution must be found for it which would meet with universal approval.

44. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) would not have had any objection to accepting some points of the Byelorussian draft resolution, together with the amendments proposed by the representative of Syria. As the amendments had, however, been withdrawn, he would abstain from voting on some parts of the draft because he had the same doubts as the representative of Afghanistan. The three first paragraphs appeared to him to be unacceptable because they implied a censure the correctness of which it was impossible to prove or disprove. He would have voted for the last two paragraphs with the Syrian amendments, but in the absence of those amendments he would abstain. Finally, he would abstain from voting on the draft resolution as a whole, although he would have preferred to retain the passages relating to repatriation.

45. As regards the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.200), he regretted the negative form of some passages, especially that of the second paragraph in the preamble which mentioned refugees "who will not have been repatriated or resettled". He also regretted that paragraph 3 of the operative part seemed to encourage resettlement rather than repatriation. Consequently, he would vote for the draft only if the Syrian amendment were adopted. If not, he would abstain.

46. As regards the draft resolution concerning the convention relating to refugees, he had no objection to it, and he supported the observations of the representative of Afghanistan.

47. He deplored the fact that the members of the Third Committee had permitted themselves to indulge in attacks and counter-attacks which did nothing to further the Committee's work. He had no doubt that some excessively romantic refugees had found a vocation in espionage, but their number could only be infinitesimal, and besides, it was certain that those refugees were themselves victims of circumstances.

48. Mr. YU TSUNE-CHI (China) noted that the Byelorussian draft resolution (A/C.3/L.201) contradicted point by point the views expressed by the Chinese dele-

gation regarding the High Commissioner's work, the work of IRO and the generous aid given by certain countries, especially the United States of America. The Chinese delegation could not remain silent in the face of the attacks that had accompanied the presentation of the draft resolution (376th meeting). It felt it necessary to mention the sabotage committed against the work done by the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the International Labour Organisation and aid to Korea and to denounce the draft resolution as a simple propaganda manoeuvre. It also asked who, in reality, had resorted to the subversive and diversionary activities referred to in the draft resolution. The Chinese delegation paid a tribute to the commendable efforts of the representative of Syria, who had himself had to abandon his attempts at conciliation.

49. As a result, the Chinese delegation would not only vote against the draft resolution while most categorically condemning it, but would also urge delegations which had so far displayed considerable forbearance not to abstain but to vote resolutely against the text submitted by the Byelorussian SSR.

50. As regards the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.200) the Chinese delegation supported it, because it was in accordance with the attitude which the Chinese delegation had adopted during the general discussion and afforded the High Commissioner full latitude to work towards improvement of the lot of the refugees.

51. Mr. SHCHERBATJUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that he would vote for the Byelorussian draft resolution because it contained concrete proposals which alone would make it possible to solve the refugee problem.

52. He had noted that in the debate nobody had refuted the facts submitted by the representatives of the peoples' democracies regarding the miserable lot of the displaced persons in the camps and their forcible transfer overseas. The United States of America had not replied to the questions raised about the situation of refugees taken to the United States and the recruitment of spies from among them. The representative of France had attempted to reply to the Ukrainian arguments, but had adduced no proofs and had not stated why the French Government did not permit 30,000 Soviet citizens to return to the Soviet Union. He cited the case of a Soviet citizen who had been arrested in the United Kingdom when he sought the USSR consulate and had been arbitrarily committed to a lunatic asylum when he refused to speak. Such data gave the justification for paragraph 1 of the Byelorussian draft resolution which maintained that the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and certain other countries were failing to aid the displaced persons to return to their country, as resolution 8 (I) had directed.

53. Replying to the representative of Venezuela, he pointed out that the complaint of European emigrants settled in Venezuela regarding housing conditions and the delay in providing them with work had not come from the delegations of the Byelorussian SSR or the Ukrainian SSR, but had been addressed directly to the United Nations by the persons concerned.

54. He also took issue with those who appeared to question the existence of the Ukraine and stated that he was prepared to supply them with information regarding the establishment of that country, which had existed as a sovereign State since 1917.

55. The CHAIRMAN stated that the representative of the Ukrainian SSR was the last speaker on his list.

56. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) submitted a motion for adjournment.

The motion for adjournment was rejected by 24 votes to 4, with 20 abstentions.

57. Mr. ROCHEFORT (France), replying to the representative of the USSR, stated that he had not made any false charges and that there must be some misunderstanding. He had not said that the USSR had voted against the granting of the right to reply, but that it had voted twice in favour of upholding the Committee's decision to limit the time allowed to speakers under the right to reply as could be seen from the summary records of the Committee's meetings.

58. Mr. CORLEY SMITH (United Kingdom) recalled that during the general debate the delegations of the USSR and of the peoples' democracies had launched attacks for hours on end against the United Kingdom and other governments, whereas the Committee had only granted him ten minutes in which to reply to those insults. Yet he had loyally abided by that decision. He considered it highly improper that he and others were being reproached for not having replied when they had not been given the time to do so.

59. The CHAIRMAN, in accordance with the request of the representative of Afghanistan, called for a vote on the Byelorussian draft resolution (A/C.3/L.201) paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraph 1 was rejected by 35 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.

Paragraph 2 was rejected by 38 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.

Paragraph 3 was rejected by 37 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.

Paragraph 4 was rejected by 31 votes to 7, with 9 abstentions.

Paragraph 5 was rejected by 25 votes to 8, with 11 abstentions.

60. All parts of the draft resolution having been rejected, the CHAIRMAN pointed out that under the terms of rule 128 of the rules of procedure, the text as a whole need not be put to the vote and that the draft resolution submitted by the Byelorussian SSR (A/C.3/L.201) was rejected.

61. He asked the members of the Committee to express their views on the joint draft resolution submitted by Colombia, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Uruguay and Yugoslavia (A/C.3/L.199) concerning the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

JOINT DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY COLOMBIA, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, URUGUAY, AND YUGOSLAVIA (A/C.3/L.199)

62. Mr. CORLEY SMITH (United Kingdom), on

behalf of his delegation and of the co-authors, introduced the joint draft resolution (A/C.3/L.199), the meaning of which was sufficiently clear from the preceding discussion.

63. Mr. FRIIS (Denmark) stated that his delegation would vote for the joint draft resolution. The Danish Government was examining the possibility of ratifying the convention, which it had already signed, but could not deny that it regretted that the instrument contained the so-called "federal" clause. He wished to stress that his delegation's attitude towards the joint draft resolution must not prejudice the stand it would take on that important point when other international agreements were under consideration.

64. As regards the discussion of certain administrative problems in the Third Committee, he considered that it had permitted the Committee to hear a number of observations and suggestions of great interest and that new information had been given in the replies to questions raised by the members of the Third Committee. He did not feel, however, that it would be possible for the Third Committee to approve a collective statement on the subject in the form of a draft resolution. In order, however, not to disappoint the Fifth Committee, which was waiting for some indication as to the views of the Third Committee on the practical aspects of the High Commissioner's task, the Danish delegation suggested that the Third Committee should ask its Chairman to contact the Chairman of the Fifth Committee and transmit to him the records of the Committee's discussions and its report on the refugee problem, drawing the Fifth Committee's attention parti-

cularly to the various observations made in connexion with the question of representatives or branch offices of the High Commissioner's Office.

65. Mr. PAVLOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) considered that the duration of meetings should be restricted so as to enable the representatives to fulfil other obligations.

66. Mr. ROY (Haiti), remarking on the lateness of the hour, pointed out that the Committee was proceeding to consider a new matter. He was of the opinion that the meeting should be adjourned.

67. Mr. HARRY (Australia) proposed that the list of speakers on the joint draft resolution on the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (A/C.3/L.199) should be closed.

It was so agreed.

68. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon), Rapporteur, stated that the Fifth Committee had decided to begin to consider the problems of assistance to refugees on 14 January 1952 and that he must have sufficient time to prepare his report.

69. Mr. ROY (Haiti) proposed that the list of speakers on the joint draft resolution on problems of assistance to refugees (A/C.3/L.200) should be closed.

It was so agreed.

70. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) moved the adjournment of the meeting.

The motion was adopted by 35 votes to 1, with 10 abstentions.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.