Freedom of information

(b) Interference with radio signals: Economic and Social Council resolution 306 B (XI) (A/1397 and A/C.3/L.112) ................. 279

Chairman: Mr. G. J. van Heuven Goedhart (Netherlands).

Frederick K. Haynes, Jr., U.S.A.

[Item 30]*

(b) Interference with radio signals: Economic and Social Council resolution 306 B (XI) (A/1397 and A/C.3/L.112)

1. The CHAIRMAN invited the Committee to consider Economic and Social Council resolution 306 B (XI) on interference with radio signals.

2. AZMI Bey (Egypt) noted that in the resolution the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press had submitted to the Economic and Social Council on the question, it had declared its opinion that radio operating agencies in the Soviet Union were deliberately interfering with the reception by the people of the USSR of certain radio signals originating beyond the territory of the Soviet Union. Most members of the Economic and Social Council had considered that a particular State should not be mentioned in a resolution of that kind. The resolution recommended by the Economic and Social Council for adoption therefore made no reference to the USSR; it merely said that the radio operating agencies in some countries were deliberately interfering with the reception by the people of those countries of certain radio signals originating beyond their territories, and recommended that the General Assembly should call upon all Member States to refrain from such interference with the right of their peoples to freedom of information.

3. The Egyptian delegation fully supported the resolution as submitted by the Economic and Social Council, and was convinced that it would be supported by all delegations which, like that of Egypt, believed that interference was not carried out by a single State alone.

4. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) considered that the text of the resolution, which was reproduced in the note by the Secretary-General (A/1397) was not properly speaking, a General Assembly resolution. In its place he proposed a draft resolution (A/C.3/L.112) under which the General Assembly would adopt the declaration in Economic and Social Council resolution 306 B (XI) to the effect that that type of interference constituted a violation of the accepted principles of information and that all measures of that nature were to be condemned as a denial of the right of all persons to be fully informed concerning news, opinions and ideas regardless of frontiers, and would invite all Member States to refrain from such interference with the right of their peoples to freedom of information.

5. The First Committee had recently adopted by 43 votes to none, with 8 abstentions, a draft resolution once again condemning all propaganda against peace, and recommending the free exchange of information and ideas. By that draft resolution the First Committee declared such propaganda to include not only direct incitement to conflicts or acts of aggression, but also all measures tending to isolate the peoples from any contact with the outside world, by preventing the Press, radio and other media of information from reporting international events, and measures tending to silence or distort the activities of the United Nations in favour of peace.

6. In adopting the resolution placed before it, the Third Committee would therefore merely be following in the steps of the First Committee.

7. Mrs. SAMPSON (United States of America) said that the United States considered interference with radio signals a flagrant violation of the principle of freedom of information.

8. Jamming was not a new development. During the Second World War, Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and Japan had used it on a wide scale to prevent their people from learning of United Nations victories, and in particular Soviet victories.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda

9. Jamming consisted in drowning a radio signal by various noises of different intensities. The USSR Government had begun to jam foreign broadcasts in the Russian language in February 1948. For that purpose it had erected a far-flung network of transmitters; and radio engineers who had studied the problem estimated that more than a thousand jammers were being used. In April 1949, the Soviet Union had begun a determined attempt to black out all broadcasts beamed to the Soviet Union. Since then, Soviet jammers had interfered with foreign broadcasts beamed to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Apparently the Government of the Soviet Union had taken upon itself the right to determine what the people even in those countries should hear from abroad.

10. For eighteen months the USSR Government had been operating a network of jammers more elaborate and more costly than the entire international broadcasting service of the United States. That was a clear indication of the importance the Soviet régime attached to its jamming activities.

11. Such measures were a clear violation of the Cairo and Atlantic City international telecommunication conventions, both of which had been ratified by the United States and the Soviet Union.

12. The United States had protested in that connexion to the Soviet Government, but its protests had been ignored. The United States had also informed the International Telecommunication Union that the illegal interference of the Soviet Union would compel the United States to take action to protect its broadcasts, but that it would make every effort to avoid inconvenience to other members of ITU which were adhering to their international obligations in that field.

13. In the meantime, the Soviet Union was broadcasting to foreign countries on a very extensive scale, and some of those broadcasts attacked the régimes of the countries concerned. Yet no one denied the right of the Government of the Soviet Union to beam radio programmes to foreign countries or the right of people to listen to them. Moscow radio not only broadcast freely to the United States, but the times and wave-lengths of its programmes were regularly published in the New York Times. The American people were used to making up their own minds; anybody who asked for foreign propaganda directed at the United States to be jammed would certainly meet with a hostile reception.

14. What were the reasons for systematic jamming by the USSR? A year previously, Mr. Vyshinsky had said that the Soviet régime had jammed foreign broadcasts in order to protect the broadcasters from the antagonism of the Russian people; listeners in the Soviet Union, he had said, would rise up in anger if they heard the "nonsense and trash" broadcast to them from abroad. Surely, the explanation must really lie elsewhere; it was easy to stop nonsense on the radio by turning it off. A government which maintained the largest propaganda monopoly in the world should be able to expose what it called the "lies and slander" of the foreign radio, if the broadcasts were falsehoods. But that had not been done. Must it then be concluded that the Soviet leaders feared the truth; that they did not believe their own picture of the non-Soviet world; did they doubt whether that picture could stand up against the facts broadcast from foreign lands, or was it that they did not trust their people to be able to judge for themselves what was true and what was false?

15. If the Soviet leaders did have faith in their own position and did trust their people's judgment, why did they erect that artificial barrier between their people and the foreign radio? As everyone knew, the radio was the only means through which citizens of the Soviet Union could still have contact with the world outside. Jamming was not an isolated action; it was but the latest of many attempts by the USSR to isolate the Russian people from other countries and peoples.

16. The Government was conducting a terrifying experiment. The Soviet régime incessantly repeated that some countries were trying to start another war, that the Republic of Korea had attacked North Korea, and that the United States was on the verge of economic collapse and had millions of unemployed. As everyone knew, that was not the case. The Soviet propaganda policy was deliberately designed to make the Russian people hate and fear the rest of the world; and by jamming foreign broadcasts the USSR Government was attempting to prevent other countries from interfering with its plans. There could be no doubt that the people of the USSR, like people everywhere, were genuinely curious about life outside their frontiers; that they wanted to know how other people led their daily lives, brought up their children, earned their living. But what they heard about those things from foreign broadcasts did not always square with the caricature offered by the Soviet Press and radio. Their government had found only one solution to the problem: that of blacking out everything but the official picture. Thus the USSR Government, far from championing peace, as it claimed, was undermining the very foundations of peace, which were mutual understanding and co-operation: among the peoples.

17. The United States delegation therefore believed that the General Assembly should adopt the Economic and Social Council resolution, which, by doing away with barriers to freedom of information, would enable the world to take a step towards the achievement of understanding and co-operation.

18. Mr. Roshchin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the real purpose of the United States in asking for the question of interference with radio signals to be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly had been to secure United Nations support for the "psychological war" it was waging against the national liberation movements in Asia, the peoples' democracies, the USSR and the People's Republic of China.

19. Military circles in the United States of America and the United Kingdom had not failed to appreciate the need to supplement their rearrangement programmes by an intense psychological campaign and by inflaming public opinion against the peoples of the Soviet Union. The United States and the United Kingdom had assiduously sought every means of intensifying the "psychological war", and had been quick to realize the essential importance of the part radio might play in that connexion. They had therefore appropriated increasingly large sums for their broadcasting services, had set themselves the task of establishing new transmitters
throughout the world and had assigned the work of broadcasting their war propaganda to two special organizations—the "Voice of America" and the British Broadcasting Corporation.

20. Broadcasts from the United Kingdom and the United States systematically endeavoured to sow confusion by presenting a false picture of events in the Soviet Union. While, for example, a report published by the Statistical Office of the USSR showed that in 1949 the general level of production had been 53 per cent higher than in 1940, and that there had been an increase of 17 per cent in the national income as compared with the previous year; while the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the world economic situation in 1949 showed that industrial production in the USSR was on the increase and that the standards of living of workers and peasants had improved, the "Voice of America" had referred in a broadcast of 26 January 1950, without quoting any figures, to a fall in the national income of the USSR and a price increase which, it was scarcely necessary to say, bore absolutely no relation to the truth.

21. While in March 1950 the USSR Government had decreed a general price reduction for foodstuffs and manufactured goods for the third time since the monetary reform in 1947, the British Broadcasting Corporation had stated in a broadcast that the officially announced price reduction would probably remain a dead letter, and that in any case it affected only such luxury goods as motor cars, television sets and pianos.

22. On 22 May 1950 the British Broadcasting Corporation had stated in one of its broadcasts that the USSR Government tolerated no criticism, and that it was because some of the members of the Supreme Council intended to voice criticism that the Council had not been convened. The truth was that at the time of that broadcast the Supreme Council had already been convened, and that when it met a number of representatives had seriously criticized certain ministerial acts.

23. In making their broadcasting services available for lying propaganda, the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom, far from promoting the purpose of the United Nations, which was the maintenance of international peace and security, directly impeded it. The position of the United States and the United Kingdom in that respect was incompatible with resolution 127 (11) of the General Assembly.

24. All nations must seek to protect their people against the harmful effects of the war propaganda disseminated by military circles in the United States and the United Kingdom. By invoking the principle of freedom of information, those governments hoped to persuade the General Assembly to authorize them to continue their war propaganda with impunity and put the stamp of legality on their criminal acts.

25. The USSR delegation therefore appealed to the members of the Committee to reject the Economic and Social Council resolution: it was contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, since it did not stress the necessity of combating all false propaganda, which in itself was a threat to international peace.

26. The USSR delegation had several times indicated what principles it would like to see adopted. It had explained that it would favour any measures calculated to ensure the dissemination of true and objective information and had emphasized the importance of the part Press and information services could play in that dissemination.

27. Press and information organs had a great responsibility towards the people because of the information they disseminated. Their principal task was: (a) To promote the spread of all true and impartial information designed to maintain and strengthen peace and security throughout the world; (b) To promote implementation of General Assembly resolution 110 (II) relative to measures to be taken against propaganda for, and the inciters of, a new war, with a view to actively combating any propaganda for aggression, nazi, fascist or other, which might produce a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace; (c) To promote friendly relations between States, on the basis of respect for the independence and equality of all sovereign States, as well as of the accomplishment of tasks in conformity with the high aims and principles of the United Nations; (d) To combat all propaganda in favour of nazi or fascist views, in whatever form, as well as racist propaganda, national discrimination, hatred and scorn.

28. The United Nations should take steps to achieve the aims he had just enumerated. That would be a contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

29. Lord Macdonald (United Kingdom) said that of the two statements which had been made, that of the United States representative and that of the USSR representative, he would not hesitate to support the former.

30. The representative of the Soviet Union had admitted that his country jammed radio signals, sometimes because it did not like the reporters or commentators, sometimes because it did not consider the broadcasts to be in line with the truth.

31. Lord MacDonald quite understood that radio listeners would not listen to persons or programmes they disliked. All that was needed was to cut off the electric current, and fortunately every radio set had a switch for that purpose. What he could not understand was why the USSR Government wanted to prevent its people from listening to such broadcasts. A listener could judge the value of the programmes he heard, either by comparing the information broadcast with what he was able to see and note himself, or by applying to his own government for information.

32. In that respect, it was hard to believe that the USSR Government was not in a position to establish the facts with the means at its disposal. There was nothing to prevent it from refuting, to its own citizens, the allegations of certain foreign radio stations.

33. The USSR representative had endeavoured to justify radio jamming by resorting to the argument that a psychological war had been launched against his country. For its part, the United Kingdom knew noth-
ing of such a psychological war; its radio broadcasts merely tried to make the truth about events in various countries known to the people of the Soviet Union. That was precisely the reason why the USSR Government opposed the free dissemination of information. It wished to keep its people in ignorance of the truth.

Aside from the objections which his delegation had raised in the Economic and Social Council, and which it maintained, as regards the third paragraph, Lord MacDonald stated that as a whole the draft resolution before the Committee was acceptable to his delegation.

Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland) recalled that the question of jamming radio signals had been raised in the General Assembly in connexion with the question of freedom of information. It was therefore linked, in the minds of those who had raised it, with article 14 of the draft covenant on human rights, which was intended to protect that freedom. But there was reason to wonder what was hidden behind that formal aspect, and what persons or things the draft resolution was intended to protect.

The real question was the radio waves which crossed Europe and Asia to carry political propaganda designed to further the psychological war waged throughout the world by the United States of America. It was the many radio stations of the "Voice of America" the British Broadcasting Corporation, what was called Free Europe, Paris and Madrid. Those broadcasts, though in many languages, all said the same thing and all originated, as did their financial support, from the same source. The stations in question endeavoured to camouflage their activities by invoking the right to information and the duty to speak the truth, to spread culture and to bring peoples closer together.

The Polish delegation had always stressed the importance it attached to the question of exchange of information and achievements in cultural and scientific fields. The radio could play a major role in that connexion and bring closer understanding between peoples. Radio's constructive role consisted in disseminating true and impartial information, and, in the field of propaganda, in emphasizing certain social, cultural or political achievements.

But when, in place of disseminating that kind of information, in place of speaking the truth, radio was used to spread lies and slander, to broadcast accusations and insults against other peoples, to encourage espionage and sabotage and incite to war, it might be said to have become, like atomic energy, a scourge of mankind.

For that reason, no one was justified in availing himself of freedom of information in order to make such broadcasts. Article 14 of the draft covenant on human rights, imperfect though it was, was categorical in that respect. It stipulated that freedom of information might be subject to certain restrictions "for the protection of national security, public order, safety, health or morals, or of the rights, freedoms or reputations of others". Those restrictions were entirely applicable to the broadcasts of the "Voice of America", the British Broadcasting Corporation and Madrid. Each country had the sovereign right to defend itself against that form of aggression, just as it had the right to prevent opium smuggling, the sale of pornographic literature, or the traffic in persons. To attempt to drag the United Nations in as a defender of such radio broadcasts was one of the most pernicious and cynical acts ever recorded in the annals of international relations.

The records of the debates which had taken place in the United States Congress at the time of the vote on the budget for the "Voice of America" were sufficient evidence of the aggressive and criminal nature of the broadcasts in question. From the statements made in that connexion in 1949 and 1950 by Senators J. William Fulbright and Karl E. Mundt and by Assistant Secretary of State Edward W. Barrett, it was apparent that the "Voice of America" was a weapon of aggression designed to destroy the morale of certain peoples. The weapon had been used effectively during the war, but the world was no longer at war, and the chief objective of the United Nations was to maintain peace. Moreover, the "Voice of America" had not achieved the results it had expected, for it had encountered the resistance of societies sufficiently enlightened to recognize the reprehensible nature of such activities.

He wondered that what type of broadcast had in common with information, as he had described it. He had personally noted that in the programmes broadcast to Poland from Washington or Madrid, only a very little time was given to information, which was very biased, and the rest to false and slanderous propaganda. The "Voice of America" did its best to minimize or systematically deny Poland's constructive achievements. There was an example in the monetary reform of 6 November 1950, which had been the subject of misleading commentaries, whereas the preceding year the devaluation of the pound sterling had been received with enthusiasm by the same station.

Another method of propaganda used consisted of efforts to disturb friendly relations between neighbouring States. Every agreement concluded by Poland, the USSR, Czechoslovakia or other peoples' democracies was immediately denounced as a proof of servitude or exploitation. The same was true of the assistance that the USSR had generously given to Poland immediately after the war. Moreover, when Poland concluded agreements with Western nations, the "Voice of America" declared that the Polish Government had capitulated, that it had been abandoned by its friends, and that the socialist economy had failed. When Poland had signed an agreement with the Polish Catholic Church a year previously, radio stations that claimed to serve the cause of truth had continued for fifteen days to deny the existence of that agreement. Lastly, in order to disturb relations between Poland and East Germany and to encourage German revisionism, the "Voice of America" and Madrid radio almost every week warned the Polish inhabitants settled in the western territories of the temporary nature of the Oder-Neisse frontier.

Mr. Michalowski also referred to the practice of starting rumours of arrests, deportations and executions. In the spring one of the broadcasts in question had announced that he himself had been recalled from London to Warsaw and executed.

See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Eleventh Session, 405th meeting, para. 11.
44. Clearly, if there were an international law on defamation, such lies would be punished. Unfortunately lies were too cheap, and efforts were even made to place that type of activity under the protection of the United Nations.

45. But the most pernicious activity of stations such as the "Voice of America" was incitement to war—the assurance that conflict was imminent, the promise that the atomic bomb would be used, and appeals to commit sabotage. It would suffice to recall resolution 110 (II) of the General Assembly, by which the Assembly unanimously condemned propaganda for war, to show that the United Nations should not only refrain from supporting such activity but should condemn it.

46. Mr. Michalowski asserted that, in order to produce the broadcasts that he had described, those radio stations employed traitors, outlaws, and "turncoats" who had not succeeded in their own country and tried to conceal their failure under the cloak of patriotism. Furthermore, the "Voice of America" attempted to justify its activity on the pretext of dissemination of culture: it claimed to provide an accurate picture of life in the United States, of the ideas and activities of the American people. Unfortunately the American radio, as it was conducted, could not fulfill that role. In support of his statement, Mr. Michalowski cited Mr. John Crosby's criticism of the American radio in a recent issue of Life magazine.

47. He stressed the importance that Poland attached to the role of radio as an instrument for peace and referred to the efforts undertaken by his country in both the technical and the educational aspects of radio.

48. The United Nations should not serve as an instrument to defend the broadcasts that he had just described. On the contrary, it should undertake to define what was information in the true sense of the word and what was not. Unfortunately the efforts made in that direction, such as those undertaken by the Polish delegation, had been systematically blocked. There remained only article 14 of the draft covenant on human rights, the wording of which was superficial and inadequate.

49. Article 14 nevertheless sufficed to justify the rejection of the draft resolution under consideration. The submission of that draft was in fact a tactical manoeuvre, a camouflaged attack that fitted into the propaganda campaign that the United States of America was waging against the Soviet Union. The draft attempted to use the United Nations as an instrument for that propaganda, as a mere relay station for the "Voice of America", and should therefore be categorically rejected.

50. Mr. AZKOU (Lebanon) felt obliged to intervene in the discussion because the representatives of the USSR and Poland had attempted to extort a reprehensible practice into a principle, and in order to do so had taken their stand on the question of freedom of information.

51. He emphasized that for the first time a representative of the Soviet bloc had revealed his point of view on the question, and he recalled that when the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press had been considering the draft resolution, he had himself proposed that the reference to the Soviet Union should be deleted, not only because he was opposed in principle to the insertion of such specific references in a resolution, but because the representative of the USSR had not been present and he was reluctant to condemn a country in the absence of its representative. He had nevertheless voted for the resolution, because it established a principle.

52. The representative of the USSR had said, in substance, that psychological warfare should be proscribed, that the "Voice of America" was one of the arms in that warfare, and that it used only lies. He had concluded that the USSR ought to prevent the broadcasts of the "Voice of America" from reaching its territory.

53. Mr. Azkoul, on the contrary, felt that psychological war was desirable, since the world would approach its ideal of peace when it no longer had to fear armed conflict and when differences would give rise only to psychological wars. If that principle were accepted, the second argument could not stand; no one could be reproached for using all the means of communication at his disposal in order to convince his neighbour that he was in error. Lastly, he was not in a position to say whether the "Voice of America" based its broadcasts on lies; but, even if it did, the people had an inalienable right to hear lies and judge them. If those radio broadcasts really attempted to give a false picture of the Soviet Union, then Mr. Azkoul could understand the anxiety of the Government of the USSR if the "Voice of America" reached listeners in Lebanon, for example, and represented life in the USSR in an unfavourable light and if the USSR had no means of establishing the truth. He could also understand its anxiety if the radio presented too rosy a picture of the United States in order to win sympathies in other parts of the world if the USSR was unable to do likewise. But the problem was quite different.

54. The fact was that a gulf existed between the people of the Soviet Union and the broadcasts from abroad. As to the substance of those broadcasts, Mr. Azkoul gathered that they gave a false picture of the situation in the USSR; in other words, that the people of the Soviet Union saw themselves pictured on a sort of auditory screen in a manner that differed from reality. Mr. Azkoul could see no danger in that; he was convinced, in fact, that that was the best means of persuading the Soviet peoples that the people of the West were lying. Moreover, the information disseminated in that way was such that the listener in the country for which it was intended could check its authenticity, and, even in a complex matter difficult for ordinary persons to understand, the State itself could always explain the facts to its citizens.

55. The Government of the USSR therefore could not fear that its people would come to believe that they were living under conditions under which they were not actually living. But assuming that the peoples of the USSR were so constituted that they would come to believe that they were living under conditions similar to those depicted to them, Mr. Azkoul recalled a practice which the USSR certainly regarded as evidence of obscurantism and black reaction—the Index established by the Catholic Church. The Church provided believers...
with a list of books which they should not read, but did not go so far as to destroy or burn such books to prevent them from being read. The only recourse of the Soviet State, if it deemed it necessary, would therefore be to tell its citizens that they should not listen to certain broadcasts; to prevent them from listening was a method contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and to human rights.

56. The representatives of the USSR and Poland had held that the question at issue was not one of information. Yet information was composed of facts accompanied by ideas, either of which could be true or false; and no one could claim to be the final judge of truth. Nazism and fascism had assumed the right to determine what was true and what was false, but a democratic world could not accept that concept.

57. Mr. Azkoul then recalled that his country had not escaped harm from untruths concerning it disseminated by the foreign Press. But even in 1943 when Lebanon had won its independence, when the inhabitants were raising barricades against the army of occupation, the government had never thought of jamming broadcasts from unfavourable sources.

58. Mr. Azkoul admitted that the Press sometimes failed in its mission; but that did not constitute grounds for preventing it from expressing itself. The Soviet Union was not entitled to punish its people for wrong committed by foreign Powers in depriving it of the right to receive information; and if it could suggest another remedy which respected democratic principles, Lebanon would be most willing to consider it.

59. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) noted that the delegations of the USSR and Poland had based their rejection of the draft resolution proposed by Chile (A/C.3/ L.113) on the propaganda carried on by broadcasting stations of certain Member States of the United Nations against friendly relations among peoples.

60. He concurred with the reasons given by the representative of Lebanon for approving the resolution of the Economic and Social Council, and felt it necessary to point out that in his opinion, that resolution did not expressly condemn propaganda against peace jeopardizing friendly relations among peoples, it did not follow that the United Nations had ceased to be concerned with such propaganda or that the delegation of Chile approved of it.

61. In 1947 the General Assembly had adopted resolution 110 (II) condemning all propaganda likely to jeopardize friendly relations among nations. The First Committee had just reiterated that condemnation.

62. The draft resolution before the Commission was, however, somewhat different, since it merely represented an effort to cope with a situation for which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and an international telecommunication convention had expressly provided. If the measures taken by certain countries to prevent information from abroad from penetrating into their territory were designed to stop propaganda against peace, then in all probability neither the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press nor the Economic and Social Council would have deemed it necessary to formulate such a recommendation. However, since those measures were designed to suppress all information from abroad and even the objective reporting of the work of the United Nations, and were based on a policy of total isolation, the United Nations had sufficient grounds for concerning itself with the question.

63. Mr. Santa Cruz felt that to protect the entire world, to protect the work of the United Nations for peace, and to comply with resolution 290 (IV) of the General Assembly and the request of the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press endorsed by the Economic and Social Council, the Third Committee was bound to condemn in the policy of interference and to submit a draft resolution to that effect to the General Assembly.

64. Mr. Santa Cruz stated that he was opposed to all propaganda against peace and all information capable of disturbing friendly relations among nations, and that he was prepared, when a draft convention on freedom of information and of the press was submitted for consideration, to support any measure designed to counteract that type of propaganda or that type of freedom, which was not really freedom at all. In the circumstances, however, he considered that the Third Committee and the General Assembly ought to adopt immediate measures such as those proposed by two bodies of the United Nations.

65. The CHAIRMAN announced that the Committee would return to the question during the afternoon meeting, after completing its discussion of the draft first international convention on human rights.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.