

JAPANESE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AGGRESSION

IN MANCHURIA

SUMMARY OF PROOF

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That section of our case covering Japanese aggression in Manchuria deals with one of the most important and crucial periods covered by the indictment. During this period of 1928 to 1945 occurred the formation of the original conspiracy to pursue aggressive tactics and use military force in beginning the Japanese expansion in, and control of, Manchuria and North China, which was subsequently extended to cover the entire Eastern and Southern portions of Asia, the South Seas and the Islands of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

The first overt acts in placing this conspiracy in operation were also committed during this period, in Manchuria.

To begin with, it was shown that the Japanese by earlier threats and questionable diplomatic maneuvers, mis-interpretation of treaties and agreements, and gradual encroachments, had obtained an unusual degree of interest and influence, and claimed and exercised many special rights in Manchuria, including the control of large areas in the Kwantung peninsula and the railway zones where extra-territorial rights were exercised and consular police and an army were maintained. Also, Premier Tanaka announced that a positive policy was to be pursued toward China and that Manchuria was to be treated separately from the

rest of China. To substantiate these facts, various official Japanese documents were introduced, and long quotations from the Lytton Report, Exhibit 57, were read into the record.

The statement of the Honorable Cordell Hull, former Secretary of State to the United States, made before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, dealing with "Japan's Record of Aggression" and "Japan's Record of Duplicity" was also read into the record. (Exhibit 174, Record 1803 to 1808)

The murder of Chang Tso-lin in 1928 by a small group of officers in the Kwantung Army, led by Colonel Kawamoto, showed clearly the existence of a conspiracy on the part of the Kwantung Army at that time to openly assert its power and interfere directly with political matters. This was the first public proof of the existence of a conspiracy among army officers to interfere in International affairs and their intention to impose their will and decisions upon the entire government of Japan. This was probably the beginning of the conspiracy to wage aggressive war. The testimony of former Premier OKADA, Keisuke, (Record 1818 to 1820), General TANAKA, Ryukichi, (Record 1948 to 1958) and MORISHIMA, Morito, former Acting Consul General in Mukden (Record 3014 to 3016), prove the murder of Chang Tso-lin by the above-named army group.

General TANAKA, Ryukichi, as former Chief of the Military Service and Discipline Bureau of the War Ministry, testified as to the

contents of an official report made by Major General NINE, which the Japanese government refused or failed to deliver to the prosecution: that

"The killing of Chang Tso-lin was planned by Senior Staff Officer, Kwantung Army, Colonel KAWAMOTO. This incident had no connection whatsoever with the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army at the time. The Kwantung Army, in accordance with the policy of the TANAKA Cabinet to secure an early settlement of Manchurian problems, endeavored to disarm Chinese troops retreating from (toward) Mukden in (from) the direction of Feiping and Taientsin, in the direction of Kinshu, or Chinchow. The purpose was to get rid of Marshal Chang Tso-lin and to set up a new state separated from the Hanking Government with Chang Hsueh-liang as leader: in other words, to create a new state under Japanese control, a state of peace and order which later became Manchukuo."

THE MONITOR: Correction: "Which was something like Manchukuo that came into existence later."

Captain UZAKI told General TANAKA in 1929 (Record 1957) that he had issued a mustering-out order for the troops at the command of Colonel KAWAMOTO, but that he was stopped in this action by Lt. General SAITO, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, who evidently had not been

informed as to the plan of the conspirators. The conspirators profited by this mistake, however, because on September 18, 1931, the Staff Officers participated, and there was no hitch in the proceedings.

This brief statement of preliminary facts clearly shows why the methods and conduct of the Japanese had aroused such antagonism and opposition on the part of the Chinese that by September, 1931 the feeling was very tense on both sides.

Whether the conspiracy to create an incident, and by taking advantage of it to overrun and occupy Manchuria, was merely a continuation and extension of the plot to kill Chang Tso-lin in 1928 and take advantage of that situation to conquer Manchuria, or was an entirely new conspiracy, has been difficult to establish positively.

The Tribunal should keep in mind, however, that it has been extremely difficult for the prosecution to obtain and present all the evidence which it desired, and which unquestionably at one time existed. The documents and records which have been introduced in evidence have come almost entirely from Departments or Bureaus over which some one or more of these accused were formerly in control. Many of the employees of these departments were, and still are, relatives or appointees of these accused. It should therefore be apparent that many of the most valuable and desirable documents have been concealed or destroyed. We

are in the enemy's country and have to obtain our evidence, in many instances, from friends or relatives of the accused, many of whom are actively engaged in helping some of the accused. It has not been an easy task.

In the entry in Kido's Diary for October 1, 1931, Exhibit No. 179 L, (Record 1940) it states in part as follows:

"We discussed and consulted upon the militarist's secret plot. The combination of the middle class elements of the Army is likely to be pretty tight, and the plan to break down the present political party system by means of effecting coup-d'etat and to administer national affairs under dictatorship has been made secretly ever since the 2nd year of Showa era (1927). This is a serious problem indeed! It will be impossible for our statesmen and politicians to realize the danger of such a problem. It is very difficult to devise a counter-measure. Anyway, it will be necessary to guide those militarists so that they won't cause the nation a serious damage and unnecessary sacrifice. It is a national calamity."

This is evidence from one of the accused that the Manchurian Incident was merely an outgrowth and extension of the Chang Tso-lin murder, but who all the conspirators were then cannot be definitely established.

At least as early as 1929 there were definite plans being made in the Headquarters of the Japanese Army for the conquest of Manchuria. General TANAKA, Ryukichi testified (Record 2002-2003) that in 1929 when he

"was Chief of the Investigation Section of the General Staff Office, General TATEKAWA was Chief of the Second Division of the Army General Staff. General TATEKAWA at that time told me that under all circumstance Manchukuo -- Manchuria should be placed under Japanese control and that it should be made into a self-sustaining state or self-sufficient state, with the exception of petroleum. Accordingly, General TATEKAWA instructed me to go to Manchukuo for the purpose of investigating this matter. As a result of my investigation, I found that Manchuria could not become in itself a self-sufficient state, and reported accordingly. However, he said that efforts should be made to make Manchuria a self-contained country with the exception of petroleum, and that every effort should be made to develop resources in order to produce that product. In August, 1929, a conference of Chiefs of Staff was held and the plan for establishing self-sufficiency in Manchuria was distributed among those who attended the conference. By utilizing this material, effort was made to impress upon them the fact that Manchuria was the life-line of Japan."

"MONITOR: 'Correction: To impress upon the entire Japanese Army.'

"WITNESS: (Continuing) 'Major General TATEKAWA had a strong conviction that unless Manchuria were seized by Japan it would be impossible for Japan to become one of the powers of the world as a highly developed national defense state. That is all.'"

Also, prior to March, 1931, there was a plan in existence to reform and take over the Central Government, and immediately upon the failure of this plan to be consummated, plans were laid for the creation of the Manchurian Incident. That there was a connection between the March 1931 Incident and the Manchurian Incident is shown by a number of the same conspirators being involved in both matters. This is evidenced by another entry from the Kido Diary, that of August 7, 1931, appearing on pages 1927 to 1928 of the Record (Exhibit No. 179 F):

August 7, Friday --"Came to Tokyo by electric car starting at 8:19 and went to see Mr. HARADA. I learned about the latest political conditions and especially of the plot to be carried out in Army circles during the middle of March. It is regrettable from the standpoint of control of our country that it is becoming very obvious that the Army will carry out a certain type of plot.

"During the middle of March when the Parliamentary session was being held a plan was drafted at the official residence of

War Minister to disrupt the Parliamentary session and bring about the political change by Major Generals KOISO, TATEKAWA and NISHIMIYA as leaders with Lieutenant Colonels HASHIMOTO and SHIGEMUJI who would act at their beck and call. OKAWA, Shunmei, stood between them collaborating with Social Mass Party. They planned to send Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI to MORI of the SEIYUKAI party, conveying their plot confidentially. This was given up, however, by the advice of SUZUKI, who (entertained fears) for the sake of the Army. It could be guessed that UGAKI was at the back of the plot.

"An association of research group of Manchurian and Mongolian questions was formed among a group of captains graduated recently from the Army Staff College, and the above-mentioned Lieutenant Colonel HASHIMOTO and SHIGEMUJI were its backers.

"The brains of the Army cannot check these kind of associations because they themselves planned such plots as mentioned above.

"Recently the Army group has been getting very strong. There is a danger of strong antagonism between the civilians and the Army regarding drafting of the budget."

But whether the conspiracy charged in the Indictment was a continuation and extension of the old conspiracy, or a new conspiracy with new

conspirators, is entirely immaterial; because the conspiracy for, and resulting in, the Manchurian Incident was gradually expanded and continuously in effect until the close of the war, and clearly covers the scope of the conspiracy charged in the Indictment. The evidence submitted to the Tribunal during the presentation of this phase of the case definitely proved the establishment of the conspiracy and named some of the conspirators, including certain of the accused. This early proof clearly made all subsequent statements of the conspirators admissible in evidence.

The report adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on February 24, 1933, Exhibit 59, states, on Page 18:

"A group of Japanese civil and military officials conceived, organized, and carried through the Manchurian independence movement as a solution to the situation in Manchuria as it existed after the events of September 18th, and, with this object, made use of the names and actions of certain Chinese individuals and took advantage of certain minorities and native communities that had grievances against the Chinese Administration. This movement, which rapidly received assistance and direction from the Japanese General Staff, could only be carried through owing to the presence of the Japanese troops. It cannot be considered as a spontaneous and genuine independence movement."

That was the verdict of an impartial and neutral group, after careful consideration of the evidence, stated mildly, in a futile hope to peacefully solve the situation.

Some of the further proof submitted to show the formation and extent of this conspiracy is as follows:

Exhibit 177, (Record 1917-1920) being a book written by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, entitled "The Road to the Reconstruction of the World", stated on pages 3 and 4 that in 1930, on his return from assignment as Military Attache to the Turkish Embassy:

"During my thirty days' voyage, I pondered on how to reform Japan, and as the result, I succeeded in drawing a definite plan to a certain degree. And on returning to the General Staff Office, my former haunt, I devised several schemes in order to put my ideas into execution. Although I dare not say it was the only cause of such results, however, the Manchurian Incident, secession from the League of Nations, and renunciation of the disarmament treaty, took place successively and within the country, May 15 Incident, SHINPEI TAI Incident, and the February 26 Incident took place in succession." (Record 1918-1920)

Former Premier OKADA testified on direct examination (Record 1820):

"After the murder of Chang Tso-lin, the influence of the army insofar as participation in the formulation of policy on the part of the government with respect to Manchuria was concerned grew progressively stronger."

Then on Page 1821 he stated:

"In the early part of 1931 I received many reports that the army was planning an occurrence which might be made the basis for the occupation of Manchuria. Simultaneously OKAWA, Shunel was conducting a propaganda campaign consisting of public speeches and publications to the end of building up a public sentiment in support of such a movement on the part of the army." And on Page 1822 of the record he stated:

"* * * that the occurrence which came to pass on the night of September 18, 1931, was plotted and arranged by the clique in the Kwantung Army". * * * "The army during these years was completely out of control by the government and no restraint could be placed upon it."

He further stated that Dr. OKAWA and many young officers in the Kwantung Army were involved in the creation and consummation of the Mukden Incident.

General TANAKA, Ryukichi, confirmed and supplemented this testimony by stating that the conspirators among the military officials in Japan were Major General TATEKAWA, Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro; Captain CHO, Isamu, and in Manchuria, Col. ITAGAKI, Seishiro and Lt. Colonel ISRIHARA Kanji, while a civilian group was centered around

OKAWA, Shunsei. (Record 1960-61, 1966)

General TANAKA's testimony was clear and convincing. In 1930 he was serving on the Army General Staff in Tokyo and was carrying on investigations on Manchurian problems, therefore he knew the facts. Aside from the statements based on his own knowledge, he told of the statements made and explanations given to him by several of the conspirators during the course of the conspiracy.

He told of the formation of the Sakura-kai Society by a group of Army and Navy Officers and his presence at the first meeting. The story of the subsequent development and activity of this society was told him later by various defendants. General HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, then a Lieutenant Colonel, presided at the first meeting held in October, 1930 (Record 1961)

"According to what Captain Cho told me in Shanghai, the purpose of the Sakura-kai was two fold: One, to carry out an internal revolution, or renovation, and, second, to settle the Manchurian problem." (Record 1962)

Referring to the statements made by various defendants, he stated that he talked with the accused, HASHIMOTO, in Tokyo in the Fall of 1934.

He stated that HASHIMOTO --

" * * * told me that the Manchurian Incident was planned by the Kwantung Army and that he, in accordance with this plan,

would assist and support the Incident and by that means endeavor to bring about a renovation of internal politics in Japan, which at that time was extremely corrupted. He also said that he and Captain Cho had planned the October Incident that had failed. But he also said that in spite of that failure they had succeeded in creating a new state, Manchukuo.

"He also said that at first it was the plan of the Kwantung Army to exploit Manchuria while under the Japanese Kwantung Army occupation, but that he had urged that a new and independent state be created in order to avoid international complications. And this proposal of his was taken up." (Record 1969)

According to HASHIMOTO's statement, among the persons involved in this conspiracy were Major General TATEKAWA, HASHIMOTO, CHO, OKAWA, ITAGAKI and ISHIBARA. (Record 1970)

Their intention was:

"to occupy Manchuria, to destroy the influence of the war lords in that area, and to bring about the economic development of that territory under army occupation." (Record 1971)

HASHIMOTO further stated that

"After the Incident, however, he planned the October Incident in order to bring the downfall of the weak and corrupted government in Japan and to concentrate Japanese public opinion on Manchurian affairs." (Record 1971)

According to Captain CHO, another member of the conspiracy, and

confirmed by HASHIMOTO, the purpose of the October, 1931 Incident--

*** was to cleanse the ideological and political atmosphere of that time; to set up a new renovated government, and thereby save the nation; and then to bring about unity among the people in order to secure their unanimous support of the settlement of the Manchurian situation." (Record 1973)

With reference to Dr. OKAWA, Tanaka stated that he had known him since 1925, and had talked with him in 1930 about Manchuria, and at that time Dr. OKAWA had said that:

"by all means Manchuria must be separated from the Hanking government and placed under Japanese control, and also recommended that Manchuria be made independent and that an inseparable relationship should be established between Japan and Manchuria"; that as Japan became stronger it was to become the leader of the people of Asia and drive the entire white race from this area. (Record 1979)

Dr. OKAWA also claimed to have gone to Manchuria in 1930 to talk these plans over with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, but the Marshal had not evidenced any interest. OKAWA named the same conspirators that were named by HASHIMOTO, and stated that he himself had traveled all over Japan spreading propaganda to the effect that Manchuria must be placed under Japanese control. (Record 1982)

With reference to the accused, ITAGAKI, Seishiro, General TANAKA stated that in June, 1930, ITAGAKI had told him then

***that Manchuria should be placed under Japanese control by all means.* (Record 1985)

He claimed there was no alternative except the use of armed force, and that they should drive Chang Hsueh-liang and his regime out of Manchuria, and that in the political field Manchuria should be guided by the Japanese in the first stages. (Record 1986)

He was further of the opinion that Japan should become the leader of Asia, and would free Asia from white domination --

"and bring about the fulfillment of the ideal of Asia for the Asiatics". (Record 1987)

Following the Manchurian Incident, General ITAGAKI in 1935 told General TANAKA about the secret installation of two 24 c. m. guns in the army compound in Mukden, and that their installation was completed on September 10, 1931. (Record 1990)

General TANAKA further testified that he had talked with General TATEKAWA in 1934 about the Manchurian Incident, and that General TATEKAWA had told him that prior to September 18, 1931, he was expecting an outbreak in Manchuria, and that on the 15th or 16th of September, Foreign Minister SHIDEMARU had received a disturbing telegram from the Consul General in Mukden, advising him that the army was planning a big

incident soon, and so General MIKAMI, the then War Minister, ordered General TATEKAWA to go to Mukden as a special emissary to stop the contemplated action of the Kwantung Army. General TATEKAWA stated that he was in sympathy with the movement, and had no desire to stop it, so that when he arrived in Mukden on the evening of September 18th, he permitted himself to be entertained by Major HANAYA without attempting to deliver the message. In the morning it was too late. (Record 2005-2007)

In view of General MIKAMI's unusual speech on August 4, 1931, to a conference of Division Commanders (Exhibit 186, Part 1, Record, 2209-2210) concerning Manchuria, and Mongolia and the need for a larger and better army, as well as his public utterances and writings on the subject which were criticized in the letter sent him on August 6, 1931, by seven members of the Citizens' Disarmament League (Exhibit 184, Record 2192-2194), his action in selecting General TATEKAWA as the one to go to Manchuria cannot but be open to suspicion.

According to General TAKAOKA, General TATEKAWA stated that the Manchurian Incident was planned in advance (Record 2010-2013) and named the same leaders in the conspiracy as had been heretofore named, and re-affirmed the fact that HASHIMOTO, GHO and OKAWA planned the October Incident for the purpose of overthrowing the Government, and setting up a new Government which would support the Manchurian Incident. (Record 2012-2013)

The first direct step was to be the creating of an incident, and the testimony clearly reveals that such an incident was created on the evening of September 18, 1931, by the Japanese themselves, although for public consumption and propaganda purposes it was claimed that Chinese troops were responsible for an explosion on the South Manchurian Railway just north of Mukden.

While not conclusive, the Lytton Report, Exhibit 57, suggests that the claimed explosion was a "fake" when it says on pages 70 and 71:

"After a thorough consideration of such opinions, as well as of the accounts of the interested parties, and after a mature study of the considerable quantity of written material and a careful weighing of the great mass of evidence which was presented or collected, the Commission has come to the following conclusions:

"Tense feeling undoubtedly existed between the Japanese and Chinese military forces. The Japanese, as was explained to the Commission in evidence, had a carefully prepared plan to meet the case of possible hostilities between themselves and the Chinese. On the night of September 18th-19th, this plan was put into operation with swiftness and precision. The Chinese, in accordance with the instructions referred to on page 69, had no plan of attacking the Japanese troops, or of

endangering the lives or property of Japanese nationals at this particular time or place. They made no concerted or authorized attack on the Japanese forces and were surprised by the Japanese attack and subsequent operations. An explosion undoubtedly occurred on or near the railroad between 10 and 10:30 p. m. on September 18th, but the damage, if any, to the railroad did not in fact prevent the punctual arrival of the southbound train from Changshun, and was not in itself sufficient to justify military action. The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night, which have been described above, cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence. In saying this, the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defence.*

The testimony of John E. Powell, War Correspondent (Record, 3213-14) showed that an examination at the scene of the alleged explosion four or five days later, revealed no visible damage to the roadbed. His testimony (Record 3213-3216) also showed that the Japanese went to unusual trouble to attempt to build up evidence that the Chinese were to blame. The purpose of the exhibit on the floor outside General HONJO's office and the placing of dead Chinese soldiers, with no blood stains on the ground under them, near the scene of the alleged explosion, was so obvious it immediately

aroused the suspicion of neutral investigators.

That these suspicions were not confined to the neutral observers is shown by the entry in Kido's Diary for Wednesday, September 23, 1931, where he says:

"At 2:00 p. m., attended a tea party thrown for Gentlemen of the Press at KASUMIYAMA Club. Heard the course of events in the Manchurian Incident from HAYASHI, the head of Maintenance Bureau of the Department of War. However, as the cause of the railway explosion, the most important point of the whole affair was not explained clearly, I asked him the question. To this, (he replied that he had not as yet received the report. It seems very strange to me. It is regrettable also, not to be posted and informed on this point, especially when people are talking with skepticism about the cause of this accident." (Exhibit 179 J, Record 1939)

That their suspicions were well founded is shown conclusively by the telegram (Exhibit 181) sent by Consul General HAYASHI at Mukden on the morning of September 19th, 1931, only a few hours after the alleged explosion on the railway tracks, to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, in which he said:

"According to confidential information from Mr. KIMURA, Director of the S. M. R. Co., when trackmen were sent for repair work on the section reported to have been damaged by the

Chinese, the Army authorities forbade them to approach the spot. Putting this and that together, it is considered that the recent incident was wholly an action planned by the Army." (Record 2178-2179).

The testimony of General TAKAKA and Admiral OKADA heretofore referred to, showed conclusively that the incident was carefully planned and executed by a clique of the Kwantung Army, but was done in such a manner as to try to give the impression that the Chinese had done it.

MORASHIMA, Motito, confirmed the part that Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro, and Lieutenant Colonel ISHIHARA, Kanji, had in the plot, and added to the list of conspirators the name of Major HAMAYA, who unsheathed his sword and threatened MORISHIMA if he interfered with the army's plans. (Record 3016). He also confirmed the part that General TATEKAWA, Yoshitsugi took in the conspiracy by showing his presence in Mukden in civilian clothes on the night of the incident and the day following. (Record 3019 and 3023). MORASHIMA also stated that the attempts of the Consular Officers to settle the pending disputes between Japan and Manchuria were interfered with by the Army officers, so that in the late summer of 1931 it was difficult to make any progress, and it became apparent "that it was only a question of days until the military would be on the move in Manchuria". (Record 3017)

MORASHIMA's failure to contact the responsible officers of the Kwantung Army on the night of the incident prior to 10:00 o'clock and his finding them all shortly after 10:30 P. M. in response to their call, as well as their belligerent attitude and refusal to permit diplomatic intervention, clearly shows that the pre-arranged plan to use military force in occupying Manchuria had been placed in operation.

The next step in the development of the conspiracy to wage aggressive warfare is the story of the military action taken immediately following September 18, 1931. The action taken is a matter of history, and there is little need to narrate the detailed troop movements.

The Lytton Report, Exhibit 57, states on page 67:

"On the morning of Saturday, September 19th, the population of Mukden woke to find their city in the hands of Japanese troops ***.

"Appreciating the great importance of this occurrence, which, as will be shown, was the first step of a movement which resulted in the military occupation of practically the whole of Manchuria, the Commission conducted an extensive enquiry into the events of that night."

On page 71 it states:

"All the forces in Manchuria, and some of those in Korea, were brought into action almost simultaneously on the night of September 18th over the whole area of the South Manchuria Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur."

An interesting sidelight on the activities of the conspirators and the detailed plans made for taking advantage of the created incident of September 18th was disclosed in the testimony of John B. Powell when he told about the large number of Japanese male tourists who had been seen on the streets of Mukden just prior to September 18th, and who appeared the morning after, wearing the sashbands of Japanese Reservists and carrying rifles. Thus, the Japanese conspirators first established the pattern subsequently followed by Hitler in Vienna. (Record 3216-3217)

General TANAKA, (Record 1987-1990) and John B. Powell (Record 3217-3218) told about the secret installation of the two 24 c. m. guns in the Japanese Infantry Compound in Mukden and how one of them was trained on the North barracks and the other on the airfield.

That the conspirators who planned this incident, and those in control of the Kwantung Army, did not intend to localize the action is clearly shown by the foregoing statements, as well as by two other telegrams sent by Consul General HAYASHI at Mukden on September 19th to Foreign Minister SHIDEMARA. One of them, Exhibit 181, Part 1 (Record 2180) says in part:

"In view of the fact that it was proposed several times from the Chinese side that this matter be settled in a peaceful way, I phoned to Staff Officer SAKAGAKI and said that since Japan and China had not yet formally entered into a state of war and that, moreover as China had declared that she would act on the non-resistance principle absolutely, it was necessary for us at this time to endeavor to prevent the aggravation of the incident unnecessarily, and I urged that the matter be handled through diplomatic channels, but the above mentioned Staff Officer answered that since this matter concerned the prestige of the State and the Army, it was the Army's intention to see it through thoroughly because the Chinese Army had attacked the Japanese Army, although the Japanese Army would do their best to protect the foreign residents here. Thus since he did not appear to readily accept my proposal, I repeated the above purport again and called his attention to it."

Therefore, as early as the morning of September 19th, if they did not know it before, the Kwantung Army Staff knew the Chinese would follow a course of non-resistance, and that may easily account for what seemed to be the bold military action of the Japanese army with vastly inferior numerical forces.

The second telegram, Exhibit 181, Part 2, (Record 2183) shows the action decided upon by the army and states in part:

"Putting together reports from various quarters, it can be presumed that the army is planning to start positive operations simultaneously throughout the various places along the Manchurian Railway Zone."

Other passages from the Lytton Report, Exhibit 57, showed the Army's successive military movements into the interior of Manchuria at Changchun, Kirin, Honni Bridge, Tsitsihar, Chinchow and Harbin. When the Lytton Report was signed, on September 4, 1932, nearly a year after the incident started, there was still much fighting going on. Many large areas of Manchuria had not come under Japanese control, and the invasion of Jehol was threatened.

That the Japanese became vicious and vindictive and perpetrated many atrocities amazingly similar to those committed later in the Philippines and China, was clearly indicated by the testimony of John B. Powell and the two articles in the "Chicago Daily Tribune", (Exhibits 610A and 611 A (Record 6698)

"There were stories in circulation from Chinese sources of villages being wiped out in retaliation for harboring so-called 'guerrillas' or 'bandits.' Those stories were constantly in circulation. I personally did not see any of that, but I heard of it." (Record 3220)

One such story, which was widely printed and reported, concerned the killing of approximately 3,000 men, women and children in a Manchurian

village near Fushun which had allegedly harbored guerrillas or native forces. These villagers were taken and lined up in a ditch or gully and then machine-gunned. The original story printed in the "Chicago Daily Tribune" stated 2750 villagers were thus murdered. The Japanese Consul-General at Chicago went to the Editor of the paper and objected to the story, stating that it was not true. He was asked to obtain the true facts, and he returned in a few days stating that there had been "no massacre" because only 350 villagers had been killed. This information must have been obtained from or through ARAKI, Sadao, the then War Minister; and the fact remains that at least 350 men, women and children were murdered in cold blood. This was but one of many such stories in general circulation, and it is important because it showed the pattern which was followed so closely by the Japanese army in later atrocities.

After ARAKI, Sadao became War Minister on December 13, 1931, more and more reinforcements were sent to Manchuria, until the country was completely overrun by Japanese forces, and in the Spring of 1933 Jehol was invaded and conquered, and effectively made a part of Manchukuo.

The Lytton Report (Exhibit 57) shows at least part of these military reinforcements sent prior to September, 1932. On page 77 it states from Japanese sources:

"Reinforcements soon began to arrive: the 4th Brigade of the 8th Division between December 10th and 15th. On December 27th, Imperial sanction was obtained for the despatch of the Staff of the 20th Division and another brigade from Korea."

Following the occupation of Harbin on February 5, 1932, the Report states on page 80:

"The arrival of further re-inforcements, repeated expeditions to the east and north and six months of fighting took place before the occupied area was extended as far as Hailun in the north and the districts of Yangchung and Hailin in the east."

* * * * *

"By that time, the 10th Division had arrived at Harbin and took over the sector from the 2nd Division."

* * * * *

"In the earlier part of May, the Japanese forces in the north of Manchuria were further reinforced by the 14th Division."

The admissions of ARAKI, Sadao himself show the part he played in "pacifying" Manchuria. In his interrogatories of February 19, 1946. Exhibit 188 B, (Record 2218-19) he said:

"After I became War Minister, I discussed the policy of the occupation of General Chang's four provinces to clear up the Manchurian situation. After I had made the plan up myself with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Finance Minister, all agreed with me. The Prime Minister approached the Privy Council for approval."

Admissions made on February 7th, 8th and 11th, Exhibit 188 C (Record 2220-2221) are as follows:

"Q. General, you ordered the extension of the Japanese occupation in Manchuria from the time you became Minister of War?"

"A. After a policy has been decided by the government, orders for operations would be issued by the Chief of the General Staff. The War Minister has no right to issue orders in connection with operations. In other words, policies would be decided by the government and the carrying out of this policy would be effected by the General Staff, and the policy was to bring peace and order to territory under Chang Hsueh-liang."

This decision was made about December 17, 1931.

"A. **Until this time there had been no fixed policy, and it was realized that the absence of policy would result

in the spreading of hostilities. It had been decided that the three provinces comprising Chang Hsueh-liang's territory required pacification, but a statement by Chang Hsueh-liang to the effect that his jurisdiction extended over four territories expanded the scene of activities to Jehol. Chang Hsueh-liang was originally at Ching Chow (Chinchow). He later withdrew to Jehol from where he conducted his government."

In ARAKI's admissions on February 13, 1946, Exhibit 188E (Record 2240) it is stated:

"Q General, what I want to know now is --after the decision of the Imperial Conference, how did you order the completion of the occupation of these four provinces?

"A We immediately decided to send the troops to Fengtien Province. The principal plan was made in the War Ministry's order to General Headquarters, and they took the procedure of sending the troops for operation.

"Q Who signed the order? Did you, General? The order to General Headquarters?

"A The principal plan approved by the conference as a matter of procedure I signed."

The entire action in Jehol is well summarized in Exhibit 192 (Record 2269-70), which is part of Summary of Japanese War Crimes prepared by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China.

"After the occupation of the three provinces Liaoning.

Kirin, and Heilungkiang, the Japanese continued to carry out their plan of westward expansion. In the Spring of 1932, when the war in Shanghai was concluded, their Army in the Chinese Northeastern Provinces was reinforced. In the middle of July, 1932, on the pretext that a Japanese officer by the name of ISHIMOTO was missing, the Japanese started to invade Jehol. Two general offenses were launched in July and August respectively. They failed to gain ground on account of the Chinese garrison forces in the front and Chinese volunteers operating in their rear. Yet the Japanese issued the fantastic declaration that Jehol Province was the territory of 'Manchukuo'; a pretext for its eventual occupation. Meanwhile, more reinforcements were sent to prepare another invasion on a grand scale. For the remaining half of the year, besides occupying quite a number of Chinese key points, small scale attacks occurred from time to time. There was no peace. At the beginning of the year, 1933, the Battle of Yu-Kwan (Shanhaikwan) was started, the key points along the Great Wall, such as Shanhaikwan and Kiumenkou fell into Japanese hands, the strategical situation of Jehol became very critical. On 22 February 1933, in the name of puppet "Manchukuo," the Japanese Army sent to the Chinese an ultimatum, stating that Jehol was

not Chinese territory and demanding that Chinese forces in the Jehol Province be withdrawn within 24 hours. On 25 February 1933, war broke out. The Japanese Army, from their bases in Tungliac and Sui-Chung advanced in three columns and commenced the general offense. For both military and political reasons, the Province of Jehol eventually fell into Japanese hands on 2 March 1933."

"I should like to point out that the accused, KOISO, Kuniaki, was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army from August, 1932, to March, 1934; and that the accused, ARAKI, was Minister of War during this time."

The conquest of Jehol was concluded by the Tang-ku truce on May 31, 1933, Exhibit 193 (Record 2273-4). This provided for a demilitarized zone in the Northern part of Hopei Province, from which area the Chinese were to remove their armies to the West and South and the Japanese agreed to move their armies North of the Great Wall. The Japanese, however, reserved the right to pass over this territory in airplanes to see that the terms of the truce were complied with. As usual, however, they abused this privilege and continued to use the zone and adjoining areas for military airplanes in spite of frequent objections by the Chinese. (Exhibit 213, (Record 2708-2712)

Also, the Japanese failed to keep the spirit of their agreement to remove their troops North of the Great Wall. According to the testimony of John Goette (Record 3745-3746) on two occasions after May 31, 1933, he personally saw armies of so-called Chinese renegade troops commanded by Generals Feng-Cha-Ju and Liu-Wei-Tang enter the demilitarized zone from Japanese controlled areas, and after crossing the demilitarized zone disappear again into other Japanese held areas. That the action of these armies was directed by the Japanese is evidenced by the fact that Goette saw the troops of General Liu-Wei-Tang on the morning of July 8, 1937, within a few miles of the Marco Polo Bridge.

Long before the military occupation of Manchuria was completed, puppet governments were set up in the provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, and Heilungkiang. The machinery for performing this function was planned long in advance. The Self-Government Guiding Board was set up in Mukden at least as early as the latter part of September 1931, according to the testimony of KASAGI, Ryomei (Record 2791). The functions of this organization were described by him. He further testified, to supplement and strengthen the Lytton Report, that this organization was definitely and completely under the control of the Japanese, although it had a Chinese Chairman; that it was financed by the Kwantung Army, and that all of its policies and activities had to be approved by the division of the Kwantung Army headed by

the accused ITAGAKI, while the information as to which Chinese would be friendly to their plans and would serve as willing collaborators was furnished by the division headed by the accused, DOIHARA.

KASAGI testified (Record 2793):

"There were approximately one hundred twenty members on the committee, about twenty from the Yu-Ho-Kai and the balance from the Manchu Seinen Kenmi (Manchu Young Men's Association). Out of the members, approximately fifteen were Chinese or Manchurian."

The Lytton Report states on page 92:

"The chief agency in bringing about independence was the Self-Government Guiding Board, which had its central office in Mukden. By reliable witnesses, it was stated to the Commission to have been organized and in large part officered, by Japanese, although its chief was a Chinese, and to have functioned as an organ of the Fourth Division of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. Its main purpose was to foster the Independence Movement."

The Lytton Report, Exhibit 57, pages 88-99, goes on to show in detail the operations of the Self-Government Guiding Board and how it fostered and developed the so-called "Independence Movements" of the various cities and provinces and finally the establishment of an independent state known as Manchukuo.

Although Jehol was included in the new State of Manchukuo by apparent agreement with its Governor, General Tang Ju-lin, who took an active part in the formation of the new state, it did not long accept the new government, but became the rallying ground for the forces of Chang Hsueh-liang. This led to its military occupation and subjugation by the Japanese in 1933 as outlined above.

While fighting continued with small independent bands of loyal Chinese for sometime; for all practical purposes, the provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol were under the complete domination of the Japanese before the summer of 1933.

On March 9, 1932, Henry Pu-Yi, a former Emperor of China, who had been induced to accept the position as Regent of Manchukuo was installed. The inducements failed to materialize, and he became a mere puppet, whose every action was dictated and controlled by the officers of the Kwantung Army. Every department of this government, many of which had Chinese as the titular heads, was under the control of Japanese advisors, secretaries or assistants. (Lytton Report P.106).

These conspirators fully recognized the fact that this action taken by them in Manchuria was in violation of solemn obligations and treaties entered into by the Japanese government, and it was in a vain attempt to give a color of legality to their proceedings that the so-called "Independent State" of Manchukuo was set up. HASEINOTO claimed

credit for this suggestion (Record 1969). To further keep up the appearances of this hoax, Japan, at the insistence of ITAGAKI, ARAKI and others of the conspirators, recognized the independence of Manchukuo on September 15, 1932, before the report of the Lytton Commission had been filed. At the same time it entered into treaties and secret agreements with the Government of Manchukuo, which gave the Japanese army full control.

That the government established by the Japanese in Manchukuo was clearly a "puppet government" under the complete domination and control of the Kwantung army and the Japanese government was definitely shown by the testimony of OKADA, TANAKA and MORISHIMA and by numerous Japanese documents, most of which were marked either "secret" or "restricted".

The Lytton report was prepared too early for a conclusive judgment to be rendered, but it stated at the bottom of page 111:

"we have come to the conclusion that there is no general Chinese support for the 'Manchukuo Government' which is regarded by the local Chinese as an instrument of the Japanese."

Interrogatories of ARAKI, Sadao, (Exhibit 187-I, Record 2784-2786), who was then Minister of War, show the action taken by the Japanese Cabinet prior to March 1st 1932 when the Manchukuoan government was established.

He stated:

"The Cabinet meeting of February or March 1932 was called by the Premier to form the Administration Committee to set up the independent state of Manchoukuo. A request was transmitted from the Kwantung Army to myself asking that a government be set up to govern the state. I in turn transmitted it to the Premier. The report from the Kwantung Army stated that it was advisable to set up Henry Pu-Yi as head of the Manchoukuo. The Commander in Chief (HOSHO) of the Kwantung Army sent this request. I had the power to refuse or to over-rule it if I wished to be irresponsible." ***

I thought the request of the Kwantung Army would settle the Manchurian matter to the interest of all parties concerned. The proposal in the Cabinet was to carry out the request of the Kwantung Army--set up Henry Pu-Yi as governor of Manchoukuo."

"There was already an Administration Committee formed before March 30 by the Kwantung Army. The civil population was administered by various civil governors and the four provinces were placed under one administrator, most of those men being formerly the administrators of that area. This was from the latter part of 1931 to March 1932. The various provincial governors submitted their plans to the Kwantung Army and these were passed upon by the Kwantung Army. The Commander-in-Chief of this army conceived and authorized this, and it was necessary

only to make a report to the Tokyo government in these matters. I only gave sanction to him to the effect that if the Manchurian Incident was settled peaceably, there was no need for him to make any special request on minor matters.

"Various Japanese government officials were sent to help in the organization of the Manchurian government since Manchuria did not know how to set up a well functioning government, not having had experience in the past. This was discussed in the Cabinet meeting. Various problems were brought up by the Department concerned. For instance, financial matters were brought up by TAKAHASHI."

Exhibit #222, being minutes of a Cabinet Conference meeting of March 1, 1932, clearly shows that the Japanese Cabinet at even that early date had decided to take full advantage of the military achievements of the Japanese Army in Manchuria and not only approved its action but made long range plans for the future. The Japanese Government tried to arrange proceedings so that Manchukuo would be recognized as an independent state by other foreign powers, but, at the same time, the Japanese Cabinet was planning for permanent control. This is shown by paragraphs 5 and 6 of the aforesaid Exhibit #222, (Record 2819).

"(5) Regarding our seizure of real military power, we should try to establish accomplished status according to the right of subjugating bandits and the policy of protecting Empire subjects which were recognized by the League Council.

"(6) Regarding our grasp of real power on foreign and home affairs, we should let her appoint small number of Japanese as the officials or councilors at first which may be enlarged later."

In order to take advantage of the situation, they developed two alternative plans for seizing and controlling the custom stations in Manchuria, and even then were considering turning Dairen and the Kwantung leased territory over to the new state.

That the Japanese Government desired to be discreet in its control of the new territory is shown under the provisions for "The Appointment of Japanese Officials by the New State". Those plans provided in part, (Record 2622):

"The appointment of too many Japanese to prominent positions as officials or councilors from the beginning of the foundation of the new state may stimulate the claim that the new state is nothing but a proctorate (protectorate) of Japan. Theoretical explanations can deny this but at any rate, realistically, it may impress otherwise.

"And as to the control of the new state by Japan, it can be carried out with military power for the time being. It would be to the benefit of the new state in her future foreign relations to increase the number, formal capacity, and authority of the Japanese in the new government organizations gradually."

Exhibit 226 (Record 2835-6) contains a message addressed to War Minister ARAKI from the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, dated April 3, 1932, and a reply thereto. This message refers to the recent dispatch of part of the Korean Army to Chientao and suggests that the administrative functions in Chientao be conducted by the Manchukuo Government under the guidance of the Kwantung Army, although listening to suggestions and advice from the Governor General of Chosen (Korea). It further stated that the writer believed War Minister ARAKI had no objections to the Kwantung army controlling all negotiations with Manchukuo for the purpose of obtaining unified joint execution of the measures decided upon in the recent Cabinet Council meeting. War Minister ARAKI's answer stated:

"I agree in principle to your opinion regarding unification in the execution of our Manchurian policies as well as the policy of the Army under your command regarding the Chientao."

The Minutes of the Cabinet Council meeting on April 11, 1932,

Exhibit 223 (Record 2826-2827) show that in spite of the Kwantung Army being given direct control, the Japanese government itself was directly interested in the development of Japanese control, when it was said:

"to realize a single self-sufficient economic unit comprising Japan and Manchukuo by effecting a rational control over the industries of the two countries, authoritative leaders are required. Concerning the above, it will be properly executed through the following two measures after taking into consideration the demands of the new state and its missions toward the Empire and all other situations:

"The new state shall employ authoritative advisers from our country and make them the highest advisers in connection with financial, economic and general political problems.

"The new state shall appoint competent Japanese nationals to the leading posts in the Privy Council, the Central Bank, and other organs of the new state".

The minutes of the Cabinet Council Meeting of May 3, 1932,

Exhibit 224 (Record 2827-2829) show the Japanese Cabinet was determining the policy of management and construction of railways in Manchukuo. With reference to the construction of certain new lines, the record states, page 2829:

"In order to construct the aforementioned lines, the present Tien-Tu Railway shall be purchased by the State of Manchukuo at a fair price, and the funds needed for this purpose shall be credited by the South Manchurian Railway Co.*** Purchase expense shall be dealt as a loan made to the State of Manchukuo by the South Manchurian Railway Company".

It further provided that the South Manchurian Railway Company should build and operate the road as well as connecting lines and terminal facilities.

An interesting insight into the plans of the Japanese Government both prior to September 18, 1931, and immediately afterward, is shown by Exhibit 225 (Record 2831-2833). This document contains the Minutes of the Cabinet Conference meeting of August 12, 1932, and relates that in the cabinet conference meeting of November 18, 1930, it was planned to open negotiations with the Chinese authorities in Manchuria but they were not able to complete negotiations with Chang-Kueh-liang.

"After the outbreak of the Incident, the Imperial Government decided in the Cabinet Conference of 11th November last year

to make the Japan Air Transportation Company temporarily open the regular Changchung-Dairen-Mukden air route and the Seoul-Pinghsiang-Mukden route, on the pretext of military communication and for the purpose of establishing the foundation for acquiring aviation rights in Manchuria and Mongolia and at the same time insuring communications between Kwantung Army units. Since then, according to the above decision, we have been meeting the immediate demands under the pretext of military air service, but today when the surrounding situations have developed favorably for us with the establishment of Manchukuo, we believe it is important that we turn the above military air service into a standing business organ and give it permanency."

They decided to use this company as the opening step in establishing a European-Asiatic air line and "the preparation of acquiring aviation rights in China proper." In order that the plan might meet the "demand of national defense ***it is absolutely necessary for the above business organ to be administered under the perfect leadership and supervision of the Imperial Government." It was decided to incorporate the company in Manchukuo with ownership by both Japanese and Manchurians, but with the substantial leadership

and supervision in the hands of the Japanese. This document further states (Record 2833):

"the fundamental policy for the institution and management of the aviation enterprise in Manchuria is to meet the demand of national defense of our Empire and, at the same time, to contribute to the advance of our nation's aviation enterprise and the economical development of Manchukuo."

On June 4, 1932, the Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army sent a telegram (Exhibit 227, Record 2838-2843) to the Vice-Minister of War in which he recommended as a matter of urgent necessity the need for Manchukuo to take over the custom house at Darien stating "we must keep this matter absolutely secret until its enforcement by Manchukuo". He stated (Record 2843) "if Japan should formally recognize Manchukuo at once, and deliver the above mentioned custom house to her there would be no problem."

Exhibit 228 (Record 2846-7) is a telegram from War Minister ARAKI to Commander-in-Chief Kwantung Army, dated June 10, 1932 which stated that while ARAKI appreciated the awkward position of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army in guiding Manchukuo without its having been formally recognized by Japan, he believed the time was not ripe for either recognition of Manchukuo or the discussion of Manchukuo taking over administrative rights in the South Manchurian Railway Zone or the Kwantung leased territory because of conditions at home and abroad.

In August, however, ARAKI evidently decided the time was ripe.

In his interrogatories on February 13th and March 8th of this year, (Exhibit 229, Record 2899-2902), ARAKI stated that since the government in Manchukuo was then in order he thought it best to recognize the independence of Manchukuo while that condition existed and so he agreed first with the Foreign Minister that this should be done and later, at a conference of the Big Three (Foreign, Navy, and Air Ministers), he suggested that Japan exchange ambassadors with Manchuria since it was an independent state.

As a result of these discussions the matter was presented to the Cabinet by the Foreign Minister. This was done in response to the request made by the Kwantung Army. At the same meeting the contents of a treaty to be executed between Japan and Manchuria were discussed. This treaty was subsequently prepared by the Foreign Office but, its terms did not vary from the Cabinet agreement and it was subsequently executed, on or about September 15, 1932, in exactly the form prepared, although prior approval of it by the Privy Council was necessary.

The action of the Privy Council is shown by Exhibit 241 (Record, 2972-2994) which is the minutes of the Privy Council meeting of September 13, 1932. At this meeting, HIRANUMA, Kiichiro, served as Vice-Chairman and as Chairman of the Committee of Judges to report

on the project. ANAXI, Sadao, Minister of War, was also present. Chairman KURATOMI stated the meeting had been called at the request of the Cabinet and that, therefore, the usual procedural steps would be dispensed with and he called directly on HIRANUMA for a report. HIRANUMA outlined the situation in Manchuria resulting in the establishing of Manchukuo on March 1st, and claimed that it was an independent state by virtue of independent action of its citizens, and that, therefore, its recognition by Japan would not only help Manchukuo but would confuse the issue and save Japan from embarrassment before the League of Nations. The question was raised as to whether or not the establishment of Manchukuo was not in violation of the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris, but HIRANUMA explained that he thought it was not, although his explanation was very specious.

The terms of the Protocol and the notes to be exchanged in connection with it as prepared by the Foreign Office were then discussed and agreed to. By the terms of the Protocol, Manchukuo was to respect those International agreements concluded by the Republic of China which were applicable to Manchukuo. Japan and Manchukuo agreed to mutually respect each other's territorial integrity, and all the rights which Japan and her subjects had possessed under various Sino-Japanese arrangements, both public

and private, were to be confirmed and respected by Manchukuo; and further, that the two states agreed to jointly defend themselves against any attack. Four notes had been, or were to be, exchanged between the Regent or Prime Minister of Manchukuo and the Commander of the Kwantung Army. By means of these secret agreements Japan was entrusted with the national defense of Manchukuo and the maintenance of peace within its borders, but the necessary expenses were to be borne by Manchukuo. Manchukuo also agreed that the control of the existing railroads, harbors, water-ways, air routes, etc., as well as construction of new routes as required by the Japanese Army for the purpose of national defense should all be entrusted to Japan. It was also provided that Japanese should be appointed State Councilors and also as officials of the central as well as the local governments. The selection of these officials was to be made upon the recommendation of the Commander of the Kwantung Army and their dismissals were subject to his approval. It was further provided that the agreements referred to above were to be written both in Japanese and Chinese but, in event of any dispute, the Japanese version should control.

Although, by these various agreements, the control of Manchukuo was apparently under the jurisdiction of the Kwantung

Army, the Commander-in-Chief of that army was, of course, subject to orders from the Japanese Government and, that Government continued to exercise that control either by Cabinet action or orders from the Minister of War, showing clearly that the Government of Manchukuo was absolutely under the direct control of the Japanese Government.

This is clearly shown by Exhibit 230 (Record 2903-2911) which consists of a letter from KOISO, Kuniaki, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Vice-Minister of War dated November 3, 1932 and enclosing therewith "An Outline for Guiding Manchukuo" prepared by the staff section of the Kwantung Army, based upon a draft for such a plan prepared by the Second Section of the General Staff Headquarters. This policy provided that Manchukuo should be supported and developed as an independent state but should adapt herself to the Japanese national policy for the purpose of realizing full prosperity and harmony between the two countries. It further provided that the government of Manchukuo in the future should nominally be a constitutional Empire but substantially was to be autocratic, and the participation of the people in the legislature was to be only by those people selected by the Government.

The gist of the plan was that the administration of Manchukuo should be backed for the time being by the inner leadership of the Commander of the Japanese Kwantung Army and carried out by officials of Japanese lineage, although officials of Manchukuoan lineage would outwardly appear to be in charge. When an organ of civilian administration was established it was provided that the commander of the Kwantung Army should be chief of that organ. Economically, there was to be established a "bloc" between Japan and Manchukuo. Diplomatically, her attitude was to be anti-Chinese in principle, although outwardly it was to be one of non-interference. For the time being, Manchukuo was to advocate the Open-Door Policy toward the United States and the Soviet Governments.

Provisions for the adjustment of relations between Japan and Manchukuo were set out in detail; it provided for the joint defense of both countries, that industrially each industry was to be given a suitable locality either in Japan or Manchukuo, with the aim of abolishing mutual customs barriers; it further provided that political parties should not be permitted to exist for sometime to come, and that Japan was to lead the general situation skillfully according to the principle of "let the people follow blindly". Japanese were to occupy key positions and racial struggle was to be

avoided if possible; but, if unavoidable, military power should be used.

Although for international appearances Manchukuo was recognized as an independent state by Japan on September 15, 1932; fundamentally, Japan still exercised complete control and domination. Further evidence of this fact is shown by Exhibit 231 (Record 2919-2924) which shows Japan's plan to control the entire communications system of Manchuria. Her control of newspapers, the press and all media of propaganda will be shown by a later exhibit. The foregoing exhibit records a decision of the Japanese Cabinet on December 9, 1932 concerning matters relating to the telegraph, telephone, and radio enterprises in Manchuria. The Cabinet decided that a treaty relating to the establishment of a Japanese-Manchurian joint enterprise should be negotiated between Ambassador Plenipotentiary MUTO and delegates of the Manchurian Government for the purpose of establishing and operating the wire, wireless telegraph, telephone and broadcasting systems in Manchuria. The details of the proposed treaty were then set forth providing for the financing and operation of the new company and providing that it should be under the control of the military authorities. As usual, there was a secret document to be attached to the treaty which provided "the secret official exchange documents will be prescribed in the secret command relating to the company of both governments". (Record 2922).

Exhibit 232 (Record 2926) shows that the agreement referred to in the above document was actually concluded between the proper parties on March 29, 1933.

Exhibit 233 (record 2926-2932) is a decision of the Japanese Cabinet dated August 8, 1933, and shows a "summary of the guiding policy towards Manchuria".

It will be recalled that Exhibit 241 shows the terms of the treaty and the Protocol executed between Japan and Manchukuo on September 15, 1932, while Exhibit 230 showed the outline for guiding Manchuria as developed by the Kwantung Army. The terms of this latest guiding policy are very similar to and in effect a combination of the other two documents but are given greater official status by the fact that this guiding policy was issued by the Japanese Cabinet, with some elaboration on the items mentioned in the other documents. Essentially, however, the purpose was the same, Japan was to control and dominate the politics, economic life, foreign relations and national defense of Manchukuo in such a manner as to make them harmonize with the aims and desires of the Japanese Government.

That the Japanese continued to exercise direct control over the affairs of Manchuria is clearly disclosed by Exhibit 234 (Record 2933) which is a decision of the Japanese Cabinet made on

December 22, 1933, determining that the Government of Manchukuo should be changed from that of a Regency to that of a Constitutional Monarchy. That decision says in part (Record 2934-2935):

"when preparations are completed, Manchukuo will be directed to enforce the Monarchy."

"I. It must be made clear that the enforcement of Monarchy is not a restoration of the Shin regime, which was an autocracy of followers of the monarch, but the foundation of national constitution of a new Manchukuo, and all causes of hinderances to the development of the Manchurian state affairs and the execution of the national policy must be nullified, especially to contribute to the strengthening and expansion of the Japanese and Manchurian national defense power necessary to overcome the international crisis which we may encounter before long. Accordingly, the enforcement of the Monarchy must act upon the following three essential points."

Point one had to do with changes so that:

"there will be no hindrance or check-up on the development of state affairs of Manchukuo and upon the execution of our national policies."

Point three states in part:

"It shall be kept in mind that though the Monarchy will be carried into effect, there will be no change in the policy or spirit of directing Manchukuo and that there shall be no hinderance whatever to the execution of national policies."

The instrument then provided for an exchange of letters between the two governments and outlined the details for setting up the new Monarchy.

Exhibit 235 is a certificate from the Japanese Foreign Office showing that the notes referred to were actually exchanged between the Japanese Ambassador and the Prime Minister of Manchukuo, on March 1, 1934, the very day the Monarchy was inaugurated.

The next document Exhibit 236, is a record of the Japanese Cabinet decision of March 20, 1934, (Record 2929-2943) and was offered to show that Manchukuo was so much a puppet government of Japan that the Japanese Cabinet determined how the principal industries of Manchukuo should be organized and developed to meet the "demands of the Japanese Empire's national defense".

As will be shown in a few moments by other documents, before 1936 Japan had started to organize other puppet governments in North China and Mongolia, and evidently because she felt sure

of her situation in Manchukuo, and probably with a desire to influence world opinion and particularly to create favorable sentiment in North China and Mongolia, a treaty was prepared by the Japanese for execution with Manchukuo (Exhibit 237, Record 2944-2946) whereby it recites that, actuated by the terms of the Protocol of September 15, 1932, they have decided to abolish by progressive stages Japan's extra-territoriality in Manchukuo, and in return, Japanese subjects were to be free to reside, travel and engage in business in Manchukuo, the same as native Manchurians. As usual, however, there was a supplemental agreement and a secret understanding (Exhibit 238) attached to the treaty which modified the high-sounding phrases in the formal treaty. It was provided that the Japanese should receive reduced rates of taxation which should be one-fourth of the original rates in respect to certain taxes and one-third of the original rates with respect to certain other taxes. By the provisions of the "agreed terms of understanding" certain taxes with reference to the South Manchurian Railway zone could become effective only after consultation with Japanese authorities. During the period before the changes proposed in the treaty became effective, Japanese consuls and other officials retained full power. From what we already know of the set-up of the Manchukuo

Government it is apparent that negotiations were carried on by Japanese nationals representing both governments. What more is needed to create a "puppet government"?

Before the date of the next document, the China Incident of July 7, 1937, had occurred, so the decision of the Japanese Cabinet on October 22, 1937 (Exhibit 239) is important in showing the complete control the Japanese Government exercised over Manchuria and its internal affairs. This document is a Cabinet decision which has to do with the reorganization and expansion of heavy industry in Manchukuo. The extent of Japanese control is indicated in the following paragraph (Record 2963):

"The Manchurian government will invest half the amount, and the other half will be investigated (invested) by the privates. The privates mentioned in the above article is scheduled for the Nissan at present."

Then follows a description of what the new company shall invest in and what it shall control, and limiting the amount of stock which could be sold to foreign investors. Even the Japanese civilian who would manage the company was designated in the cabinet decision.

Now we come to the document referred to above whereby the

Japanese planned to direct and control public opinion in Manchukuo by compelling a unification of all the press and news agencies in Manchukuo and providing for their control by the governments of Japan and Manchukuo and the Manchurian Railway Company.

This is Exhibit 240 (Record 2967-2971) and is a letter dated October 25, 1935, from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Vice-Minister of War, concerning the plans for directing and controlling public opinion in Manchukuo. A Echo Committee had been set up which included most of the leading press and news agencies in Manchukuo. The purposes of the organization are well illustrated by the following (Record, Page 2969):

"5. Propaganda in Manchukuo conducted by this association shall be carried out chiefly by the press offices and propaganda to foreign countries shall be carried out by the news agencies with the help of the press. For the above mentioned object, this association shall decide upon the policy and means for propaganda and convey them to the companies and control their propaganda operations."

The extent of the control exercised is indicated by the following quotation from Paragraph 7 (Record 2970):

"2. The personnel administration of the managing

staff of this association and the news agencies belonging to this association shall be decided upon with the consent of the Koho Committee."

The next three exhibits are important principally to show that the internal affairs of Manchuria were controlled and directed by the Army authorities even as late as November 1940. Exhibit 242 consists of three telegrams exchanged between the Commander of the Kwantung Army and the Vice-Minister of War UMZEO, Yoshijiro, dated November 13, 1937, May 14, 1938, and May 24, 1938, with reference to Manchukuo joining the anti-Comintern Pact already executed by Japan, Germany and Italy. The Kwantung Army asked permission "to make Manchukuo enter" the Pact, and the Vice-Minister of War consented thereto.

Exhibit 243 is a telegram dated December 16, 1940, to the Vice-Minister of War, inquiring about the trade pact between Japan, Manchukuo and China on one side and Germany on the other, and expressed opinions concerning some of the reported provisions.

Exhibit 244 is a telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Vice-Minister of War dated November 5, 1940, regarding the change of the Manchukuo Ambassador to Japan and his appointment as Minister of Communications of Manchukuo, and the reply dated November 8, 1940, agreeing to the proposed changes.

The testimony of the witnesses OKADA, TANAKA and MORISHIMA referred to above summarizes nicely the true position of the Manchukuo Government. Former Premier OKADA testified (Record 1826):

"After the occupation of Manchuria, the Kwantung Army was the real government there, although a so-called independent government was set up in Manchuria in the early part of 1932, whose independence was supposedly recognized by Japan in September of that year. This government was completely dominated and controlled by the Kwantung Army. The government of Japan had no way of learning what the plans and activities of the Kwantung Army were in those years. The army was completely without the control of the Japanese government and remained so up until the Great War in 1941."

General TANAKA testified (Record 1999):

"Inasmuch as the political, economic, and financial affairs of the Manchukuo Government were operated in accordance with Japanese desire with a view to promoting the welfare of the people of Manchuria through the control exercised by the General Affairs Department, which in turn was under the control of the Kwantung Army, which exercised,

as I have said before, internal control over its affairs, it can be concluded that the Kwantung Army exercised control over the government of Manchukuo."

MORISHIMA, Morito, testified (Record 3024):

"Upon the establishment of the puppet government, the Province of Jehol in Inner-Mongolia was declared to be within its sphere of influence. This move proved ineffectual because it did not have the support of the Government nor the people of Jehol. When the Kwantung Army realized this situation, and the continued existence of the exiled Government of Chang-Kuash-Liang in Jehol, the Army proceeded to occupy Jehol and make it a part of the puppet regime by force. This puppet government continued to be dominated and controlled by the Kwantung Army until 1945. Japan officially recognized the independence of this Government in September 1932. This gesture in no wise altered the control and domination of the Government by the Kwantung Army."

If any further proof is needed that the Government of Manchukuo was purely a "puppet government" under the direction and absolute control of Japan and the Kwantung Army, the testimony

of Henry PU-Yi, the puppet Emperor himself, should be conclusive.

Entirely aside from his testimony, however, the record is unequivocal, from the testimony of John Goette, a news reporter, and the secret telegrams that were exchanged between Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA and his consuls general in Tientsin, Shanghai, Dairen and Mukden, as to the means employed to induce PU-Yi to leave Tientsin and go to Manchuria. The skillful, unprincipled and underhanded work of DOKUHARA is revealed in these documents.

General DOKUHARA went to Tientsin in the Fall of 1931, and endeavored to induce Pu-Yi to go to Manchuria; failing to achieve his purpose by purely diplomatic negotiations he resorted to threats and insisted on pursuing his nefarious plans even though he was warned that his actions were objectionable to the Foreign Ministry and would cause Japan to violate various international treaties and agreements. (Exhibit 286, Record 4356-9; Exhibit 287, Record 4360-1; Exhibit 288, Record 4363; Exhibit 289, Record 4364-6; Exhibit 290, Record 4367-9; Exhibit 291, Record 4373-4; Exhibit 292, Record 4375-6; Exhibit 293, Record 4377; Exhibit 300, Record 4394-7).

First, he had a basket of fruit containing a bomb which was evidently not set to explode, sent to Pu-Yi. (Goette's testimony.

Record 3729-30; Exhibit 295, Record 4382; Exhibit 296, Record 4385).

Then, threatening letters were sent to Pu-Yi (Exhibit 296, Record 4385). Next, Dohihara created a riot in Tientsin, which became an insurrection with international repercussions and resulted in the deaths of many innocent persons. (Goette's testimony, Record 3731-2; Exhibit 296, Record 4385; Exhibit 300, Record 4395-7).

The net result was that PU-YI went, or was taken, to Manchuria for alleged safety reasons. (Exhibit 293, Record 4377; Exhibit 294, Record 4379; Exhibit 295, Record 4381-3; Exhibit 297, Record 4387-8).

PU-YI's own testimony was to the effect that after he arrived in Manchuria he was visited by Colonel ITAGAKI on at least two occasions. (Record 3957-3963).

ITAGAKI's persuasive efforts, however, also failed, and he, too, had to resort to threats to obtain PU-YI's acquiescence. (Record 3964; 3967; 3970).

Coupled with these threats were the statements that Japan had absolutely no territorial designs in Manchuria, and many glowing promises as to the nature and status of an independent Manchuria, which evidently influenced PU-YI's advisers. (Record 3950; 3960; 3977).

FU-YI finally yielded to the pressure and agreed to serve first as Regent over a provisional government, even though ITAGAKI's demands were that Japanese officials were to control the Government and the Kwantung Army was to have full power to preserve order and to establish and protect the new boundaries. (Record 3969;3976).

The net result was that, although Chinese and Manchurians were placed in the top positions so that it might appear to the outside world that a truly independent government had been effected, the vice-chairman of every department and the chairman of the General Affairs Board, which exercised all real control, were Japanese. (Record 3986; 3987; 3989; 3994).

A legislative body was provided for but never called into action. (Record 3987; 3991).

All laws and Imperial rescripts were prepared and approved by the Japanese. FU-YI and his Chinese officials were mere rubber stamps. (Record 3977; 3994; 3997; 3999; 4019;).

Even the Religion of the country was changed and the people were compelled to establish Shintoism as the national religion and worship the Japanese Emperor. (Record 4005-4019).

Under the General Affairs Bureau directed by HOSHINO, Naoki, a bureau of monopolies was established with Japanese in charge, which

rigidly controlled opium, cotton, textiles, manufacturing, machinery, mines and foodstuffs. The raising of poppies was increased by government subsidies, and the use of opium and its derivatives by the natives was made easy and encouraged. The Chinese in Manchuria were not allowed to eat the food they raised, nor engage in business without a permit from the Japanese. (Record 4021-4025; 4028-4031).

This situation was well summarized by PU-Yi in his concluding statement under direct examination (Record 4051)

"The State of Manchukuo was not a sovereign state at all. It was under the complete control of Japan. The Manchukuo people, officials and myself, lost freedom completely. Everybody then had the desire to resist Japan, but under that circumstances none could do it."

Evidently satisfied that their control of Manchukuo was now complete the Japanese conspirators continued to carry out their plans for the further disintegration of China and the destruction of the Chinese National Government under Chiang-Kai-shek. The old policy "divide and conquer" was put into effect. The first steps were to set up as nearly autonomous areas as possible in North China whose governments would claim independence from the Chinese National Government and would be pro-Japanese, and later on to consolidate them into one body.

As previously referred to, the Tang-ku truce of May 31, 1933, (Exhibit 193), concluding the occupation of Jehol, provided for a demilitarized area in Northeastern Hopei province, north and east of the important Chinese cities of Peiping and Tientsin. By this truce the Chinese army was withdrawn to the West and South of the demilitarized area and the Japanese agreed to withdraw their troops North of the Great Wall. The maintenance of order in the demilitarized area was entrusted to the Chinese police force, but they were not to employ armed groups which might provoke trouble with the Japanese. General Dohihara and other Japanese diplomats and conspirators tried to take advantage of this situation and set up an autonomous pro-Japanese government in this area, but they were not successful until 1935.

As previously stated, the testimony of John Goette (Record 3745-9) showed that Japanese-controlled Chinese renegade troops were using the demilitarized zone without the Chinese National Government being able to prevent it because it had no military forces there. The Japanese were also bringing military pressure to bear on the Chinese National Government and making continual demands which are hereafter referred to. These demands resulted in the so-called Ho-Ueno Agreement, which, while not formally recognized by the

Chinese National Government, was given effect in the areas involved. The results of this agreement were that the provisional capital of Hopei Province was moved from Tientsin to Paoting, approximately one hundred miles south of Peiping. The troops of General Yu-Kueih-Chun, the provisional governor, were evacuated from Tientsin and the troops of the 32nd Army, under the command of General Shan-Chen were also moved, leaving only the 29th Army in the garrison at Peiping, under the command of General Sung-Che-yuan, who was chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. After this time, General Sung-Che-yuan was subjected to constant and increasing pressure from the Japanese. (See Exhibit 196, discussed later).

Exhibit 210, (Record 2701-2703) an excerpt from Exhibit 192, which is a "Summary of Japanese War Crimes in China from September 18, 1931, to August 1937", prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, discloses the Japanese efforts and states:

"Since 1933, Japan attempted urgently to have Hopei, Chahar, and other provinces in North China under her domination."***

"Therefore, they indulged in persistent conspiracies, attempting to oust the political power of the Chinese National Government from Hopei and Chahar. The Japanese

utilized every opportunity to put up pretexts and difficulties against the Chinese Government."***

"During this period, the Japanese Army and diplomats openly declared that the political structure in North China did not satisfy the wishes of the Japanese. Repeatedly they instigated the local authorities in North China to proclaim autonomy. Being loyal, the local authorities managed to evade all these Japanese proposed plots. The Japanese became so impatient that they finally resorted to underhand measures."

On October 20, 1935, a Chinese traitor in Eastern Hopei province bribed some local ruffians and started a riot on the pretext of demanding autonomy. The riot was settled in a few days but the Japanese, having failed to obtain their objective, induced Ying, Ju-Keng, the Administrative Commissioner of the area, by threats and bribery, to cable the National Government, on November 15, 1935, asking for autonomy.

On November 24, 1935, the "Preparatory Committee for Autonomy in the War Zone" was organized, and on November 25th the Eastern Hopei Anti-Comintern Autonomous Council was set up.

claiming independence from the National Government. The 22 Hsiens, or districts, in the demilitarized zone were forcibly and unlawfully taken over by this puppet organization which then came under Japanese domination. The resources, industries, maritime custom revenues and salt revenues in said zone fell into Japanese hands and it became the base of Japanese operations for the narcotic traffic and smuggling, and a refuge for bandits and traitors.

Exhibit 211, Record 2704, an excerpt from the Japan Year Book for 1937 states:

"Towards the close of November, 1935, an independent government was established with the demilitarized zone as the center, which was named as the East Hopei Anti-Comintern Autonomous Council". ***

"In December, the Committee was renamed as the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government and appointed Mr. Yin as its chairman."

In the other areas of North China a similar program was attempted.

Exhibit 199 (Record 2311-17) is an affidavit covering the direct testimony of General Ching-Teh-chun, Vice-Minister of the Ministry of National Defense of China, which shows that an

almost exactly similar plan was employed by the Japanese in Chahar Province as in Hopei. In June 1935, two Japanese officers and two Japanese soldiers attempted to enter Chahar Province without possessing entry permits. They were detained temporarily by the Chinese guards but finally were permitted to proceed on their way. The Japanese claimed this innocuous incident was an insult to the Japanese Army men, and demanded the punishment of the responsible officers and an apology from the Chinese authorities. The witness testified that he was appointed to negotiate this settlement with HASHIMOTO, the Japanese Consul; but it was soon referred to the headquarters of the Japanese Garrison in Tientsin, which was represented by General Bohihara, and the negotiations were then transferred at Peiping. The results were that the Chinese punished the men in charge of the army unit that had detained the Japanese and removed the units of the 29th Army from Northern Chahar. The Chinese further agreed not to migrate or settle in Northern Chahar, and the activities of the Kuomintang party were completely withdrawn from the province.

"The Chinese Government, in seeking for peace, did not refrain from making compromises one after another, yet the progress of the aggressions by Japanese militarists never

ceased. During the said negotiations, ****it was DOHIRARA, Kenji, who actually controlled the whole thing." (Record 2313-2314).

The witness further stated that beginning in September, 1935, the Japanese sent Dohihara to Peiping many times to instigate movements to form a North China Autonomous Government, and to estrange the local government from the Central Government. General Dohihara wanted to install General SUNG Che-Yuan as leader of the new autonomous government and promised that the Japanese would extend every possible aid in military and economic affairs. The Chinese refused to fall into the Japanese trap and, as a counter measure, established the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, with General SUNG Che-Yuan as Chairman. This council was to be in charge of military and political affairs in the two provinces of Hopei and Chahar and in the cities of Peiping and Tientsin.

Dohihara continued his inducement tactics, endeavoring to get General SUNG Che-Yuan to become the leader of the North China Autonomous Government, but was unsuccessful. He was joined in his efforts by MATSUI, then Chief of the Japanese Special Service Board in Peiping. They demanded the construction of a railway

between Tientsin and Shih-Chia-Chuan, and that the custom tariffs at Tientsin be revised in favor of the Japanese and against European and American commodities.

MATSUI, Iwane, also went to Peiping in the Autumn of 1935, and attempted to establish a branch of the Greater Asia Association. He advocated to the witness that Asia should be for the Asiatics and American and European influences should be expelled. General Sung-Che-Yuan, however, refused to be swayed and would not betray the Chinese National Government although he was compelled by force of arms to make certain unpleasant concessions.

That each step taken by the Japanese was part of a well coordinated plan prepared in advance by the conspirators on trial here is evidenced by Exhibit 197 (Record 2283-2284), which consisted of two cablegrams sent on October 2, 1935, by the Secretary General of the Japanese Embassy in Peiping to Foreign Minister HIROTA, Koki, one of the accused in this case. These cablegrams say in part:

"My observations of the recent situation in this area lead me to believe that the Army is intending to organize a combined self-government (practically an Independent State) out of the five provinces of North China free from the domination of the Nanking Government for the sake of national

defence and of forming an economic bloc of Japan, Manchuria and North China, and ultimately for the sake of politics, finance and economy."

"Cable 331:2, first paragraph. "In addition to the aforesaid, the Japanese Forces' Mongolian policy is making steady progress at I and the Consul at Changchiakou repeatedly reported to you. The other day Maj. Gen. DOIHARA made a trip from Chiangchiakou to Chengte and back and saw the Governor of Chahar Province and Prince Te; his mission was no doubt to promote the Inner-Mongolian self-government. The Okura Gumi recently set up a subsidiary company, Tameng Co. (with its head office at Heinching, and with Tuelun and Changchiakou as the centres of its activity) for the purpose of economic development in Inner Mongolia at the request of the Japanese Army. It is merely a help to the above policy.

"As stated above, the Japanese Army's farsighted scheme is under steady progress."

Again referring to Exhibit 211 (Record 2704), it states that the Kuomintang Government was disturbed by the establishment of the East Hopei Anti-Comintern Autonomous Council, and

sent General Ho Ying-Ch'iu into the Northern area to handle the situation. As a result of his investigation he set up the Hopen-Chahar Political Council as an organ to manage the administration of North China. General Sung Cheh-yuan was appointed chairman and assumed office on December 18, 1935. This was a new political organization and was to control the two provinces of Hopen and Chahar, while the province of Shantung was to be governed by General Han Fu-chu and the provinces of Suiyuan and Shansi by General Yen Hsi-shan.

Thus these five northern provinces were placed under the control of men the Japanese thought they could control, or at least, negotiate with satisfactorily. They were partly right.

The next exhibit discloses the fact that the unusual demands made in Hopen province were repeated in Chahar province. Exhibit 196 (Record 2279) was not read into the Record but is another excerpt from the "Summary of Japanese War Crimes in China prepared by the Minister of Public Affairs of the Republic of China". This document discloses that the Japanese, acting both directly and through the Manchukuo government, demanded that the six hsien, or districts, around Kalgan be guarded by the Mongolian Pacification

Corps, rather than by the Chinese Pacification Corps. This demand was refused by the Chinese and an incident was created at Chang-Pei. Claiming in November, 1935, that the Jehol border was in danger, the Japanese, on December 8, 1935, led three armies, consisting of Japanese, Manchukuoans and three thousand from the Mongolian Pacification Corps, into Chahar. Chinese troops were badly outnumbered, four of the provinces were overrun within a few days. Thus another Japanese demand that friendly troops should control the border districts was granted because of the use of force.

To understand these moves, an examination of the map, Exhibit #220-A is necessary. This shows Chahar is a province of Inner Mongolia which completely borders Jehol on the West while Hopei borders it on the South.

According to the further testimony of John Goette (Record 3750) the same tactics as were employed in Manchuria were used in North China. In November, 1935, when all this additional pressure was being brought to bear on General Sung Cha-Tuan, Governor of the Hopei-Chahar regime, the Japanese sent motor cars speeding about the main streets of Peiping, throwing out handbills containing an

alleged appeal from the peoples of the five Northern provinces to secure autonomy from the National Government of China. At the same time Japanese airplanes passed over the city dropping similar pamphlets.

These five provinces constituted an important area, not only strategically but politically and economically, as it involved some six hundred thousand square miles of Chinese territory with a population of 170,000,000 Chinese.

While General Sung Che-Yuan did not yield directly to this pressure, the Japanese did create, and the General had to accept, the puppet regime known as the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government, with its capitol at Tung-Chan, only fifteen miles East of Peiping, heretofore discussed, and the infiltration of Japanese influences in Chahar province disclosed by Exhibit 196.

That the events heretofore related and the action taken in North China, as well as the invasion of China Proper, beginning on July 7, 1937, were all part of a carefully worked out plan or conspiracy of aggression as charged against these accused in the indictment, is clearly shown by the following Japanese documents beginning with Exhibit 195 (Record 2277-2279), which is a letter from the Chief of Staff NISHIO, of the Kwantung Army, dated

December 9, 1935, to FURUSHO, Vice Minister of War. This letter contained the "Kwantung Army's Propaganda Plan Which Shall Be Carried Out in Parallel with its Military Activity in North China".

That the invasion of China Proper was then planned is shown by the following quotation (Record 2377-2278):

"I. General Principle. We start our propaganda to convince the whole world of our lawfulness, as soon as the advancement of the Kwantung Army into China Proper takes place".

"II. The program of propaganda. Paragraph 5. It must be made clear that when we do dispatch our military force to China sometime in the future, we do it for the purpose of punishing the Chinese military clique, and not the Chinese people at large."

"III. Execution program."***

"2. Prior to the advance of our military forces into China Proper, this propaganda shall be launched, chiefly to support from the side, the propaganda of the Japanese government and the Japanese forces stationed in China. After the advance of our forces into China proper, it shall be performed so as to facilitate our military activities."

This exhibit further shows that this plan of propaganda was to be carried out by Army personnel and that a Propaganda section would be dispatched directly from the army, if necessary.

That the Kwantung Army's plan was evidently adopted by the General Staff at headquarters in Tokyo, and instructions issued to the commanders of the Japanese forces in China not under the control of the Kwantung Army, is disclosed by Exhibit 215 (Record 2721-2726). This exhibit was found in the Japanese Foreign Ministry files and was a confidential dispatch from Foreign Minister HIROTA to Ambassador Ariyoshi in China. The Dispatch contained a copy of "The gist of plans for dealing with North China", prepared by the Army Department under date of January 13, 1936. Here the Army stated that the Chinese people in North China were to be aided in setting up a government independent from the Chinese Central Government, and it was stated "we are determined to give support and guidance to the new political organization and thus expand and strengthen its functions." The plans provided for establishing self-government in the five provinces and carefully discussed the manner in which the guidance was to be given so as to arouse as little foreign opposition as possible. An endeavor to increase

the independence of the Hopei-Chahar regime was discussed and the plans for Inner Mongolia were not to interfere with this. It was further stated that a provisional organization would be established in Peiping under the supervision of the Commander of the Japanese troops in China, which would probably be similar to the Self-Governing Guiding Board used in Manchuria.

The next exhibit is important because it shows that the policy of the conspirators was no longer dictated by the army members alone, and it was extended to cover the USSR, Britain, America and the South Seas. Exhibit 315 (Record 2727-2728) is an official statement of the "Basic Principle of National Policy 7 August, 1936" determined by Prime Minister HIROTA, Koki; Foreign Minister ARITA, Kichiro; Finance Minister BABA, Riichi; War Minister TERAUCHI, Hisaichi; and Navy Minister HAGANO, Osami. This document states in part:

"In view of the situation in and out of the Empire, the fundamental national policy to be established by the Empire is to secure the position of the Empire on the East Asia Continent by dint of diplomatic policy and national defense, mutually dependent on each other, as well as to advance and develop the Empire toward the South Seas. The basic principles are as follows:" ****

"3. The fundamental principles of our continental policy are as follows: a sound development and accomplishment of Manchukuo; intensification of national defense of Japan and Manchukuo in order to eradicate the Soviet menace in the north and at the same time to prepare against Britain and America; and realization of a close cooperation among Japan, Manchukuo and China for our economic development. In carrying out these policies, we should be careful to have friendly relations with other countries."

Exhibit 217 (Record, 2728, 2740-2743) is dated August 11, 1936, only four days after the preceding document, and is entitled "The Second Administrative Policy toward North China". This document is evidently merely an elaboration of the principles outlined in Exhibit 216, and was undoubtedly the document intended for distribution to the persons and departments who would apply the policies outlined. Great stress is laid upon the need for so conducting the Japanese operations as not to arouse the suspicion and opposition of either the Chinese Central Government or other foreign powers, but the ultimate object was the same. This document outlines in detail the policy of guidance to be employed in each of the five provinces in North China and the East Hopeh Autonomy

Government. Not all of this document was read into the record, but there was attached to it a supplement which dealt with the policy to be pursued regarding:

1. Custom tariff.
2. Financial policy.
3. Central power of tax imposition.
4. Transportation and communication.

It also went into such details as the policy of dealing with resources of North China necessary to the national defense of Japan.

Exhibit 218 (Record 2745-2748) dated February 20, 1937, is entitled "The Third Administrative Policy Toward North China". This document is important for two reasons. First, it was issued by the officials of the Hayashi Cabinet, which came into power February 2, 1937, and was composed entirely of new members. Second, because "the foreign powers think we are aggressive in China", it was decided to work less openly and with less show of force. Stress was laid upon more use of friendly diplomatic and commercial negotiations and less use of military coercion.

The object in view, however, was

"to complete our aim of making Manchukuo quite pro-

Japanese and pro-anti-comintern, procuring defense materials, enforcing transportation, preparing the defense against U. S. S. R., and establishing the concert between Japan, Manchukuo and China.

2. To complete the above object, we do our best for the economic policy in North China, aid in secret the government of North China and make the Nanking Government recognize the speciality of North China and aid the concert between, Japan, Manchukuo and China.

Exhibit 219 (Record 2748-2750), dated April 16, 1937, and entitled "Plans for Guiding North China", was decided by the Foreign, Finance, War and Navy Ministers of the Hayashi Cabinet, and indicates an extension of the plans, applied to Manchukuo only in the February statement, to the entire area of North China. It also indicates an intention to try to make the Nanking regime recognize the special position of North China and to voluntarily cooperate in developing the policies of Sino-Manchu- Japanese unity and mutual aid.

Stress is again laid upon the need for so conducting Japanese guidance and cooperation as to allay foreign fears that

Japan intends to set up an independent regime in North China, or extend the frontiers of Manchukuo. Great effort was to be exerted in building up a spirit of friendly cooperation with Japan, and by so guiding the governments of the various provinces, that conditions would be improved for the Chinese people and joint commercial ventures between the Chinese and Japanese and other foreigners would be encouraged.

This was a more moderate plan than pursued before, which evidently did not meet with the approval of the conspirators on trial in this case, because the Hayashi Cabinet fell on June 3, 1937, and was succeeded by the first KONOYE Cabinet and the China Incident of July 7, 1937.

The testimony of General Tanaka (Record 2024-2042), again furnishes an illuminating summary of the Japanese plans and accomplishments in North China. Once again he was peculiarly fitted to testify on this subject, because as a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, he handled all telegraphic messages and official papers relating to the autonomous movement besides making a personal trip to Inner Mongolia.

According to his testimony, General Dohihara was sent to Peiping in September 1935, to help develop the independent movement in North China. The movement, however, began seriously in April 1935,

when an attempt was made to create an autonomous regime in Mongolia, and another one among the five North China provinces. He stated the Japanese had two objects in establishing the Inner Mongolian autonomous regime. One was to stop the infiltration of Outer Mongolian influence which was under Soviet control, and the other was to set up an independent state.

The purpose of creating an autonomous regime in North China of the five provinces of Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar and Suiyuan was to separate these provinces from the Nanking regime, and thus weaken the Chinese central government; bring this area into close relationship with Manchukuo under Japanese leadership and thus create a buffer state between China proper and Manchukuo.

This autonomous movement in North China made great headway after the conclusion of the Ho-Umezo treaty in June 1935. The Japanese Army stationed in North China was charged with the responsibility of handling the movement in that area, while the Kwantung army had charge of the movement in the demilitarized zone of East Hopei and in Inner Mongolia.

It is important to note that General Dohihara was sent to Peiping by the order of the then Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army, MIYANI, Jiro, and also that the Ho-Umezo agreement

was negotiated on the part of the Japanese by Unzoo, Youshijiro, another one of the accused; and further "as a result of the great efforts made by Maj. Gen. Dohihara, two regimes were established in North China in November 1935". (Record 2029). One of these regimes was the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Regime with Yin Ju-kang as the central figure, and was completely separated from the Nanking Government, and the other regime was known as the Hopei-Chahar, with General Sung Cheb-Yuan as the leader, but this government was not completely separated from the Nanking Government, although it stood for close collaboration with Japan. Japanese military and economic advisers were assigned to these two regimes, especially the first one.

According to General Tanaka, the starting point of the Mongolian independent government was in March 1933, when he claimed an Inner Mongolian autonomous government was set up in Suiyuan province under an agreement with General Chiang-Kai-shek. He claimed that the Nanking Government did not support this autonomous council economically, as it had promised, and, furthermore, the Governor of Suiyuan province was not in favor of it and endeavored to stop it.

Prince Teh, however, favored this movement as he hoped to

ultimately include in the new state both Inner and Outer Mongolia. General Tanaka stated that on orders of MIKAMI, Jiro, he went with Colonel ISHIMOTO to see Prince Teh personally. The purpose of the trip was to form a close relationship between this autonomous government and Japan, with Prince Teh as the central figure, and ultimately to establish an independent government in line with the Kwantung army's anti-Soviet policies. At first, Prince Teh would not agree to cooperate, but in 1935, he visited General Mikami and promised close cooperation, upon the Kwantung army giving him financial assistance.

General Tanaka further testified that an agreement was reached between General Dohihara and General Chin Teh-chun of the Hopei-Chahar regime that Chahar should be under the control of Prince Teh, and on February 11, 1936, Prince Teh transferred the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Council from Pai-ling-miao to his own capitol of West Sunito. In June of 1936, the council was transferred to Teh-Hua, where Prince Teh secretly established an independent Mongolian government, and in July concluded an agreement with Manchukuo whereby each agreed to give the other political and economical aid. General MIKAMI and Colonel ITAGAKI were earnest supporters of this plan.

The economic aggression in Manchuria followed the military aggression, and was made an integral part of the conspirators' plans for strengthening and supplying the Japanese forces in their continued aggression. Some phases of this aggression were introduced by Mr. Darcey and his associates in presenting the Manchurian phase of the indictment, and these documents were supplemented by Mr. Hauxhurst when he presented the entire phase of Japan's economic aggression in China. These documents show clearly that from the very beginning the Japanese planned a permanent economic control of this area.

Exhibit 436A (Record 5014-5015) and Exhibit 437A (Record 5015-5017) were the organic laws of Manchukuo under the Regency and the Emperor, respectively, and showed clearly the puppet nature of the Manchukuo regime, because, while a legislative body was provided for, none was ever called into being, and the Japanese were able to promulgate laws and ordinances as they wished.

Exhibit 438 (Record 5018-5020) was the ordinance and agreement between Manchukuo and Japan providing for the establishment of the Manchuria Development Company under the joint control of the two governments and their nationals. This organization was

to promote emigration to Manchukuo and to develop its lands.

Exhibit 439 (Record 5021-5028) was the Charter of the South Manchurian Railway and the ordinance creating it of June 7, 1906, as amended.

Exhibit 440 (Record 5034-5035) was the Protocol between Japan and Manchukuo of September 15, 1932, the terms of which were discussed and explained in Exhibit 241 (Record 2972-2994).

Exhibit 441 (Record 5036-5037) was the 4th report of progress in Manchuria as issued by the South Manchuria Railway, which showed that upon the establishment of the State Railway System, the South Manchuria Railway Company took over the operation of all the railways in Manchuria.

Exhibit 442 (Record 5038-5041) was an excerpt from "The Economic Construction Program of Manchukuo" of March 1, 1933, and was offered to show that at that early date an economic construction plan for Manchuria had been prepared to strengthen Japanese economy.

Exhibit 443A (Record 5042-5047) shows the purchase from the U. S. S. R., of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Manchukuo government and the guarantee by the Japanese government of the payment price and completion of the contract. This guarantee was signed by HIROTA, Koki, as Foreign Minister.

Exhibit 444 (Record 5048-5051) was an excerpt from the "Manchukuo Government Bulletin for May 1937". It showed ordinance No. 66 was passed for the purpose of giving the government control of all important industries.

Exhibit 445 (Record 5052-5069) was the "Official Report of Manchukuo Government No. 866", issued February 17, 1937, and was a statement of the first five years of the administration of the Manchukuo government, together with an outline of a proposed five-year plan for the future. This document showed the Manchukuo government under Japanese domination had control and planned to control the development of important industries in Manchukuo, with the object in view of correlating them to the national defense plans of Japan.

Exhibit 446 (Record 5069-5098) was the actual five-year plan as promulgated, together with subsequent amendments in 1938 increasing the production schedule and all items concerned either directly or indirectly with military armament. The need for this subservience of Manchukuo industry to the Japanese war machine was stressed throughout the entire plan.

Exhibit 447 (Record 5099-5101) was an excerpt from the Japanese

Year Book of 1941-1942, and shows the result of the fourth year under the five-year plan in Manchukuo, and states that a second five-year plan was under consideration. This report shows that the plan had been successful in increasing both industrial and agricultural products, also that the emigration into Manchuria had been substantial. Japan contributed fifty-five per cent of the capital required for these improvements.

Exhibit 449 (Record 5104-5105) was an article which appeared in the Tokyo Gazette June 1939, entitled "Progress of Economic Construction in Manchukuo". It showed that a comprehensive plan for the expansion of productive power throughout Japan, Manchukuo and North China was considered.

Exhibit 450 (Record 5205-5110) was an excerpt from the Tokyo Gazette for November 1941, entitled "Ten Years of the New State". This article was issued by the Board of Information and stated that Japan was short on coal and iron but that Manchukuo was able to supply the deficiency, and increased enormously her production of light metals and agricultural products, also an extensive electrical power system was developed and many additions were planned. The national budget increased from ¥110,000,000 in 1932 to ¥2,500,000,000 in 1941; tax revenue increased in the same

period from ¥99,000,000 to ¥377,000,000, and the custom revenue from ¥52,350,000 to ¥172,000,000. Japanese investments increased from ¥1,750,000,000 in 1932 to ¥6,000,000,000⁰⁰⁰ in 1941, while bank deposits increased from ¥271,000,000 to ¥1,710,000,000.

Exhibit 451 (Record 5112-5114) was an Imperial Ordinance issued December 26, 1934, establishing the Manchurian Affairs Board, and placing this board under jurisdiction of the Japanese Premier. It supervised and directed all affairs in Manchukuo except the military.

Exhibit 452A (Record 5114-5116) was an excerpt from the "Sixth Report of the Progress in Manchuria", and dealt with "Reorganization of Japanese Jurisdiction". It showed how in the beginning the commander of the Kwantung Army was the Governor of the leased territory and the Ambassador to Manchukuo, and then showed the various changes resulting from the Japanese surrendering extra-territoriality in Manchukuo. General MIYAMI, Jiro, became the first joint Ambassador and Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army.

Exhibit 453A (Record 5119-5182) consisted of excerpts from the interrogatories of the accused HOSHINO, Naoki, showing that he went to Manchuria in 1932, to serve on the General Affairs Board. It dealt with the Board's jurisdiction and connection with the Army and showed that this Board was the most powerful civil unit in the Manchukuo government. General MIYAMI, Jiro and Col. ISAGAKI were among the officers of the Kwantung Army with whom Hoshino had to deal.

Respectfully submitted,

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